



HUMAN SECURITY

SPECIFICS AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR UKRAINE

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HUMAN SECURITY: SPECIFICS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR UKRAINE, KYIV, 2021

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1 Tatiana Malyarenko receives funding from the Jean Monnet Program of the European Union

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ABBREVIATIONS

ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
GCA	government-controlled areas
IDPs	internally displaced people
KIIS	Kyiv International Institute of Sociology
LGBT	lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
NGGA	non-government-controlled areas
NSDC	National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN	United Nations

INTRODUCTION

Reconceptualizing security demonstrates a steady shift towards recognizing people and communities as the center of attention. The approach does not contradict the, until recently, widespread concept of national security, which focuses on protecting states from external threats. On the contrary, it strengthens and specifies it. Switching attention to human and community security allows us to look both deliberately and holistically at the problems and challenges facing modern humanity, which directly threaten its existence. Pandemics, climate change, social injustice, and physical violence are just a few challenges that the world faces daily. Most of these threats have crossed national borders already long ago, manifesting themselves differently in different regions and political landscapes. Therefore, human security allows us to balance humanity's contextual and comprehensive problems. Shifting attention to people and communities helps to expand the circle of security stakeholders who can actively contribute to change. In this way, not only states, but also many international and national organizations, associations, and local communities are involved in the process of determining our future, as well as its desired features and ways of achieving it that are acceptable to everyone.

In a situation where a wider range of participants is involved in building a secure society, many communities whose opinions and problems have not been presented before are given a voice and the right to speak out. An active declaration of problems leads to re-establishing thresholds that humanity has no right to cross in its quest for security, safety, and stability. Security is about respect and interaction in the community, physical security and fair justice, economic and health security, the cities and the environment in which we live, and much more. No matter how we define human security, we are talking about the protection of the whole set of human rights and freedoms, as well as about the governance mechanisms that create all the conditions for such protection.

Changes are only possible if we work together. In this paper, we give the floor to professionals who work with various aspects of human security, such as political security, personal and community security, law enforcement, and urban and climate policy. By bringing together expertise from different areas, it is important for us to emphasize the multi-dimensional nature of security and the interaction of different areas for a safer and fairer living environment.

This publication includes five policy papers on various aspects of human security. Focusing on modern Ukrainian society allows us to raise the question of compliance and/or non-compliance with modern international concepts of human security,

to show the existing gaps, and to highlight the problems and processes at the country level, taking into account its local specifics, internal political context, and society overall. This approach allows us to identify key “pain points” and suggest possible formulas and mechanisms for solving the problems on the way to building a society whose members are confident in protecting their rights and freedoms and, most importantly, are actively shaping their future.

Discussion of the concept of human security becomes more and more relevant these days, attracting attention not only in the international arena but also in Ukraine. We hope that this publication will serve as another impetus to intensify the discussion on human security in Ukraine. The collected opinions and recommendations will be useful for developing evidence-based decisions and policies, which, in turn, will contribute to the security and well-being of citizens.

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POLITICAL SECURITY AND SECURITY STRATEGY OF UKRAINE: Institutions and Policies in a European Perspective

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Abstract

The paper considers the key trends in the development of institutions and factors affecting Ukraine's political security from the "human security" perspective. Political security, by definition, establishes a link between contradictions among the country's social groups, the state's ability to settle disputes and balance interests, and state security. The main research question of this analysis is the effectiveness and efficiency of the Ukrainian state's efforts to ensure civil and political human rights; that is, the extent to which the state's efforts aim at expanding rather than narrowing civil and political rights and freedoms, reducing rather than deepening discrimination, and expanding rather than narrowing human development opportunities. The study relies on an analysis of legislation regulating political security in terms of human security in general and analysis of legislation application taking into account the role of non-state actors (civil society, media, and political parties) in shaping political security or danger.

¹ Tatiana Malyarenko receives funding from the Jean Monnet Program of the European Union.

Introduction

This paper analyzes Ukraine's political security from the "human security" perspective. In contrast to the "state security" approach (synonymous with "national security"), within the chosen approach, the object is a person rather than a state and, therefore, protecting individual rights and interests is of paramount importance. This perspective is based on a narrow definition of "human security" as "freedom from fear."²

According to the concept of "human security" developed by the United Nations (UN), political security is viewed as a state of human protection from state repressions and structural violence embedded in public institutions, and as a state's capacity to ensure civil and political human rights, in particular the rights to freedom of speech and assembly, people's participation in the management of state affairs, and the population's protection from political and social discrimination.³ Within the "human security" concept, political security establishes a link between a) contradictions among the country's social groups, b) the state's ability to balance interests and settle disputes, and c) state security. A state's institutional weakness is a factor of social conflicts that causes danger to both people and the state.⁴

Brief Overview of the Context and Formulation of the Problem

Academic use of the "human security" concept started in the late 1980s, due to the **expansion** and **deepening** of security understanding (the Copenhagen School of Security Studies). The first definition of "human security" suggested by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) extended the traditional understanding of security as "state security" in several ways, as a result of which the *"referent object was shifted from nation-states to that of 'people,' and to be 'people-centered'*

2 Taylor Owen, "Human Security — Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 373–87, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010604047555>; Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "In Defense of the Broad View of Human Security," in *Routledge Handbook of Human Security*, eds. Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, 43–57 (New York: Routledge, 2014).

3 Human Security on Theory and Practice. Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (New York: Human Security Unit, UN, 2009), <https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/Human%20Security%20Tools/Human%20Security%20in%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20English.pdf>, 6, 16, 18.

4 Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Elise Egan et al., *Good Governance: Preventing Conflict and Building Peace* (Washington, DC: Mercy Corps, 2019), https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/GoodGovernance_PreventingConflictBuildingPeace_ResearchBrief1.pdf; Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Consequences," in *State Weakness and State Failure in a Time of Terror*, 1–25 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), 4.

was to be 'concerned with how people live [...] This implied a radical widening of the types of threats and sectors.'⁵ The subject of the "human security" approach is individual rights and freedoms, and the goal is to protect people from "traditional" and "non-traditional" threats.⁶ During the 1990s and early 2000s, the concept of "human security" was institutionalized through several international initiatives. At the supranational level, the UN played a key role in defining and implementing the "human security" approach. At the national level, the approach was implemented by the governments of Canada and Japan, which established the Human Security Network. The European Union's security strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*,⁷ adopted in 2003, relied on "human security" provisions that were further developed in the program document *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*.⁸

However, both "human security" provisions and the possibility of implementing them within security management at the national and international levels remain rather controversial. Moreover, the European Union's security strategies adopted in 2016 (*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*⁹) and 2020 (*EU Security Union Strategy*¹⁰) demonstrate a significant focus on protection against traditional threats and addressing primarily the European Union's own issues (such as protecting borders, developing innovative industries in competition with the United States and China, and protecting against terrorist and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure). In contrast to previous strategies aimed at creating a secure environment outside the EU, "resilience," namely the ability of European institutions and society to withstand external threats, is at the core of the current European Union security strategy.

Since 1991, Ukraine's security policy has mainly focused on the political and military aspects of security — the country's political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Though security understanding has been **expanded** by research on economic, social,

5 Barry Buzan and Hansen Lene, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2009), 203.

6 Catia Gregoratti, "Human Security," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, December 14, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/human-security>.

7 *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy* (Brussels, December 12, 2003), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/78367.pdf.

8 Ulrich Albrecht et al., *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities* (Barcelona, September 15, 2004), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40209/1/A_human_security_doctrine_for_Europe%28author%29.pdf.

9 *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, European External Action Service, June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

10 *EU Security Union Strategy*, European Commission (Brussels, July 24, 2020), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1596452256370&uri=CELEX:52020DC0605>.

energy, and information security, national interests are dominant in the system of security actors' interests. State security priority gained additional justification with the outbreak of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia. This analysis takes into account that Ukraine has been in a state of undeclared war for seven years and a joint forces operation is being carried out in the east of the country. Even in democracies with developed institutions, in a state of war, state policy priority shifts from the protection of individual security to the protection of national security.

The main research question of this analysis is the effectiveness and efficiency of the Ukrainian state's efforts to ensure civil and political human rights; that is, the extent to which the state's efforts aim at expanding rather than narrowing civil and political rights and freedoms, reducing rather than deepening discrimination, and expanding rather than narrowing human development opportunities. The study relies on an analysis of legislation regulating political security in terms of human security and analysis of legislation application taking into account the role of non-state actors (civil society, media, and political parties) in shaping political security or danger.

The first step of the study is an analysis of integrated indicators that assess state institutions' capacity to manage tensions *between identity groups defined by language, religion, [...] ethnicity, nationality, class, [...] or area of origin*,¹¹ and *people's access to political rights*.¹²

The dynamics of integrated indicators demonstrates a wave of increasing political danger during 2014–2015 due to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and waves of declining political danger (2011–2013 and 2016–2020), but in general, Ukraine neither worsened nor improved its position in the rankings over the past ten years. Freedom House and the Fund for Peace¹³ assessments show that Ukrainian state institutions affecting political security are still weak; most democratic reforms are conducted under pressure from Ukraine's international partners; elites demonstrate a lack of strategic vision and opportunism; and the majority of the population are insufficiently aware of their rights and protection mechanisms and are not ready

11 "Methodology," Fragile States Index, accessed November 23, 2021, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/>.

12 "Countries and Territories. Global Freedom Scores," Freedom House, 2021 <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores>.

13 "County Dashboard: Ukraine," Fragile State Index, accessed November 23, 2021, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>.

to protect their interests.¹⁴ Herewith, opinion polls reveal some improvements in the perception of human rights changes in Ukraine. For instance, compared to 2018, in 2020 the share of respondents who believed that the human rights situation had changed for the better (3.5% and 5.0%, respectively) and remained unchanged (28.7% and 37.5%, respectively) increased while the share of those indicating the situation had deteriorated decreased (from 33.8% to 28.5%).¹⁵ Ukrainian experts' surveys on the anniversary of Ukraine's independence also summarized political security achievements, including preserving the state's independence and political sovereignty in the armed conflict (the Ukrainian state has proved its viability and ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity), maintaining the course towards European integration, and human and civil rights and freedoms and mechanisms for protecting human rights enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine; strong and effective powers of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, who has the right to apply to the Constitutional Court with relevant constitutional submissions; and strong effective powers of the Constitutional Court.¹⁶ Decentralization reform strengthens the powers of local communities and can help prevent and resolve conflicts at the local level.¹⁷

Since 2014, three competing driving forces have determined Ukraine's political security: (1) democratic reforming of public administration under pressure from international partners and part of civil society; (2) the opportunistic behavior of Ukrainian elites restricting human rights and using the state apparatus for unfair political competition; and (3) an objective conflict between national security interests and human rights in the armed conflict.

In Ukraine, the Russian Federation's armed aggression and the need to counter it are the main arguments for national security dominance over human rights in public

14 See also the speech of the Commissioner for Human Rights, who noted that monitoring visits systematically reveal violations of equal rights to access to social protection, medical care, and free choice of residence, but citizens are barely aware of their rights and protection mechanisms: «Уповноважений ВРУ з прав людини взяла участь у всеукраїнському онлайн-обговоренні проекту нової редакції Закону України «Про національні меншини в Україні», Уповноважений Верховної Ради України з прав людини, 4 червня 2021, <https://ombudsman.gov.ua/ua/all-news/pr/onlajn-obgovorenn%D1%96-proektu-novo%D1%97-redakcz%D1%96%D1%97-zakonu-ukra%D1%97ni-pro-nacz%D1%96onaln%D1%96-menshini-v-ukra%D1%97n%D1%96/>.

15 Human Rights Observance in Ukraine, UNDP Ukraine, December 10, 2020, https://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/library/democratic_governance/what-ukrainians-know-and-think-about-human-rights--assessment-of.html?fbclid=IwAR0-Bp7wEvAnXgP4IV13Yrgt6BiAvcV_aE3AVHXhCfBTyLHgwL1idvJDfxI.

16 Ксенія Лазоренко, «Річниця незалежності України: найбільші успіхи та поразки країни за останні 30 років», Економічні новини, 23 серпня 2021, <https://enovosty.com/uk/society-ukr/full/2308-richnicya-nezalezhnosti-ukraini-najbilshi-uspixi-ta-porazki-kraini-za-ostanni-30-rokiv>; Ю. Якименко та ін., Україна: 30 років на європейському шляху (Київ: Заповіт, 2021), <https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/2021-nezalezhnist-30.pdf>.

17 Tetyana Malyarenko and Wolff Stefan, «Decentralization Reloaded in Ukraine: Opportunities and Challenges for its Latest Government Reform Project», PONARS Eurasia, February 24, 2021, <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/decentralization-reloaded-in-ukraine-opportunities-and-challenges-for-its-latest-local-government-reform-project/>.

policy. Conceptual documents defining the security policy of Ukraine¹⁸ determine the state policy priorities as protecting the country's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political system.

However, despite the objective need to concentrate government and society efforts to resist the aggressor, strengthening of directive management methods increases the risk of abuse. For example, national and international organizations have criticized shifting the decision-making center from the parliament to the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) (which negatively affects the democratic discussion of decisions taken) and the NSDC using a sanctions mechanism against Ukrainian citizens. In particular, according to a joint statement by Ukrainian human rights organizations, applying sanctions "*undermines the fundamental principles of law.*"¹⁹ International human rights organizations are concerned with the threats to freedom of speech and information dissemination in Ukraine posed by personal sanctions.²⁰

Under centralized power, representatives of socially important professions (such as journalists, human rights activists, artists); national, religious, and linguistic minorities; and representatives of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community are at risk. On the one hand, the principles of non-discrimination are defined by Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine.²¹ In the context of Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU, Law #5207-VI "On Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine" was adopted.²²

18 Стратегія воєнної безпеки України, Указ Президента України від 25.03.2021 №121/2021, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1212021-37661>; Стратегія громадської безпеки та цивільного захисту, Міністерство внутрішніх справ України, 2021, <https://mvs.gov.ua/uk/ministry/normativna-baza-mvs/proekti-normativnix-aktiv/strategiya-gromadskoyi-bezpeki-ta-civilnogo-zaxistu-ukrayini-zatverdzeno-vid-29062021>; Стратегія національної безпеки, Указ Президента України від 14.09.2020, №392/2020, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/392/2020#Text>.

19 «Є ознаки узурпації влади: заява правозахисних організацій щодо санкцій проти громадян України», Харківська правозахисна група, 6 квітня 2021, <https://khpgr.org/1608808961>.

20 "Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression," Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 21, 2021, <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26403>; "Ukraine: Freedom House President Sends Letter to Biden Ahead to Zelenskyy Visit," Freedom House, August 26, 2021, <https://freedomhouse.org/article/ukraine-freedom-house-president-sends-letter-biden-ahead-zelenskyy-visit>.

21 Конституція України, Документ 254к/96-ВР, редакція від 01.01.2020, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text>.

22 Про засади запобігання та протидії дискримінації в Україні, Закон України, 5207-VI, редакція від 30.05.2014, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5207-17#Text>.

Moreover, on March 24, 2021, the National Strategy for Human Rights (Presidential Decree #119/2021)²³ was adopted to improve anti-discrimination legislation, legislation governing the freedom of speech and freedom of peaceful assembly, and the protection of journalists. On the other hand, protection mechanisms against discrimination and violations of political rights are currently weak.

Analysis of Data and Available Evidence

Analysis of 2020–2021 reports of human rights organizations and expert surveys²⁴ reveals some trends related to the weakness of Ukrainian state institutions.

1. Gaps in legislation on important political communication channels. Due to the weak legal regulation, for instance that of online behavior and organizing public events, authorities have broad powers to block websites at their own discretion, motivating the decision by *"the interests of public or national security."* According to human rights organizations, the police response to violence against journalists, civil society activists, and members of the LGBT community is lacking.²⁵

2. Concentration of the president's power due to growing influence on all branches of power and violation of the system of checks and balances. The temptation to concentrate power around the president and his entourage is a traditional problem for Ukrainian democracy.²⁶ The positions held by the Servant of the People party in the Cabinet of Ministers, the Verkhovna Rada, most parliamentary committees, and all regional and most district administrations have given the party full control over all branches of power, often assuming disregard for established democratic procedures (for example, removal of the Constitutional Court judges from office in a manner not provided for by the Constitution of Ukraine²⁷ or the NSDC's adoption of decisions that are not always consistent with current law).

23 Про Національну стратегію у сфері прав людини, Указ Президента України №119/2021, від 24 березня 2021, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1192021-37537>.

24 Ukraine 2020 Human Rights Report, US Department of State, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/UKRAINE-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf>.

25 "Countries and Territories."

26 Mikhail Minakov, "Democratization and Europeanization in 21st Century Ukraine," in *The Struggle for Good Governance in Eastern Europe*, eds. Michael Emerson et al., 83–120, 2nd ed. (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2021), https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/The-Struggle-for-Good-Governance-in-Eastern-Europe-2nd-edition_.pdf.

27 "Ukrainian President Dismissed Head of Constitutional Court," Reuters, March 27, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-court-idUSKBN2BJ08Z>.

3. Significant challenges regarding access to justice and trust in the judiciary.

Although attempts to reform the Ukrainian judiciary date back to 2016, it still involves high corruption risks, including judicial independence, judicial self-government, and selection and appointment of judges.²⁸ Experts often emphasize that much of the Ukrainian judiciary has become a kind of corrupt syndicate controlled by judicial self-government.²⁹ Recently, the judiciary has been used to roll back reforms, for instance when a significant number of anti-corruption instruments were dismantled due to the Constitutional Court's decision involving a conflict of interest.³⁰ Moreover, the judiciary has started an attack on civil society and civil society organizations that protect the right to a fair trial. In particular, representatives of judicial self-government actively promote the thesis that *"distrust in the judiciary results from a purposeful information campaign"* allegedly conducted by public organizations.³¹ There are similar narratives with regard to the media³² and sociological services.³³ In addition, "pocket" non-governmental organizations are created, affiliated with judiciary representatives and trying to form a favorable information bubble. In fact, the judiciary has become a political player, primarily concerned with the promotion of corporate interests.

4. Weakness of formal mechanisms aimed at balancing interests between different social groups and preventing conflict. Balancing conflicting interests between different social groups, as well as between authorities and society, is an important state function. The weakness of mechanisms aimed at balancing interests was one of the reasons for the revolutions of 2004–2005 and 2013–2014. In Ukraine,

28 Victoria Jennet, Corruption Risks in Recent Reforms in the Ukrainian Judiciary, USAID, September 2017, https://newjustice.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/NJ_Judicial_Corruption_Risks_Report_2017_ENG-1.pdf.

29 Mikhailo Zhernakov, "It Is Time to Start Treating Ukraine's Corrupt Judiciary as a Criminal Syndicate," Atlantic Council, December, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/its-time-to-start-treating-ukraines-corrupt-judiciary-as-a-criminal-syndicate>.

30 "Fight Against Corruption in Ukraine: Venice Commission says Constitutional Court Decision 'Regrettable,'" Council of Europe, December 10, 2020, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/fight-against-corruption-in-ukraine-venice-commission-says-constitutional-court-decision-regrettable->.

31 «Недовіра до судової влади сформована внаслідок цілеспрямованої інформаційної кампанії», — Ігор Рейтерович, Судова влада України, 6 жовтня 2021, <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1190100>.

32 «На рівень довіри до судів впливає рівень довіри до інституцій державної влади загалом», — Світлана Шелест», Вища рада правосуддя, 28 грудня 2020, <https://hcj.gov.ua/news/na-riven-doviry-do-sudiv-vplyvaye-riven-doviry-do-instytutciy-derzhavnoyi-vlady-zagalom-svitlana>.

33 «Голова РСУ закликає ЗМІ не поширювати неправдиву інформацію про рівень довіри до судової влади та результатів судової реформи», Рада Суддів України, 4 жовтня 2018, <http://rsu.gov.ua/ua/news/golova-rsu-zaklikae-zmi-ne-posiruvati-nepravdivu-informaciu-sodo-rivna-doviri-do-sudovoi-vladi>.

the introduction of these mechanisms is still controversial. For example, in 2021 the Law of Ukraine “On All-Ukrainian Referendum”³⁴ was adopted, replacing the previous, unconstitutionally adopted law; however, experts believe that over-regulation and a resource-intensive process to hold a referendum makes it an instrument of influence for political groups rather than civil society.³⁵ Positive examples of mechanisms aimed at balancing interests include the introduction of mediation projects in local communities, which involve civil society and academia. Implementation of these projects in Ukraine relies on the EU’s financial and organizational support.³⁶

The trends that can **positively affect** political security include increasing the availability of administrative services for citizens, in particular through the introduction of digital transformation programs in Ukraine, and the use of digital technologies in public administration and local governments, which will make communication between the authorities and society more efficient and public services more affordable and cheaper.³⁷ The active part of civil society continues to significantly affect policy development in the state, in particular through public councils formed under the central and local authorities. However, the major positive trend is the preservation of free, democratic, competitive, and transparent elections.³⁸ Despite shortcomings in the electoral process and the restriction of the rights of certain citizen groups (for example, voters in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts who live near the line of contact), elections in Ukraine are considered competitive and fair, and citizens can choose from a wide range of political parties and candidates.³⁹

34 Про всеукраїнський референдум, Закон України 1135-IX, прийняття від 26.01.2021, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1135-20#Text>.

35 Якименко та ін., Україна: 30 років на європейському шляху.

36 «Лариса Швецова: Медіація — перспективний спосіб вирішення конфліктів», Вища рада правосуддя, 27 серпня 2021, <https://hcj.gov.ua/news/larysa-shvecova-mediacya-perspektyvnyy-sposib-vyrishennya-konfliktiv>.

37 «Прискорення цифрової трансформації — Уряд схвалив законопроект», Урядовий портал. Міністерство цифрової трансформації України, 28 жовтня 2021, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/priskorennya-cifrovoyi-transformaciyi-ukrayini-uryad-shvaliv-zakonoproekt>.

38 Якименко та ін., Україна: 30 років на європейському шляху.

39 “Countries and Territories.”

Case Analyses

Now we shall consider progress regarding certain vulnerable groups whose rights particularly affect political security.

Ukraine's policy regarding the protection of **national minorities'** rights has always been hostage to a higher level state-building policy and formation of a single Ukrainian nation, within which national minorities' efforts to preserve their identity and diversity, especially through local governments, were seen as a threat to national security. In particular, the latter regards suggestions to introduce a federal system in Ukraine,⁴⁰ provide ethnic minorities with autonomy, and introduce regional languages. For instance, the Constitutional Court in its decision on the Law "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language" calls the Ukrainian language "*the necessary condition (conditio sine qua non) of Ukraine's statehood,*" and, hence, encroachment on its legal status threatens national security. The Constitutional Court also considers the law in the context of overcoming the consequences of the Russification policy of the Russian Empire and the USSR, which enables the state to take affirmative actions in favor of the Ukrainian language.⁴¹

Human rights organizations believe the Law "On National Minorities" adopted in 1992 has recently been criticized due to its lack of effective implementation mechanisms.⁴² In addition, the legislation regulating some aspects of national and linguistic minorities' rights and adopted in the context of Russian aggression (in particular, Law #1658-IX "On Education", dated July 15, 2021, and Law #2704-VIII "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language", latest edition from January 1, 2021), as well as legislation concerning the historical memory of certain social groups (#396-IX "On the Condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Regimes in Ukraine and Prohibition of Propaganda of their Symbols", dated December 19, 2019), contribute to more intense tensions between different groups in Ukraine (see, for example, the Venice Commission conclusion on the "Law on Education").

40 «(Де)централізація у Конституції: чи всі зміни на користь?», Ukraine Crisis Media Center, 27 грудня 2019, <http://decentralization.uacrisis.org/constitution>; Анатолій Ткачук, «Факти, які ми повинні знати про федерацію та децентралізацію», Портал «Децентралізація», 30 квітня 2014, <https://decentralization.gov.ua/news/71>.

41 "The Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 'Threat to the Ukrainian Language is Equal to Threat to the National Security of Ukraine,'" Constitutional Court of Ukraine, July 15, 2021, <https://ccu.gov.ua/en/novina/constitutional-court-ukraine-threat-ukrainian-language-equal-threat-national-security-ukraine>.

42 «Уповноважений ВРУ з прав людини взяла участь у всеукраїнському онлайн-обговоренні проекту нової редакції Закону України "Про національні меншини в Україні"».

Paragraph 139 of the Venice Commission's position on Law #2704-VIII "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language" indicated, in particular, the need to eliminate different attitudes towards indigenous languages, national minority languages that are official EU languages, and national minority languages that are not official EU languages, since such a difference lacks "*an objective and reasonable justification*."⁴³ To eliminate discrimination against the indigenous peoples of Ukraine, on July 1, 2021, the Verkhovna Rada passed Law #1616-IX "On the Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine", which defines the "indigenous peoples" status and their political rights. The law's largest group of beneficiaries are the Crimean Tatars, who are recognized as indigenous peoples and who, in accordance with Ukrainian legislation, have acquired broad political rights in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

The Ukrainian state is unable to guarantee civil and political rights in the non-government-controlled areas (NGCA), the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (which, according to Ukrainian law, are controlled by "occupation administrations").⁴⁴ Since 2015, Ukraine has been unable to ensure respect for human rights, in particular its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 2, 9, 12, 14, and 17. Ukraine has been initiating international pressure on Russia (for example, through international courts) concerning human rights observance in the Crimea and the NGCA. As of January 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) received more than 8,500 individual complaints related to the consequences of aggression in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

Without a strategy to resolve the conflict with Russia, Ukrainian government policy regarding the civilian population in the NGCA remains controversial. Since 2019, the Ukrainian government has been facing mass issuance of Russian passports to NGCA residents and their increasing participation in the political, social, and economic life of the Russian Federation.

According to official data from the Russian Foreign Ministry, more than 600,000 of the 3.5 million people registered in the NGCA have already received Russian

43 "Opinion On the Law on Supporting the Functioning of The Ukrainian Language as The State Language," European Commission for Democracy Through Law, December 9, 2019, [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2019\)032-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2019)032-e).

44 Про особливості державної політики із забезпечення державного суверенітету України на тимчасово окупованих територіях у Донецькій та Луганській областях, Закон України, 2268-VIII, редакція від 26.11.2020, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2268-19#Text>.

citizenship.⁴⁵ While the gradual integration of the NGCA with Russia is noticeable, Ukraine lacks a well-developed public policy regarding Ukrainian citizens living there and possibly having Russian citizenship. The draft Law “On the Principles of the State Policy of Transition Period” (developed pursuant to the Presidential Decree of June 2, 2021⁴⁶) contains measures to be taken when Ukraine regains control over these territories, which, in the view of President Volodymyr Zelensky, will take place in the strategic perspective.⁴⁷ In the short run, Ukrainian government policy should aim for the greater involvement of the civilian population in the NGCA in the social and political life of Ukraine.

Conclusion

Analysis of Ukraine’s political security from the “human security” perspective, considering both recent decisions of the country’s authorities and a broader horizon of public policy, reveals several established factors. Representatives of the historical institutional school (in particular, Douglas North or Kathleen Thelen) would link Ukrainian state weakness to “path dependence” (dependence on the path chosen in previous years) — historically inherited institutions and norms, limited statehood experience, lasting peripherality within empires and the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet heritage. Nevertheless, these peculiarities have been relevant to many of the independent states that emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Why do some of these states progress while others lose their economic competitiveness and social potential, collapse, and decline?

Paul Collier, professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science and author of *The Bottom Billion*, believes that a country may fall into one or more development traps related to (a) lasting wars and social conflicts; (b) economic dependence on the extraction and export of raw materials; (c) governance

45 As of May 2, 2021, 530,000 inhabitants of uncontrolled Donbas received Russian citizenship. See, for instance: «Почти 530 тыс. жителей Донбасса получили российское гражданство в упрощенном порядке», ТАСС, 2 мая 2021, <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/11296643>.

46 Проект Закону про засади державної політики перехідного періоду, Верховна Рада України, 9 серпня 2021, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=72625.

47 See Телеканал ДОМ, «Интервью Президента Зеленського», Видео YouTube, 45:18, 5 августа 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XzndR26FSug>.

inefficiency; and (d) neighborhood with a “problematic” country.⁴⁸ At least three of these traps are relevant to Ukraine, but still, Ukrainian state weakness would not be considered deadly if there was a consolidated desire of the elites and society for development and change, with innovativeness and freedom being key values.

The unprecedented international attention and support for Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity (including financial, technical, and advisory assistance in democratic reforms), and especially after the outbreak of Russian aggression, as well as elites’ renewal and civil society’s enthusiasm in Ukraine, gave hope that democratic institutions would be radically strengthened and democratic practices would be introduced at all levels and in all spheres of public administration. However, in 2021, like seven years ago, Ukrainian authorities are tempted by authoritarianism, while civil society still lacks effective mechanisms for interacting with them. According to the European Chamber of Auditors report,⁴⁹ despite the EU’s support, high-level corruption is still a vital problem for Ukraine. Since international partners’ assistance remains one of the key drivers of democratic reforms, the weakening of the international community’s attention to Ukraine may create a risk of returning to authoritarian practices.

Options and Recommendations for Implementing Solution Policies

In the short run, the policy of international assistance, technical advice, and foreign experts’ involvement in implementing democratic reforms in Ukraine, which has already proven its effectiveness in reforming law enforcement and the judiciary as well as introducing anti-corruption bodies, will remain crucial. It is advisable to expand the participation of Ukrainian governmental and non-governmental actors in regional organizations that promote human rights and democratic governance standards, such as the Partnership for Democratic Governance under the Council of Europe and the Human Security Network.⁵⁰ In the medium-term perspective,

48 Collier, *The Bottom Billion*.

49 Reducing Grand Corruption in Ukraine: Several EU Initiatives, but Still Insufficient Results, European Court of Auditors, September 23, 2021, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_23/SR_fight-against-grand-corruption-in-Ukraine_EN.pdf.

50 The Human Security Network, accessed November 11, 2021, <https://www.austria.org/the-human-security-network>.

political security system reform should shift its focus to local governments. United territorial communities and local authorities have a significant potential to ensure political security by involving citizens in policy-making processes and introducing mechanisms to balance interests and resolve conflicts at the local level.

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(IN)VISIBLE: security of marginalized communities in Ukraine (IDPs, LGBTQI , Roma)

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Abstract

Community security relates to certain population groups' freedom from both fear and need. Ensuring community security is key to protecting their identity(ies). This is especially important for groups vulnerable to stigma and discrimination. The sources of danger to communities can be varied, including the state in which they live. Although the state should take care of its people's security, people may also need protection from state authorities' arbitrary decisions.

This paper focuses on the study of community security aspects, in particular through the lens of socio-economic status, the possibility of exercising one's own rights, and discrimination and stigma levels. Community security development relies on the idea of the population participating in seeking to improve their own condition. This process should lead to an increase in service quality, reduction in social exclusion, improvement in relationships between social groups, or strengthening of democratic governance. However, in Ukraine, the most marginalized communities are deprived of both voice and agency. Examples from the modern Ukrainian context include internally displaced persons (IDPs); lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI) people; and Roma.

Introduction

Community security elements vary slightly from country to country. However, there are several notable trends. Although the number of interstate conflicts decreased after the end of the Cold War, in 2004–2008, there was an increase in non-state conflicts with a slight decrease in 2009.¹ The most common source of danger for already marginalized or vulnerable communities is their compatriots belonging to the dominant population group. Since the inception of the “human security” concept, a number of important policies, initiatives, and tools have been developed at the global and regional levels to address humanitarian security issues such as community security. However, given the broad and largely vague notion of community security, it is often difficult to identify specific measures and policies that could be taken by local and international actors and could be considered community security measures. In the context of Ukraine, where authorities often ignore conflicts between communities, it is important to pay attention to those communities whose security is currently threatened.

Brief Overview of the Context and Formulation of the Problem

Community security is part of human security and is defined as protection against community destruction due to the loss of common relationships and values.² The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report focused on security of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples. Threats to community security include discrimination, exclusion, violence from other groups, and threats from the state. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) also identified community security in terms of threats, including “*inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions*.”³

1 Human Security Research Group, Human Security Report 2012 — Sexual Violence, Education and War: Beyond the Mainstream Narrative (Vancouver, BC: Human Security Press, 2012), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2012HumanSecurityReport-FullText_0.pdf.

2 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 31–32, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.

3 UNOCHA, Human Security in Theory and Practice. Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (New York, NY: Human Security Unit, UNOCHA, 2009), 7, <https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/Human%20Security%20Tools/Human%20Security%20in%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20English.pdf>.

A more recent 2009 UNDP publication, *Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a UNDP approach*, provided an expanded definition of community security that combines both group and personal security while focusing on freedom from fear. Although community security documents mainly emphasize “freedom from fear,” they also recognize the importance of responding to a wider range of social issues affecting “freedom from need” in communities.⁴

This paper understands identity as a phenomenon that manifests itself in collective and individual consciousness and actions. It is viewed here as a “situational” phenomenon, as a changing construct created by the interaction of certain discourses and social practices. This approach could be called “soft” in the sense defined by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper.⁵ These authors understand **identity not only as a category of analysis, but also as a category of practice**, by which they mean “*categories of everyday social experience, developed and deployed by ordinary social actors.*”⁶ As a category of practice, it is used by ordinary “*actors in some [...] everyday settings to make sense of themselves, of their activities, of what they share with, and how they differ from, others. It is also used by political entrepreneurs to persuade people to understand themselves, their interests, and their predicaments in a certain way, to persuade certain people that they are (for certain purposes) ‘identical’ with one another and at the same time different from others, and to organize and justify collective action along certain lines. In these ways the term ‘identity’ is implicated both in everyday life and in ‘identity politics’ in its various form.*”⁷

Therefore, in the context of Ukraine, we are talking about community security in terms of security of certain groups of people having a common identity. Within this analytical document, community security will be considered using the example of several vulnerable groups in Ukraine. Usually, such groups are most visible in situations of danger and thus they have the potential to draw attention to the issue. The concept of community security primarily implies meaningful communication within and between communities, as well as with public authorities responsible for ensuring certain levels of human security. Without it, there is a risk of tensions between communities, which can lead to open or latent conflicts — the division into “us” and “them.” The identified vulnerable groups are more likely to stand out as

4 UNDP, *Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a UNDP Approach* (New York, NY: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 2009), 14, <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf>.

5 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000): 1–47, <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007068714468>.

6 Ibid, 5.

7 Ibid, 5-6.

“others” in society, sometimes even prior to public announcement of their identity, which makes their position even more precarious. Herewith, the selected list of groups is not exhaustive, but is largely demonstrative. We aim to analyze such key issues as:

- security level of certain vulnerable communities in Ukraine (IDPs, LGBTQI+, and Roma);
- sources of danger for existing vulnerable communities;
- COVID-19 pandemic effects on the level of security of the identified vulnerable communities in Ukraine.

Analysis of Data and Available Evidence

Internally Displaced Persons

As of July 6, 2021, the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine reported 1,473,650 migrants from the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.⁸ Many of them relocated to government-controlled areas (GCA), but some of those with a displaced person status live in non-government-controlled areas (NGCA) and regularly crossed the line of contact prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.⁹ With the onset of the global pandemic, crossing into and out of the NGCA became more difficult, and from time to time stopped completely.¹⁰ There are two main factors that caused forced displacement of a significant number of people both in Ukraine and abroad. Firstly, the temporary occupation and illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Crimea) forced people to leave the Crimean peninsula, and, secondly, intensification of hostilities in eastern Ukraine in spring-summer 2014 and Ukraine’s loss of control over parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts caused a sharp increase in the number of displaced persons.

8 «Обліковано 1 473 650 внутрішньо переміщених осіб», Міністерство соціальної політики України, 6 липня 2021, <https://www.msp.gov.ua/news/20309.html>.

9 «Близько половини зареєстрованих переселенців живе на окупованій території», ZMINA, 25 листопада 2020, <https://zmina.info/news/blyzko-polovyny-zareyestrovanyh-pereselenciv-zhyve-na-okupovaniy-terytoriyi/>.

10 Річний звіт 2020, Право на захист, 2021, https://r2p.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/richnyi_zvit_2020_ukr_web.pdf.

IDPs still face significant economic challenges. Most often, displacement involves the loss of assets, discrimination in the labor market, and loss of usual social ties. These and other issues are exacerbated by the fact that such a precarious situation can last for years due to bureaucratic obstacles. Consequently, IDPs' incomes tend to decline while their consumption, health, education, security, housing, working conditions, and social well-being deteriorate. These issues have an additional dimension for internally displaced women, who are also faced with the gender discrimination present in the country.¹¹

Displacement led to the separation of families, households, and communities. It caused personal, social, and cultural ties to be severed.¹² Communities' polarization resulting from the conflict affected social cohesion and unity for both IDPs and host communities. These gaps in social ties and loss of social support networks due to displacement make IDPs particularly vulnerable.

The lack of a state policy on IDP integration in the early stages of the armed conflict put community members in a precarious position. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in March 2016, a third of IDPs (33.7%) intended to return to the NGCA,¹³ mainly due to the strained relationships with the host community and problems in adapting to new living conditions. Herewith, only one in eight IDPs was ready to stay in the host community forever.¹⁴ Eventually, the situation changed. As of September 2019, according to IOM, 54% of IDPs said they felt integrated into the host communities. However, data for 2016 contain almost no examples of existing tensions between IDPs and host communities and examples of attitudes of host communities residents towards IDPs. In fact, due to the unsystematic state policies, since the beginning of the forced displacement, the IDP community has had little chance of building resilience in response to the crisis.¹⁵

11 Олена Уварова та Марія Ясеновська, Гендерний вимір внутрішнього переміщення: світовий досвід і ситуація в Україні (Харків: Харківська обласна фундація «Громадська Альтернатива», 2020), <https://rm.coe.int/pub-alter-gender-vimir/16809f2b03>.

12 European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights, 2021, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UNHCR, September 21, 2004, <https://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.pdf>; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, December 10, 1948, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.

13 «Національна система моніторингу ситуації з внутрішньо переміщеними особами. Раунд 1 — Березень 2016, Україна», Міжнародна організація з міграції, 2016, https://www.iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/iom_nms_r1_ukr.pdf.

14 «Національна система моніторингу ситуації з внутрішньо переміщеними особами. Раунд 2 — Квітень 2016», Міжнародна організація з міграції, 2016, https://www.iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/iom_nms_r2_ua-v.pdf.

15 Sonny S. Patel et al., "What Do We Mean by 'Community Resilience'? A Systematic Literature Review of How It Is Defined in the Literature," PLOS Currents 1, no. 9 (2017), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5693357/>.

One of the basic IDP challenges is integration into the host community. This process can take years and have no results since there is a certain level of stigmatization and discrimination against IDPs in society. In host communities, people do not always come into contact with IDPs, treat them with suspicion, and generally expect nothing good from them.¹⁶ International studies reveal that IDPs tend to stay in closed social networks to guarantee themselves access to the basic resources they need.¹⁷ The available official data indicate that IDPs most often live in cities and urban areas, because large cities have much more labor market opportunities and require more specialties compared to rural areas or small towns. There is strong evidence of a link between urban area size and economic activity and productivity. For example, 681 cities in the world with a population of at least 500,000 people account for 24% of the world's population and 60% of the world's economic production.¹⁸ However, there is no guarantee that IDPs living in cities will be able to successfully integrate into the labor market. Moreover, living in a large city increases IDPs' economic burden; housing, transportation, food, and other goods may become unavailable to people who have already lost most of their resources due to displacement. Hence, though urban areas provide more opportunities, IDPs may require support in accessing them, which means that policies and programs outlining the mechanism and ensuring the implementation of such assistance should be developed.

Integration into host communities sometimes causes tensions in society, especially when IDPs are defined as "others," that is a group of people whose behavior differs from the host community's perception of "generally accepted" behavior. This tension was openly articulated during the local elections in autumn 2020, when, for the first time since the onset of the armed conflict and the temporary occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea, IDPs were given the right to vote.¹⁹ For instance, social networks shared assumptions that the Kyiv mayoral candidate

16 Ilke Dagli Hustings et al., SCORE Ukraine. Phase Two (2018) Evidence-based Policy Brief, USAID, August 14, 2018, https://scoreforpeace.org/files/publication/pub_file/PB_UKR17_PolicyBookletFinalDraftID_Clean_20180814.pdf.

17 Frederic Noel Kamta and Jürgen Scheffran, "A Social Network Analysis of Internally Displaced Communities in Northeast Nigeria: Potential Conflicts with Host Communities in the Lake Chad Region," *GeoJournal* (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-021-10500-8>.

18 Emma Samman et al., *SDG Progress. Fragility, Crisis and Leaving No One Behind* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2018), <https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/3260/odireport.pdf>.

19 During the spring of 2014 – June 11, 2020, IDPs could only vote in the presidential elections and for the party list in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine elections; registration in the temporarily occupied territories deprived them of the right to vote in local elections in the areas of their new residence, see «Про Порядок визначення виборчої адреси виборця, який не має зареєстрованого місця проживання», Постанова Центральної виборчої комісії, 11 червня 2020, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v0103359-20#Text>.

from the Opposition Platform-For Life party, Olexandr Popov, won second place thanks to displaced persons' votes.²⁰ Thus, tensions regarding the IDP community tend to rely on the stereotyped image of an unknown "Donetsk man," who definitely has pro-Russian sympathies and nostalgia for the rule of the Party of Regions and the Soviet Union. Herewith, according to the public data of the State Register of Voters, a year after the introduction of the voting place change procedure, which allows not only IDPs but also all citizens living not at the place of registration (so-called labor migrants), a little more than 103,000 persons used it, which is less than 7% of registered displaced persons.²¹

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, IDPs' security has significantly deteriorated as the community is highly sensitive to socio-economic shifts. The quarantine changed the basic set of urgent IDP challenges. If previously housing, family welfare, and employment were the three major stress factors for them, with the onset of the pandemic, the impossibility to visit relatives in the NGCA, deteriorating economic situation due to reduced earnings, and difficulties paying rent became dominant.²² Consequently, the already vulnerable IDPs' condition has worsened due to socio-economic risks. Moreover, IDPs are at risk of falling ill and even temporarily losing their ability to work, which could negatively affect their fragile well-being.

Thus, in the absence of an effective set of policies and support systems for IDPs, their position remains uncertain. In most cases, IDPs and their families solve their problems on their own and can only count on the situational support of international donors and humanitarian organizations. At the same time, being excluded from the host communities' political life for already six years since the onset of the armed conflict and, consequently, having no adequate representation in government, IDPs are forced to rely mainly on international and humanitarian organizations regarding advocacy for their rights.

20 Дар'я Куренная, «Війна на Донбасі та мова ворожнечі. Чи винні 'донецькі'?», Радіо Свобода, 3 грудня 2020, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30982198.html>.

21 «Відомості щодо кількості опрацьованих звернень виборців за період з 01.07.2020 по 11.11.2021», Державний реєстр виборців, 2021, https://www.drv.gov.ua/ords/portal/!cm_core.cm_index?option=ext_num_voters&pdt=8&pmn_id=127.

22 Марина Нестерова та ін., Переселенці: життя до і під час COVID-19. Зовнішнє експертне онлайн дослідження потреб внутрішньо переміщених осіб у період карантину, запровадженого через пандемію COVID-19 та в умовах виходу з нього (Kyiv: Embassy of the United States, 2020), <https://sss-ua.org/Library/report/IDPs-life-before-and-during-the-coronavirus-ukr.pdf>.

LGBTQI

The LGBTQI community faces significant difficulties while remaining one of the most marginalized groups in Ukraine. The first studies on society's perception of certain LGBTQI community segments appeared in the second half of the 1990s and indicated that the Ukrainian population's attitude towards homosexuality was highly negative. According to a 2013 survey by the Center of Social Expertise of the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology, 59% of Ukrainians considered homosexuality socially unacceptable.²³

In recent years, the appropriation of Russian media discourse has played a key role in public stigmatization of the LGBTQI community. The Ukrainian government and army are portrayed as "fascists," "Nazis," and "extremists" in Russian articles and newspapers.²⁴ Along with these discursive markers, the term "geyropa" is used, which was to define Ukraine's movement towards EU integration in terms of legalization of same-sex marriages and the "breakdown of the traditional family."²⁶ In social media, this term is widely used to describe the European gender order.

In 2020, according to Pew Research, Ukraine had the highest rates of homophobia compared to other European countries.²⁷ According to the 2021 SCORE Index, members of the LGBTQI community are the second least tolerated group in Ukrainian society after drug addicts.²⁸ Thus, the community is highly marginalized and, therefore, faces an extremely low security level.

23 Юрій Привалов та ін., Звіт за результатами дослідження: "Опитування громадської думки для визначення суспільного сприйняття ЛГБТ та шляхів його поліпшення" (Київ: Центр соціальних експертиз Інституту соціології Національної академії наук України, 2013).

24 Olga Pasitselska, "Ukrainian Crisis through the Lens of Russian Media: Construction of Ideological Discourse," *Discourse & Communication* 11, no. 6 (2017): 591–609, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750481317714127>.

25 Maryna Shevtsova, "Fighting 'Gayropa': Europeanization and Instrumentalization of LGBTI Rights in Ukrainian Public Debate," *Problems of Post-Communism* 67, no. 6 (2020): 500–510, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2020.1716807>.

26 Emil Edenborg, "'Traditional Values' and the Narrative of Gay Rights as Modernity: Sexual Politics beyond Polarization," *Sexualities* (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1177/13634607211008067>.

27 Jacob Poushter and Nicholas Kent, "Views of Homosexuality around the World," Pew Research Center, June 25, 2020, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/06/25/global-divide-on-homosexuality-persists/>.

28 "Social Tolerance: Towards LGBT," SCORE, 2021, <https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/ukraine/2021/1/map?row=tn-49-42>.

LGBTQI community members often become victims of physical and symbolic violence by both ordinary citizens and radical right-wing organizations.²⁹ With the onset of the armed conflict in Donbas, right-wing radical organization representatives carrying out such attacks often have the status of participants in the hostilities. Given the significant negative attitude towards LGBTQI communities and the positive perception of armed conflict participation in society, social media demonstrate significant shifts towards tolerance of aggression and violence in the assessment of such clashes.

However, the LGBTQI community actively fights for its own representation and normalization in the public space while conducting educational and public events. For example, the Equality March on June 23, 2019, in Kyiv gathered about 8,000 people, which is almost ten times more than in 2013.³⁰ After the Revolution of Dignity, the publicity of LGBTQI events has increased, but this also fosters negative reactions of radical citizen groups. The COVID-19 pandemic limited the community's ability to hold public events in 2020 and 2021, but on September 19, 2021, 7,000 participants took part in the Equality March in Kyiv.³¹ Nevertheless, the number of recorded attacks on LGBTQI community members during the pandemic has more than doubled, from 11 to 24³² cases.

Ukraine still lacks legislation to protect members of the LGBTQI community from hate violence. Therefore, there are few opportunities to combat violence and discrimination against LGBTQI community members through legal means. However, in May 2021, the Cabinet of Ministers submitted to the Verkhovna Rada draft law No. 5488 aiming to fight discrimination and hate crimes against members of the LGBTQI community.³³

29 Ганна Гриценко, «Лінзи гендеру для українських праворадикалів: причини, прояви, наслідки», в Гендер, релігія і націоналізм в Україні, ред. Галина Ярманова, 125–150 (Київ: ТОВ «ВТС ПРИНТ», 2012), <https://ua.boell.org/sites/default/files/gender-religion-nationalism-in-ukraine-www.pdf>.

30 Jessica Zychowicz, "Ukraine Hosts Most Successful LGBTQ Event in the Nation's History, but New Challenges Appear," Wilson Center, August 2, 2019, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraine-hosts-most-successful-lgbtq-event-the-nations-history-new-challenges-appear>.

31 "Thousands March for LGBTQ+ Rights in Ukraine despite Some Opposition," Reuters, September 19, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/thousands-march-lgbtq-rights-ukraine-despite-some-opposition-2021-09-19/>.

32 "Understanding the Fight to Protect LGBTQI+ Rights in Europe and Eurasia," Congress.gov, May 11, 2021, <https://www.congress.gov/117/meeting/house/112760/witnesses/HHRG-117-FA14-Wstate-EmsonL-20210611.pdf>.

33 Проект Закону про внесення змін до Кодексу України про адміністративні правопорушення та Кримінального кодексу України щодо боротьби з проявами дискримінації, Верховна Рада України, 2021, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?id=&pf3511=71891.

Roma

There are no reliable data on the total number of Roma in Ukraine. According to various estimates, there are between 200,000 and 400,000 Roma in the country,³⁴ who are difficult to single out in a single community since they live densely in several Ukrainian regions while often speaking different dialects. The community security issues they face also vary, sometimes significantly, depending on the region. However, despite this difference in challenges, the Roma population as a whole is considered one of the most vulnerable groups in Ukraine.

According to a recent report,³⁵ up to 20% of the Roma population in Ukraine are stateless, that is they have no identity documents, such as birth certificates or passports. The lack of identity and citizenship documents means they are deprived of access to basic services such as health care, education, and social security and have no access to permanent employment. After a series of organized attacks on Roma by far-right organizations in recent years in large cities, such as Lviv and Kyiv,³⁶ a number of Roma have opted for not moving beyond their dense settlements.

Due to the lack of identity documents, Roma cannot officially work or register their businesses as legal entities or private entrepreneurs. As a discriminated group, Roma have a relatively low level of formal employment. The lack of citizenship among some of them assumes they are forced to work only informally, without any labor rights protection.

The poorest Roma living in dense settlements often have no water and electricity and live in self-built or abandoned houses, without property rights or leases. This situation increases the risk of eviction and destruction of self-builds. Those without identity documents cannot enter into formal housing contracts or appeal eviction

34 "Discussing the Post 2020 Roma Strategy in Ukraine," Council of Europe Office in Ukraine, accessed October 30, 2021, https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/national-minorities/-/asset_publisher/i6ydYw6lJGNc/content/discussion-of-the-future-roma-strategy-in-ukraine?inheritRedirect=false.

35 "Attacks on Roma in Ukraine," CSCE, July 24, 2018, <https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/attacks-roma-ukraine>; "Ukraine: Fatal Attack on Roma Settlement," Human Rights Watch, June 26, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/26/ukraine-fatal-attack-roma-settlement#>; «Волонтери заявляють про напад на ромів у Києві, поліція поки не коментує», Радіо Свобода, 2 травня 2020, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-napad-na-romiv/30589240.html>; «У селі під Ізмаїлом місцеві жителі влаштували погром циганських будинків», LB.ua, 28 серпня 2016, https://lb.ua/society/2016/08/28/343735_sele_pod_izmailom_mestnie_zhiteli.html.

36 Yuras Karmanau and Evgeny Maloletka, "Ukraine's Roma live in fear amid wave of nationalist attacks," AP News, August 6, 2018, <https://apnews.com/article/68d5fc9c0f7f41678250f19bb4c9260d>.

decisions. Similarly, Roma without citizenship documents are not entitled to social housing.

The undocumented Roma, unable to prove Ukrainian citizenship, have to pay for medical care — if they ever go to see a doctor. Discrimination against Roma in health care is very common, and Roma have reported cases of doctors refusing to treat them based on ethnicity, and in some cases, emergency services have refused to respond to Roma calls. Hence, the state of the Roma community during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in dense settlements, deteriorated. For instance, according to a report by the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Roma have limited access to medical services even in emergency cases since they have no declarations with family doctors. Also, members of the Roma community are often unable to provide themselves and their families with individual means of protection and hygiene.³⁷ The lack of declarations with family doctors also negatively affects vaccination opportunities.

Moreover, the absence of documents, low standard of living, and illiteracy of the Roma community in Ukraine cause their low government representation. According to the Renaissance Foundation, 25 representatives of Roma communities in eight oblasts took part in local elections in the fall of 2020,³⁸ which is the largest number of Roma running in local elections in Ukraine at the same time.

Recommendations

Social groups facing stereotypical perception and stigmatization prefer to remain socially “invisible” and avoid direct contacts with government institutions or representatives of local communities. In turn, state institutions and local communities also fail to actively respond to the demands and needs of marginalized communities. Both sides should have more information about possible interaction algorithms, form a deeper understanding of the issues, and, most importantly, assess the potential consequences of these issues’ disregard.

37 «Уповноважений ВРУ з прав людини презентувала спеціальну доповідь “Вплив пандемії COVID-19 на ромську громаду в Україні”», Уповноважений Верховної Ради України з прав людини, 23 грудня 2020, <https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/ua/all-news/pr/prezentuvala-speczialnu-dopovid-vpliv-pandemii-covid-19-na-romsku-gromadu-v-ukraini/>.

38 Євгеній Дмитрович Монастирський, Дослідження участі представників ромських громад на місцевих виборах 2020 року в якості кандидатів в органи місцевого самоврядування (Міжнародний фонд «Відродження», 2021), https://www.irf.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/zvit_romski-kandydaty_final-1.pdf.

Informing communities about their population diversity and promoting equal representation of all groups in local authorities' advisory bodies are important (following the example of IDP Councils and IDP Youth Councils in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Kharkiv regions).

Simplified procedures for obtaining identification documents for IDP communities' and Roma representatives who do not have or have lost additional identity documents should be introduced.

Ensuring access to social, administrative, and medical services for marginalized communities should be a priority for central executive bodies; under quarantine restrictions, it is necessary to provide access to services through maximum digitalization of the document flow.

In working with Roma and IDP communities, it is important to pay due attention to youth integration through information campaigns on entering higher education institutions of all levels to foster their further integration into society and, potentially, enhance older generation integration.

Amendments to a number of anti-discrimination laws of Ukraine (draft law No. 5488) should be made, because currently communities abused by other citizens of Ukraine (for instance, the LGBTQI+ community) are unable to punish their perpetrators and ensure at least basic "freedom from fear".

The general authorities' approach to marginalized communities should be changed from assimilation to integration.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC HUMAN SECURITY: Money, Opportunities, Context, and Psychology

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Abstract

The socio-economic aspect of human security has been one of the major challenges for the Ukrainian state and society throughout the 30 years since Ukraine gained its independence. Poverty is not only about depriving citizens of the possibility to live a decent life; one of its consequences is also the embedded helplessness that hinders any positive changes and makes Ukrainians more susceptible to information and psychological manipulation.

This paper explains the relevance of the problem and describes the approaches the Ukrainian government is pursuing to solve it. The paper identifies that both “top-down” and “bottom-up” mechanisms are required to solve the problem: on the one hand, rules and opportunities should be created to enable citizens to increase their income; on the other hand, citizens should be urged to be more active in handling their private and financial issues.

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) has developed a national security approach that is not only focused on protecting a country's territory against a possible invasion, but also emphasizes the importance of building up a domestic public governance system that makes citizens feel safe. This approach is gaining more and more popularity worldwide. Ukraine has also become a part of this trend. The National Security Strategy "Security for the People – Security for the Country" was approved by Presidential Decree in September 2020, and the accompanying action plan, approved by a Cabinet of Ministers Resolution in June 2020, states that the government's key task is to make each Ukrainian citizen feel safe and secure in their country.¹

The socio-economic dimension is one of seven components that UN experts consider in the context of individual security. In Ukraine, this dimension requires special attention both from the government and civil society. Both government bodies and citizens themselves agree that many people in Ukraine have been experiencing challenging economic conditions since the first days of Ukraine's independence and often lack money even for their basic needs. This situation is detrimental to their chances for a decent life and creates vulnerability at the individual and collective level that can be exploited by hostile external forces.

Brief context review and problem description

Persistent poverty, unemployment, lack of affordable loans, and other economic opportunities are considered the main threats to individual socio-economic security. The increasing potential of these threats has a number of negative consequences. A 1999 World Bank study conducted in 23 countries showed that poverty comes along with the isolation and stigmatization of areas populated by low-income citizens. In these areas, there are higher incidents of gender-related conflicts, inequality, discriminatory and isolating social relationships, feelings of vulnerability and anxiety, lack of attention and abuse of power by more affluent groups, feelings of being alienated from public institutions, weak self-organization, and a low level of development due to the lack of information, education, skills, and confidence.²

1 «Про затвердження Програми діяльності Кабінету Міністрів України», Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України від 12 червня 2020 р. №471, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-zatverdzhennya-programi-diyalnosti-kabinetu-ministriv-t120620>.

2 Deepa Narayan et al., *Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 2000).

Ukrainian citizens who participated in a survey conducted by the Heinrich Böll Foundation in 2020 shared experiences very similar to the World Bank findings. As the researchers point out, the poverty factor forces *"a person to constantly live in a situation of uncertainty and unpredictability, with a significantly limited planning horizon, worrying about limited family budgets and constantly living in fear of a lack of money, lacking a "financial cushion" that could help a person/family survive a crisis or a job loss."*³

Poverty also tends to repeat due to a number of objective and subjective reasons. On the one hand, financial constraints **make it impossible to attain education and receive proper healthcare services, and limits opportunities for individual development**, which, in turn, affects the chances to find a well-paid job or to start a business. On the other hand, it has **psychological consequences and forms behavioral patterns** that include the so-called learned (or gained) helplessness – disbelief in the possibility to achieve the desired result on one's own. Apart from economic insecurity, learned helplessness in Ukraine also goes back to a number of **traumatizing historical experiences** such as the Holodomor, oppressions, and life in an authoritarian/totalitarian state.

These factors are a problem on their own, since they deprive people of a life in dignity without poverty and fear. They also **lay the grounds for hybrid threats to national security**. People who find themselves in a state of uncertainty and emotional stress caused by poverty lose the ability to react rationally to arising challenges⁴ and become quite vulnerable to manipulation and radicalization. In addition, poverty poses a variable factor that points most accurately to a possible civil conflict.⁵ Hence, it is very important to study the root causes of these problems and to take measures to solve them, given the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine caused by the Russian Federation's aggression, which tries to exercise its influence through information and psychological tactics aiming to weaken its adversary by triggering internal conflicts.

3 Оксана Міхєєва та ін., Безпека людини: оцінка та очікування мешканців та мешканок чотирьох областей України (Донецької, Луганської, Запорізької та Херсонської), Фонд ім. Гайнріха Бьолля, Бюро Київ — Україна, 2020, <https://ua.boell.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/Human%20Security%20Report%20-%20UKR.pdf>.

4 «Як бідність змінює мозок. Через стрес виникає "хибне коло", що підживлює себе. Але це можна змінити», Тексти, 12 листопада 2021, <https://texty.org.ua/articles/104876/yak-bidnist-minyaye-mozok/>.


5 Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003).

Data analysis and evidence

Socio-economic problems have been worrying for Ukrainians to a different extent since the first days of Ukraine's independence and still remain relevant today. Compared to the first 10 years of independence, the level of poverty estimated by citizens themselves went down significantly, according to Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) data since 1991. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has made the situation worse again.

According to the consolidated KIIS data published in 2017, the self-assessed absolute poverty level went down from 52% to 11% in the period from 1998 to 2008, somewhat increased after the financial crisis of 2008, and almost doubled since the beginning of Russian aggression in the Crimea and Donbas in 2014.

Poverty level in Ukraine, 1994–2017 (self-assessment by respondents)⁶



We do not have enough money even for food

⁶ Source: «Українське суспільство за 25 років: динаміка деяких соціальних показників. До 25-річчя Київського міжнародного інституту соціології», прес-реліз, 2017, https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20172012_25years/pressrel_VZ1.docx.

However, according to Volodymyr Paniotto, KIIS General Director, this indicator returned to the pre-war level in 2018.⁷ Since the beginning of the pandemic, it went up again and reached 12.1% in the summer of 2020.⁸ In the beginning of August 2021, it was up to 14.1%.⁹

After 2014, the war in Eastern Ukraine was the most worrying issue for Ukrainian citizens for a while. However, it was overtaken again by the economic situation and falling incomes caused by the pandemic. In July 2020, the InfoSapiens agency reported that financial constraints had become the most worrying issue for Ukrainians for the first time in six years. According to the study, Ukrainians most often mentioned the lack of money hindering them from *"living decently and debt-free"* (41.8% of responses). The survey shows that the situation has deteriorated, as in March of the same year, the financial issue was most worrying for a *"significantly lower number of respondents (31.0%)." ¹⁰* In October 2020, even more Ukrainians (46.9%) mentioned poverty as the most rankling issue for them and their families. According to InfoSapiens, Ukrainians were also worried about access to healthcare services and unemployment (37.3% and 33.4%, respectively). Thus, two of the three key issues are related to the economy.

However, public studies do not make it that simple to assess the scale of the poverty issue in an unbiased way. Research on the daily practices of those living in poverty shows that respondents tend to be very biased in assessing their living conditions. A comparison of people's self-perception with the average income per one family member shows that people can consider themselves "middle class" despite their income.¹¹ According to the State Statistics Service, 67.1% of Ukrainian households whose members were asked to estimate their income in 2020 considered themselves poor, 31.9% of respondents consider themselves neither poor nor middle class, while only 1%

7 Дмитро Баркар, «Збройний конфлікт. Стало відомо, скільки українців відчули його особисто», Радіо Свобода, 17 березня 2021, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/zbroynyy-konflikt-stalo-vidomo-skilky-ukrayintsiv-vidchuly-yoho-osobysto/31156301.html>.

8 Антон Грушецький, «Динаміка самооцінки матеріального становища родини, квітень — червень 2020 року», Київський міжнародний інститут соціології, 1 липня 2020 року, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=957>.

9 «Суспільно-політичні настрої населення України: результати опитування, проведеного 24 липня — 1 серпня 2021 року методом особистих («face-to-face») інтерв'ю», Київський міжнародний інститут соціології, 4 серпня 2021, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1055&page=1&t=6>.

10 «Проблема нестачі грошей вийшла на перше місце вперше за 6 років спостережень», InfoSapiens, 30 липня 2020, <https://sapiens.com.ua/ua/socpol-research-single-page?id=128>.

11 Ігор Семиволос та ін., Культура (субкультури) бідності в Україні, Український Католицький Університет, 2020, <https://sociology.ucu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/KULTURA-BIDNOSTI-V-UKRAYINI.pdf>, 8.

of respondents see themselves as middle class.¹² These figures differ considerably from those published by KIIS. Hence, a unified assessment methodology taking into account both subjective and objective factors is needed for a data-based national policy in this area.

The Ukrainian state does pay attention to overcoming poverty both in the context of national security and in the context of human development. At the same time, these two contexts are handled separately. Security documents emphasize the risks caused by poverty, while the measures addressing the level of poverty belong to the country's economic and regional policy. The National Security Strategy stresses that *"the low level of prosperity leads to disappointment and uncertainty concerning future, provokes violence, which hinders development and preserves backwardness. Especially dangerous are established radical sentiments and environments that lay grounds for political violence and separatism, illegal paramilitary groups, and terrorism."*¹³

Paragraph 46 of the National Security Strategy is dedicated to human security. It refers to the rule of law, counteraction against any attempts to provoke hostility in the society, the necessity to stand up against humanitarian aggression, to develop the Ukrainian culture, and to tackle corruption. It also mentions the necessity of ensuring the transparency and accountability of state bodies and the integrity of public officials, and to improve the effectiveness of the state policy on protecting the state border. The paragraph does not contain any reference to the factors of economic human security.

These factors are reflected in the Cabinet of Ministers Program that puts the emphasis both on government efforts to establish the rules of the game and on measures to develop citizens' ability to generate income at a certain level on their own. *"Creating favourable conditions for the development and recovery of small and medium-sized businesses, including reducing the regulatory pressure and implementing support programs"* are considered as the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy. The measures that should be taken by the state include steps to ensure employment by supporting citizens' entrepreneurial activities, improving state regulation in the field of employment policy to enable a flexible influence on the labor market, improving the employment rate for job applicants,

12 Держстат: 67% українців вважають себе бідними, середнім класом — лише 1%», Економічна правда, 9 серпня 2021, <https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2021/08/9/676705/>.

13 «Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України, від 14 вересня 2020 року "Про Стратегію національної безпеки України"», Указ Президента України від 14 вересня 2020 року №392/2020, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3922020-35037>.

and improving their mobility on the labor market. In general, this approach is in line with international practices.

The poverty issue was also the focus of several other documents. In 2016, the government led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (February 27, 2014 – April 14, 2016) adopted the Strategy to Overcome Poverty that determined mechanisms to **prevent** poverty. "Prevention" is the key word here, since this is an important component in creating a safe environment for human development, as outlined in the methodological materials of the UN Trust Fund. This strategy was adopted for the period until 2020. *"Measures to support increasing citizens' labor income and income from the state social insurance system belong to the strategic areas of efforts to reduce poverty. It is also planned to ensure the population's access to social services irrespective of the place of residence and to minimize social alienation risks for the population in rural areas. Special attention shall also be paid to preventing lifelong poverty and social alienation among internally displaced persons."* The strategy also mentions the high level of poverty among working citizens, which was 18.8% in the first nine months of 2015.¹⁴

In the summer of 2021, the National Security and Defense Council adopted the Human Development Strategy¹⁵ that replaced the Strategy to Overcome Poverty. The new strategy became one more step towards implementing approaches that are closer to international practices. According to Minister of Social Policy Maryna Lazebna, the strategy *"establishes a systemic approach in building up a favorable environment to enable human development and to unfold the potential of each citizen. It also includes concrete steps that shall ensure a decent standard of life as well as effective, targeted, and motivating social aid motivating citizens to leave the poverty trap, and access to high-quality social services."*¹⁶ Hence, this document stipulates not only social care provided by the government, it also mentions the necessity of creating an environment for self-fulfillment, which should be understood as a departure from Soviet practices. One of the specific measures in this area is the project "Modernization of the Social Welfare System of Ukraine" that is implemented by the Ministry of Social Policy with the support of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).¹⁷

14 «Про схвалення Стратегії подолання бідності», Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України від 16 березня 2016 р. №161-р, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/248898080>.

15 «Прорішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 14 травня 2021 року "Про Стратегію людського розвитку"», Указ Президента України від 2 червня 2021 р. №225/2021, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/2252021-39073>.

16 «Про схвалення Стратегії подолання бідності».

17 «Модернізація системи соціальної підтримки населення України», Міністерство соціальної політики, 2021, <https://www.msp.gov.ua/timeline/Proekt-Modernizaciya-sistemi-socialnoi-pidtrimki-naselennya-Ukraini-.html>.

On January 1, 2020, a new version of the Law “On Social Services” entered into force as part of the decentralization reform that transfers to municipalities the powers to provide social services to citizens.

Municipalities play a very important role in creating a safe environment for human development, since these efforts should also take into account the local context. The Regional Development Strategy adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on August 5, 2020, emphasizes that decentralization reform has not yet “*resulted in the tangible transformation of new development opportunities for municipalities and regions into a better quality of life for citizens irrespective of their place of residence.*”¹⁸ The authors see the new regional policy’s key task as accelerating the economic development of the regions and improving their competitiveness based on the effective use of their internal potential. According to the strategy, regional policy should “contribute to establishing a culture of partnership and cooperation focused on development-oriented interaction between citizens and public institutions.” This is in line with the approach developed by the UN that stresses the importance of inclusion and participation in decision-making processes.

Analysis of cases related to the problem

Thirty years ago, Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union, a country where the interests of the state prevailed over the rights and security of the citizens and the relationship between the state and the citizens could be described as paternalistic. Ukraine is step-by-step moving away from that Soviet heritage. However, as researchers point out, this process takes time: “*The values and culture of the Ukrainian society are marked by a contradictory and very slow departure from the post-Soviet patterns in the state and political structure, economy, personal relationships, legal system, and other components.*”¹⁹

Trends in assessing the government’s role in securing the livelihoods of citizens look hopeful. During a survey conducted by the Razumkov Center on the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, 54% of respondents stated that the state

18 «Про затвердження Державної стратегії регіонального розвитку на 2021–2027 роки», Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України від 5 серпня 2020 р. №695, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/695-2020-%D0%BF#Text>.

19 Світове дослідження цінностей 2020 в Україні, Український центр європейської політики, 2020, https://ucerp.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/WVS_UA_2020_report_WEB.pdf.

should establish equal “rules of the game” for all citizens, while citizens should be responsible for the way they use their opportunities, and 37.7% of respondents hold the government responsible for supplying citizens with all necessary amenities. This opinion is mostly shared by older respondents, supported by 63% of respondents aged over 60 years and only by 43% of respondents aged 18-29. Another relevant factor is education: citizens with general or incomplete secondary education tend to expect more from the state compared to citizens with higher education (59% and 43%, respectively). Another remarkable difference can be observed in the expectations of those who work on a temporary basis and those permanently employed (56% and 46%, respectively, with even 60% of unemployed expecting more benefits from the state).²⁰ This indicates a rather significant number of citizens who are ready to take responsibility for their life. Along with this, it also proves that factors correlating with poverty (low education level, age, unemployment) make people rely more on the state, just as was the case in Soviet times.

The researcher had a number of conversations with residents of the village Zhurivka in Kyiv Oblast in spring 2016 that make it clear how the Soviet mentality hampers efforts to overcome economic hardships. A milk processing plant had been opened not far away from the village, and the owner offered salaries that were quite decent given the local situation. However, there was a strict hygiene and quality assurance system in place as well as a rigid security system that made it impossible to steal milk products. The mindset of most local residents did not motivate them to work properly and to respect private property. Hence, they did not want to work at the milk processing plant, though many of them complained about financial problems. This case demonstrates that it is not enough to create employment opportunities to overcome poverty, it is also necessary to take into account factors related to culture and history.

As noted above, people living in poverty develop specific behavioral patterns that also include learned helplessness. The latter becomes visible, when we look at people with a higher income. A study of the way of life and financial mindset of people representing the middle and upper classes shows that 37% of middle class respondents would like to start their own business, 24% prefer working for a global private company, while 13% would like to work in the non-governmental sector at the international level. Furthermore, 75% of middle class Ukrainians would like to

20 «Оцінка громадянами України ролі держави та бізнесу в економічних процесах. Вимоги громадян до соціальної політики держави (травень 2021 р.)», Разумков Центр, 16 червня 2021, <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-gromadianamy-ukrainy-rol-i-derzhavy-ta-biznesu-v-ekonomichnykh-protsesakh-vymogy-gromadian-do-sotsialnoi-polityky-derzhavy-traven-2021r>.

make as many decisions as possible in their work.²¹ These results demonstrate their readiness to take risks and their entrepreneurial spirit.

Contrary to the above, people living in poverty often mention that they would not like to have a job dealing with risk and responsibility. *"The perfect employment dream of such people includes running a company and the phrase 'Give me a job and a salary.'"*²² Hence, starting a business is not on the agenda here.

Apart from being reluctant to take responsibility, people living in poverty often lack knowledge. They have a low level of education, including a low civil awareness. A study of the culture of poverty shows that poor people do not understand the root cause of their situation and thus cannot find any a way to get out of it. *"Missing systemic understanding of the causes of poverty results in the lack of plausible scenarios to overcome it,"* the study authors note. At the same time, a 2020 study by the Heinrich Böll Foundation found that the majority of respondents (almost 40%) who did try to solve their private or social problems consider their efforts successful.

The political views and expectations of citizens living in poverty pose a vulnerable point that can be exploited by corrupt politicians or hostile external forces. Researchers of daily poverty practices describe the feelings of these people as follows: *"Dissatisfaction, isolation, frustration, lack of perspectives contribute to revanchist sentiments and fuel the desire to break down the existing system."*²³ Combined with a low level of civil awareness and lack of understanding of the root causes of poverty and dissatisfaction, these sentiments become generous soil for manipulations and radicalization, which makes it even more essential to solve this problem.

The decentralization reform underway in Ukraine has not yet delivered the expected results, mainly due to the institutional weakness of local self-government.²⁴ At the same time, surveys of citizens' attitude to state authorities demonstrate the high importance of the local level for human security. According to a survey conducted by the Razumkov Center in August 2021, mayors and heads of local councils where the respondents live enjoy the highest level of trust

21 «Особисті фінанси, сім'я та кар'єра — орієнтири українців в 2020», Info Sapiens, 31 липня 2021, <https://sapiens.com.ua/ua/publication-single-page?id=171>.

22 «Повсякденні досвіди бідності в Україні», Центр близькосхідних досліджень — AMES, 20 жовтня 2021, <https://uames.org.ua/povsiakdenni-dosvidy-bidnosti-v-ukraini/>.

23 Семиволос та ін., Культура (субкультури) бідності в Україні, 49.

24 Децентралізація, дата перегляду 23 листопада 2020, <https://decentralization.gov.ua/>.

among citizens (57% and 51%, respectively). On the other hand, the respondents were distrustful towards the central state bodies (state officials) in general (76%), the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (75%), courts (74%), the Government of Ukraine (72%), local courts (65%), the President of Ukraine (58%), the National Security and Defense Council (51%), and the State Security Service of Ukraine (50%).²⁵ Obviously, the level of trust in the central state bodies is much lower compared to the local self-government bodies, while trust is a crucial element of cooperation based on inclusivity. It is also the engagement of citizens in the life of their municipalities that most probably can deliver tangible results, which would foster both trust and citizens' self-confidence.

One more component that could contribute to overcoming poverty at the local level is access to the Internet, which the government is now working on.²⁶ The Internet enables people to work remotely and to sell their self-made products by mail.

Policy options and recommendations for solving the poverty problem

The UN points out that solving human security issues requires an approach with two components: protection ("top-down", from the state to a citizen) and capacity development ("bottom-up", enhancing the role of citizens in ensuring their prosperity and economic independence).²⁷ This approach should consider both objective and subjective factors as well as the local context. The UN promotes four key principles in strengthening human security: compatibility with the specific context, participation of local residents in developing and adopting decisions, inclusivity, and participation of a broad range of stakeholders.²⁸

25 «Довіра до інститутів суспільства та політиків, електоральні орієнтації громадян України (липень — серпень 2021 р.)», Разумков Центр, 10 серпня 2021, <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/dovira-do-instytutiv-suspilstva-ta-politykiv-elektoralni-orientatsii-gromadian-ukrainy>.

26 «17 тисяч населених пунктів не мають жодного оптичного провайдера — дослідження Мінцифри», Міністерство та Комітет цифрової трансформації України, 30 липня 2020, <https://thedigital.gov.ua/news/17-tisyach-naselenikh-punktiv-ne-mayut-zhodnogo-optichnogo-provaydera-doslidzhennya-mintsifri>.

27 Human Security on Theory and Practice. Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (New York: Human Security Unit, UN, 2009), <https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/Human%20Security%20Tools/Human%20Security%20in%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20English.pdf>.

28 "GPPAC ED at the UN High Level Event on Human Security," GPPAC, February 26, 2019, <https://www.gppac.net/news/gppac-ed-un-high-level-event-human-security>.

The Ukrainian state recognizes that it should take care of human security and applies approaches that are mostly in line with international practices. At the same time, the applied “top-down” mechanisms often reflect the Soviet paternalistic tradition, while the infrastructure that could help financially vulnerable citizens develop the ability to overcome their problems is sub-optimal. The reform of mechanisms for providing social services is already underway, and it will be possible in a while to assess the effectiveness of the new mechanisms.

Today, the Soviet centralized governance model is giving way to a decentralized system, with citizens showing more and more willingness to take responsibility. The fact that Ukrainians tend to have more trust in local authorities compared to the central government gives hope that the local authorities can really make a difference. The necessity to consider the local context and to operate with psychological factors (overcoming the syndrome of learned helplessness) makes the local level the natural choice for addressing poverty issues.

The transfer of powers to local authorities incentivizes them to increase their tax revenues and to stimulate local businesses. Apart from fostering business development, the local authorities have to interact with their citizens, which can include:

- Raising awareness about the responsibilities of public bodies;
- Communication measures by state and local self-government bodies to promote successful local initiatives. Research shows that Ukrainian success stories do exist. It is important to promote success stories made in Ukraine, so people have positive examples;
- Training mediators and facilitators who can work with stakeholders at the municipal level to develop joint solutions concerning local affairs. Targeted and tactical in the beginning, such solutions could become more strategic step by step;
- Promoting private initiative through the joint funding of business projects with their future owners, with the goal of making people participate and, at least partially, invest in solving their own problems. Loans or grants can only be provided to applicants who have completed the relevant training and prepared a business plan;

- Training and promoting measures to teach local residents and municipal officials to apply new approaches for cooperation and to develop joint action plans to tackle poverty;
- Developing individual psychological and group therapy at the local level. Poverty often results in social exclusion, which is why it is important to engage people in groups to discuss the existing problems and possible solutions and to share experience;
- Using the opportunities provided by the Internet and creating favorable working conditions for IT and creative professionals who live in the respective municipalities, pay their taxes there, and spend their money at local shops;
- Trainings for local residents to promote and sell folk craft products and organic fruit and vegetables online.

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2. "GPPAC ED at the UN High Level Event on Human Security." GPPAC, February 26, 2019. <https://www.gppac.net/news/gppac-ed-un-high-level-event-human-security>.
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HUMAN SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: The End of Policing or Safe Police?

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Abstract

When it comes to the policing-security relationship, civil society activists and reformers tend to go to extremes, either calling for the police to be equipped and empowered to use the most brutal tactics, or copying slogans like “abolish the police”/“disband the police.” This analysis offers a more cautious and nuanced approach to policing and security. We strive not to view police inefficiency in creating safer cities as a moral problem. Instead, we start with specific cases involving the police and analyze Ukrainian cases that, in different ways, illustrate both the intrinsic police inability to address complex social issues and the limited effectiveness of responses to immediate security challenges.

Introduction

The police are an institution to which members of the general public turn when they feel there is a disruption of the usual state of affairs and are not sure who can help or advise them. Egon Bittner, sociologist and police researcher, even defined the police by the situation of “something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now.”¹ These cases are often conflicting and unpleasant. Historians note that, over the past two centuries, patrolling, which is the usual police work, has technologically changed (telephone lines, cars, and other digital gadgets have appeared), but at the same time turned more stressful for police officers themselves since the police now tend to respond to challenges that are already tense.²

Interestingly, the legitimacy of the first police departments often relied on the return of missing children to their parents, placement of vagrants in station buildings, control over stray dogs, enforcement of building and sanitation regulations, removal of dead horses, and even first aid. The emergence and development of specialized city services, as well as the growing problem and coverage of brutal police actions have been marked by a broad public debate on the role of police in the modern world.

In some cases, police intervention is indeed needed to restore peaceful life. However, the police are actually unable to solve many of the problems addressed to them, because the majority of security problems lie far beyond the competencies and functions of the police and cannot be solved through policing. In other cases, the police can manage consequences, but not the causes.

To better understand the role of law enforcement agencies in creating safe communities, researchers distinguish between **perceived** and **actual** security.⁴ In particular, Jan Gehl addresses this distinction in his book *Cities for People*. Being

1 Egon Bittner, *Aspects of Police Work* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), 249. (Фраза в оригіналі: «something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now»).

2 Chris A. Williams, *Police Control Systems in Britain, 1775–1975: From Parish Constable to National Computer* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014).

3 Sam Mitrani, *The Rise of the Chicago Police Department: Class and Conflict, 1850–1894* (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 279.

4 See, for example, Thomas J. Mowen and Adrienne Freng, “Is More Necessarily Better? School Security and Perceptions of Safety Among Students and Parents in the United States,” *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 44, no. 3 (2019): 376–94; Lening Zhang, Steven F. Messner, and Sheldon Zhang, “Neighborhood Social Control and Perceptions of Crime and Disorder in Contemporary Urban China,” *Criminology* 55, no. 3 (2017): 631–63, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12142>.

an architect, he considers barriers, fences, warning signs, and cameras in cities as signs of danger while house windows' light on the streets as a factor of security at night.⁵

Brief Overview of the Context and Formulation of the Problem

Measuring **perceived security** is rather easy, periodic public opinion polls would be sufficient. In such surveys, respondents are usually asked whether they feel safe when they go home after 10 p.m., whether they take self-defense tools for personal safety with them, which doors they prefer (wooden or metal), which city areas they prefer to bypass, and the like.

Actual security is a much more complex concept. It can be measured (if at all) using indicators of the absence (or presence) of immediate threats, though well-being and protection can also be included in the equation. The study *Human Security: Assessment and Expectations of Residents of Four Regions of Ukraine*,⁶ conducted with the support of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, confirmed an already well-described theoretical concept of the **human security** framework,⁷ which considers the human dimension of security through a number of aspects, including economic aspect, health care, environmental protection, and others.

The **actual security** can be considered in a very narrow sense (as the absence or minimum level of crime and/or direct and immediate threats). According to the study *Data on Security in Ukraine: Limitations of Departmental Indicators and Available Approaches*,⁸ complex victimological surveys are needed to understand the actual situation since departmental data of law enforcement agencies are often extremely imperfect. Moreover, modern criminology increasingly distinguishes between "crimes" and "harm." "Crimes," often without victims (such as drinking alcohol

5 Йел Гел, Міста для людей, пер. з англ. Ольги Любарської (Київ: Основи, 2018), 106–8.

6 Оксана Міхеєва та ін., Безпека людини: оцінка та очікування мешканців та мешканок чотирьох областей України (Донецької, Луганської, Запорізької та Херсонської), Фонд ім. Гайнріха Бьолля, Бюро Київ — Україна, 2020, <https://ua.boell.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/Human%20Security%20Report%20-%20UKR.pdf>.

7 See, for example, Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin, and Sabine Selchow, "Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe," *International Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2007): 273–88; Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 4 (2001): 585–610; Peter H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, "Why Human Security?" *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 7, no. 1 (2006): 37–54.

8 Сергій Баглай та ін., Дані про безпеку в Україні: обмеження відомих показників і наявних підходів (Київ: Аналітичний центр Cedoss, Центр соціології права та кримінології, 2021), <https://cedos.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/dosl-dani-pro-bezpeku-v-ukraini.pdf>.

in public or using drugs), significantly affect perceived security while much of the “harm” caused, for instance, to residents by governments or corporations does not actually affect it.⁹

After all, departmental data on crime rates are often presented for public discussion without proper distinction between serious violent crimes (primarily murders) and other crimes, for example petty thefts. The nature of serious violent crimes is fundamentally different from the so-called victimless crimes or property crimes. Hence, “law and order,” “zero tolerance,” or “broken windows theory” policies immediately threaten to equalize all types of “disorders” — from spontaneous street trade and graffiti on the walls to fights in public space — and encourage assessing them in the same way, thus applying the same mechanics of external agents to them. Both the police and related structures, such as local law enforcement agencies (local police, municipal guard, and others), volunteer associations (Voluntary People’s Guards in the USSR, self-defense units during the EuroMaidan of 2013–2014, or neighborhood watch group), and private security companies, can serve as external agents.

Usually, the mechanism of implementing an abstract instruction-task of “public order protection” is limited to a typical patrol algorithm, regardless of the structure discussed above. Therefore, it would be more accurate to say that it is not only the National Police that conduct policing in Ukraine, but also the newly formed municipal guards and the National Guard, which is a military formation with law enforcement functions according to current law. Police researchers even use the concepts of “police fragmentation” or “multiple policing” to refer to the actors on patrol and other security measures in a given area.¹⁰ This process is not an exclusively Ukrainian phenomenon, but a rather common one, currently happening in the United States, Great Britain, and other countries. It generally involves such issues as lack of coordination, accountability fragmentation, duplication of powers, and inconsistent standards.¹¹

9 See, for example, Anne Alvesalo and Dave Whyte, “Eyes Wide Shut: The Police Investigation of Safety Crimes,” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 48, no. 1 (2007): 57–72.

10 See, for example, Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, eds., *Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Ian Loader and Aogan Mulcahy, *Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Samuel Walker and Charles M. Katz, *The Police in America. An Introduction*, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012).

11 Walker and Katz, *The Police in America*.

Hence, researchers, politicians, and police officers strive to understand **how to form the police and policing policies so that they are as effective as possible and could enable making the lives of the wider community and the police themselves safer.**

Analysis of Data and Available Evidence

Calls for tougher policing and more proactive policies, as well as a shift to military tactics, can deteriorate both perceived and actual security.

With regard to some of the quasi-police groups, their affinity with military groups raises the issue of law enforcement militarization. For example, the National Guard members are soldiers who live in barracks and take an oath. This affects their understanding of social order and the methods to restore it.¹² Peter Kraska claims that each police force is partially militarized, the only question is to what extent; hence, for him police militarization also has a quantitative dimension.¹³ Usually, police militarization has a negative effect on proper human rights observance by its officers (including a more aggressive intervention or higher chance of conflict escalation). Militarization also assumes poorer accountability, less visible identification (lack of badges and personal numbers, wearing helmets and masks), and generally less nuanced approaches to problem solving, which, as mentioned at the beginning of the article, is the quintessence of police work.¹⁴

Expanding the network of surveillance cameras is one of the dominant priorities of the Safe City program in many Ukrainian cities.¹⁵ For instance, there are almost 6,000 surveillance cameras in Kyiv now¹⁶ and the number is likely to grow. However, while they can be useful in preventing traffic violations and investigating property

12 Radley Balko, *Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces* (New York: Public Affairs, 2021).

13 Peter B. Kraska, "Police Militarization 101," in *Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings* by Roger G. Dunham, Geoffrey P. Alpert, and Kyle D. McLean, 445–58 (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2021).

14 Jonathan Mummolo, "Militarization Fails to Enhance Police Safety or Reduce Crime but May Harm Police Reputation," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115, no. 37 (2018): 9181–86, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1805161115>; War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing, ACLU Foundation, 2014, <https://www.aclu.org/report/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-police>.

15 Баглай та ін., Дані про безпеку в Україні.

16 Olha Karpenko, "Kyiv's \$16 Million Video Surveillance System Uses Hikvision Cameras Banned in the US and Europe," *Ain.ua*, May 19, 2021, <https://ain.ua/en/2021/05/19/what-is-wrong-with-hikvision/>.

crimes (such as car thefts), they do not help prevent violent crimes.¹⁷ Moreover, surveillance cameras threaten privacy and may increase anxiety among citizens.

Such “mechanization” of policing, emphasis on militaristic tactics, and unreasonable overreliance on equipment can also have a negative effect on police officers themselves. For more than a century, military structures have been experiencing what Siniša Malešević calls a “cumulative bureaucratization of violence,”¹⁸ in particular treating soldiers as standardized units. While this may be justified in military circumstances that require immediate and often harsh decisions, police work tends to require mediation and de-escalation skills. Furthermore, given limited resources, excessive emphasis on equipment (from cameras to helicopters) means underfunding of social support for police officers, especially at lower levels. Paradoxically, due to the lack of social support, police officers become the most vulnerable actors in dangerous, close to military, circumstances. A 2021 study by CEDOS and the Center for the Sociology of Law and Criminology¹⁹ found that Ukrainian police may lack social insurance against accidents at work and legal support if accidents do occur.

Thus, all of the above approaches not only do not contribute to the general public security, but also have a negative effect on police officers’ security (in the sense of “having a social support network”). Paradoxically, measures aimed at improving perceived security (such as installing cameras or creating so-called “barred communities”) do not enhance the actual security, and also worsen the perceived security. In order to find a solution, it is necessary to shift the focus of police discussions and talk about policing rather than the police and police officers, that is, about the process rather than the institution and people. Such reformatting requires identifying the spheres of public (and sometimes private) life — rather than the kind of police we seek — that we are ready to make subject to control and supervision by a state structure having an exclusive legitimate right to use violence within the country.

17 Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington, “Public Area CCTV and Crime Prevention: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” *Justice Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (2009): 716–45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07418820802506206>.

18 Siniša Malešević, *The Sociology of War and Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

19 Баглай та ін., Дані про безпеку в Україні.

Analysis of Cases with regard to the Issues Mentioned

When it comes to police impact on security, it is important to clearly understand what kind of security is considered — actual or perceived — and whom the security regards. On the one hand, David Bayley in his 1994 book *Police for the Future* demonstrated that the number of police officers is weakly correlated with crime rates.²⁰ Not everything that creates danger is a crime, and not everything that is criminal creates danger.

Police impact on perceived security significantly depends on the groups of people we consider. For example, in Britain, part of the working class concerned with social authority decline can be called “faith defenders.” They believe that more and tougher policing is needed, and that will make them feel safer. Naturally, other social groups, due to their interaction with this institution, also have their own ideas about the police and state power.²¹ Poor, marginalized groups, whose behavior, appearance, or health are criminalized, or groups excluded from public spaces (for instance, noisy groups of teenagers) may be threatened by an increased number of police officers and tougher police efforts.²²

In Ukraine, the situation is similar. For example, a study by the Expert Center for Human Rights in Vinnytsia²³ found that some respondents feel in danger in the dark when young people gather in yards, “disturbing the peace,” singing and playing a guitar, and behaving loudly. One of the respondents even claimed that she would call the police so that law enforcement officers would cut down benches in the yard and youth groups would not have a place to gather. However, the situations described by the respondents pose no direct threat to them, though they may increase the feeling of danger and, of course, may create significant discomfort. Increased policing in the areas where teenagers gather will make the teens feel threatened.

Hence, police patrols tend to face a complicated dilemma: it is impossible to cut a bench down and leave it at the same time. The situation, after all, illustrates

20 David H. Bayley, *Police for the Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3.

21 Loader and Mulcahy, *Policing and the Condition of England*, 201–19.

22 See, for example, Jonathan Ilan, “Scumbags! An Ethnography of the Interactions Between Street-Based Youth and Police Officers,” *Policing and Society* 28, no. 6 (2018): 684–96.

23 Злата Швець, Віктор Семенюк, та Юрій Белоусов, Оцінка думки громади міста Вінниці щодо діяльності місцевої міліції. Звіт за результатами соціологічного дослідження, Міжнародний фонд «Відродження», 2016, https://www.irf.ua/content/files/zvit_1.pdf.

that law mobilization, that is calling the police, generally takes place in contexts beyond the law enforcement powers by definition. The same people often voice conflicting demands: “there should be no excessive police intervention” and “the police should solve my problem”; police involvement is welcome only in situations improving the complainant’s condition, but is strongly condemned in similar circumstances with regard to someone with whom the complainant is in conflict.

The Dallas police chief described a similar situation: *“We’re asking cops to do too much [...]. We are. Every societal failure, we put it off on the cops to solve. Not enough mental health funding, let the cops handle it. [...] we got a loose dog problem; let’s have the cops chase loose dogs. Schools fail, let’s give it to the cops. That’s too much to ask.”*²⁴

Although historically, primarily in the 19th century, the police have always dealt with the homeless,²⁵ currently law enforcement agencies’ involvement in managing social issues is discussed in the context of the role of police in modern society. For example, Alex Vitale thoroughly explains law enforcement limitations in addressing social ills and, based on his research, calls for more investment in social services.²⁶ He believes that tighter police control is something authorities offer immediately and unconditionally, though, in fact, this is about vulnerable groups that, in the first place, need help. In the Ukrainian context, these are, for instance, homeless people seeking refuge, often at railway and bus stations. This is most noticeable at the largest railway station in Ukraine.²⁷ Though the basic need for security (housing, access to food and water, protection from violence) is an obvious priority for the people living there, authorities order the police and the municipal guard “to do something.”

While the previous case clearly illustrates how the police, by their design, are unable to cope with a problem rooted in completely different factors, professional criminologists continue discussing police impact on violence.²⁸ Here, once again,

24 Alex S. Vitale, *The End of Policing* (New York: Verso, 2017), 28.

25 See, for example, Mitrani, *The Rise of the Chicago Police Department*.

26 Vitale, *The End of Policing*.

27 See, for example, Анастасія Боброва та ін., «Коронавірус і безпека бездомних людей: аналіз наслідків пандемії», Cedoss, 15 вересня 2020, <https://cedos.org.ua/researches/koronavirus-i-bezpeka-bezdomnykh-liudei-analiz-naslidkiv-pandemii/>.

28 German Lopez, “Murders Are Spiking. Police Should Be Part of the Solution,” Vox, September 27, 2021, <https://www.vox.com/22580710/defund-the-police-reform-murder-spike-research-evidence>.

we should be careful about what we are talking about. If we are talking about crimes in general, it is appropriate to mention the classic quote by David Bayley:

*"The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best-kept secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that they are society's best defense against crime and continually argue that if they are given more resources, especially personnel, they will be able to protect communities against crime. This is a myth."*²⁹

This is, actually, the thesis that Alex Vitale repeats in his book *The End of Policing*: there is no correlation between the number of crimes and the number of police officers.³⁰ Nevertheless, one can criticize, for instance, the author's lack of attention to serious violent crimes and even traditional police work: investigation of murders.³¹ Since murder is the least latent crime, the number of homicides per 100,000 population often serves as an indicator of actual security in different countries.³²

Typical murder is a topic well studied by criminological intelligence.³³ A typical murder is about a private, not public, space, where two men are drinking alcohol. Globally, 81% of murders are so-called male-to-male violence,³⁴ when one man (often inadvertently) kills another man he knows.

In this context, the police, at first glance, can do little. A recent U.S. study based on 1960–2010 data demonstrates that every extra dollar spent on policing could save about \$1.63 on social bonuses exactly because of the lower number of murders.³⁵ Other nuanced recommendations³⁶ rely on a well-known criminological

29 Bayley, *Police for the Future*, 25–28.

30 Vitale, *The End of Policing*, 37.

31 Matthew Yglesias, "The End of Policing Left Me Convinced We Still Need Policing," *Vox*, June 18, 2020, <https://www.vox.com/2020/6/18/21293784/alex-vitale-end-of-policing-review>.

32 "Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 People)," The World Bank, 2021, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5>.

33 See, for example, *Global Study on Homicide — аналітичні дослідження вбивць та їх жертв за 2016–2019 рр.*

34 UNODC, *Global Study on Homicide*, United Nations, 2019, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf>.

35 Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary, "Are US Cities Underpoliced? Theory and Evidence." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 100, no. 1 (2018): 167–86.

36 David Lester, "Temporal Variation in Suicide and Homicide," *American Journal of Epidemiology* 109, no. 5 (1979): 517–20.

observation: murders often occur on holidays,³⁷ and, therefore, a police officer's "welcome visit" may be appropriate with regard to a typical killer — a previously convicted and often unemployed man who has had many complaints from neighbors or roommates concerning his aggression. Potentially, this could de-escalate a conflict and save dozens of lives a year.

Predictive policing limitations should also be considered.³⁸ Often, such programs rely on data collected by the police themselves, with algorithms biasedly pointing to potential criminals. For ethical reasons, a researcher group even decided to boycott any police assistance in developing such tools.³⁹ Probably, discussions about future law enforcement reforms will largely concern privacy while security will eventually cease to be equated with increased control and surveillance. According to Patrick Sharkey, author of *Uneasy Peace: The Great Crime Decline, the Renewal of City Life, and the Next War on Violence*, it is important to understand how to maintain positive trends in a decline of violence, extend these changes to areas with prevalent murders, and overcome inequalities often caused by law enforcement intervention.⁴⁰

Options and Recommendations for Implementing Solution Policies

By their nature, the police cannot cope with the causes of most security calls since most of them are rooted in social problems rather than people's individual shortcomings. Therefore, it is appropriate to discuss what the police should not do and what tactics should be abandoned.

In particular, it is necessary to review programs aimed at increasing the military component of law enforcement, and, thus, introduce demilitarization. The militarized policing approach tends to ignore the needs of the police

37 See, for example, Владимир Кудрявцев, «Когда праздники убивают», *Ведомости*, 9 января 2019, <https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2019/01/09/791039-kogda-prazdniki-ubivayut>.

38 Matthew Guariglia, "Technology Can't Predict Crime, It Can Only Weaponize Proximity to Policing," *Electronic Frontier Foundation*, September 3, 2020, <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/technology-cant-predict-crime-it-can-only-weaponize-proximity-policing/>.

39 Courtney Linder, "Why Hundreds of Mathematicians Are Boycotting Predictive Policing," *Popular Mechanics*, July 20, 2020, <https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/math/a32957375/mathematicians-boycott-predictive-policing/>.

40 Patrick Sharkey, *Uneasy Peace: The Great Crime Decline, the Renewal of City Life, and the Next War on Violence* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2018).

themselves, for example the need for social insurance, compliance with working hours, and legal advice and protection. Generally, the police should pose as few threats as possible while maintaining high accountability standards. Police officers should have adequate working conditions, social guarantees, and a balanced work schedule.

Another step necessary for greater urban security is a nuanced discussion on protection mechanisms. Security should not be equated with increased control while development of management decisions should consider both actual and perceived security.

The primary thing that can improve the quality of such discussions is reliable data on security in Ukraine. Data could be improved by regular victimological surveys conducted by independent sociological centers, as well as local studies, surveys, and focus groups on local issues involving residents in decision-making.

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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CITY ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AGENDA. Case Study of Housing Policy and Mobility

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Abstract

Environmental security means the creation of living conditions for the community that will contribute to maintaining the well-being of various social groups, not posing a threat to the environment, and retaining sufficient resources for future generations. This article considers environmental security in only one of its aspects, namely through its connection with climate change. Furthermore, this article describes the factors on which the level of environmental security in cities may depend, providing examples from housing and mobility.

Introduction: Climate change in the context of environmental security

At the global level, climate change is perceived as an **anthropogenic phenomenon associated with political, economic, and social processes in the world**, rather than as a natural disaster. Moreover, since the 1980s, climate change has become part of the international security discourse.¹ In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme added environmental security to the list of components of the “human security” concept. Nevertheless, neither Ukraine nor other countries have a common understanding of the connection between climate change and security.

At the global level, climate change is considered as a threat to **international security**. Climate change is considered to be a “**risk multiplier**”, i.e., a factor that, in combination with other factors, can accelerate the onset or deepen the effects of hostilities, and cause an international humanitarian crisis or mass migration.² International coalitions and organizations are agents to overcome this threat. After all, they can respond to conflicts that climate change will potentially cause, or minimize their consequences.³

At the national level, climate change can be considered a **threat to national security**. In strategic security documents of various countries (for example, the USA, the UK, Australia, and Germany), climate change is already named as one of the factors that can threaten national security.⁴ Adherents to this point of view focus on how climate change affects the country’s internal economic well-being, industry, agriculture, infrastructure, and territorial integrity and sovereignty. According to this approach, public authorities and the military are key agents for establishing and maintaining security.⁵

1 See, for example, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (1989): 162–77, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20043906>; Norman Myers, “Environment and Security,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 74 (1989): 23–41, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148850>.

2 See, for example, Joshua Busby, *Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2007); Joshua Busby, “Who Cares about the Weather?: Climate Change and US National Security,” *Security Studies* 17, no. 3 (2008): 468–504, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410802319529>; Kendra Sakaguchi, Anil Varughese, and Graeme Auld, “Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of Empirical Analyses on the Links Between Climate Change and Violent Conflict,” *International Studies Review* 19, no. 4 (2017): 622–45, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix022>; Nina von Uexkull and Halvard Buhaug, “Security Implications of Climate Change: A Decade of Scientific Progress,” *Journal of Peace Research* 58, no. 1 (2021): 3–17, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320984210>.

3 Matt McDonald, “Climate Change and Security: Towards Ecological Security?” *International Theory* 10, no. 2 (2018): 160, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971918000039>.

4 Catherine Foley and Andrew Holland, *Climate Security Report*, American Security Project, 2012, <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/climate-security-report/>.

5 McDonald, “Climate Change and Security,” 160.

Finally, climate change can be considered as a **threat to human and environmental security**. The special feature of this approach is that it focuses on the impact of climate change on various groups of people, as well as on entire ecosystem.⁶ Within this point of view, climate change is a factor that is already detrimental to security as it limits people's access to clean water and comfortable housing and affects health and efficiency. Adherents to this interpretation emphasize that the consequences of climate change are especially dangerous for **marginalized social groups**, where people do not have enough money or other resources.⁷ The importance of this approach is that it pays attention to how climate change will affect **future generations of people** and the **environment** (animals, plants, etc.). It also focuses on ecosystem resilience and establishing balance in order to sustain diversity on the planet.⁸ Within this approach, states, intergovernmental groups, international organizations, cities, and global civil society become actors that can influence the shaping of the climate change agenda.

Perceiving climate problems through the prism of **human security** has **several advantages**, rather than perceiving them from the point of view of a threat to national or international security. **First of all**, it allows including the issues of climate threats into the agenda of various international organizations, not only those directly engaged in the environmental problems. **Secondly**, this approach makes it possible to build a holistic link between climate change and social and economic inequalities, and to pay attention to human rights and protection of vulnerable populations. **Thirdly**, this point of view allows avoiding militarizing environmental policy⁹, which may be incompatible with effective and socially sensitive measures to adapt to climate change and mitigate its negative effects.

Thus, **environmental security** here means *the creation of living conditions for the community that will contribute to maintaining the well-being of various social groups, not posing a threat to the environment, and retaining sufficient resources for future generations.*

6 See, for example, Jon Barnett, Richard Matthew, and Karen O'Brien, eds., *Global Environmental Change and Human Security* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010); McDonald, "Climate Change and Security," 161–2.

7 Neil W. Adger et al., "Human Security," in *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, eds. C.B. Field et al., 755–91 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

8 McDonald, "Climate Change and Security."

9 Deudney Daniel, "Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 3 (1991): 22–8.

Of course, **environmental security** is not limited to combating climate change. It also includes issues of air, soil, and drinking water quality, waste management, etc. However, this section will primarily dwell on environmental security because of its connection with climate change. It will also focus on the social dimension of environmental security and give examples of how the level of environmental security depends on housing and mobility policies.

Brief overview of the context and formulation of the problem

Conceptual principles and strategies of environmental security in Ukraine

First of all, environmental security and access to a clean environment in Ukraine is one of the human rights enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution. According to it, everyone has the right to a safe and healthy environment and to compensation for damages caused by violation of this right. At the level of other state documents and strategies, environmental security is sometimes considered from the point of view of both national and personal security. For example, the **National Security Strategy of Ukraine**¹⁰ states that “Environmental security, in particular the safety of the human environment, is one of the highest priorities.” The Strategy also emphasizes that **climate change and the growing human-made burden on the environment** are among the threats to Ukraine’s national interests and security. The strategy points to various dimensions of environmental security, such as the deterioration of air, drinking water, and food quality in Ukraine, and notes that this has negative consequences for human health. Among the threats to national and human security, the strategy also points to the negative effects of climate change, including the increase in the number and scale of emergencies, destruction of ecosystems, and the spread of known and new infectious diseases. The strategy notes that the level of environmental security in Ukraine is also affected by hostilities in some parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as well as by the consequences of the Chornobyl disaster.¹¹ Based on this strategy, the National Security and Defense Council adopted the decision “On challenges and threats to the national security of Ukraine in the environmental sphere and priority measures to neutralize them”¹² in 2021.

10 Стратегія національної безпеки України, Указ Президента України №392/2020 від 14 вересня 2020 року, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3922020-35037>.

11 Ibid.

12 «Про виклики і загрози національній безпеці України в екологічній сфері та першочергові заходи щодо їх нейтралізації», Рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 23 березня 2021, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0018525-21#Text>.

In October 2021, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the **Strategy for Environmental Security and Adaptation to Climate Change until 2030**.¹³ The strategy emphasizes the importance of adapting social, economic, and environmental systems to climate change. According to the strategy, the areas most affected by climate change are transportation and public health¹⁴, and the authors draw particular attention to how climate change affects cities and local communities, emphasizing that city residents are vulnerable to the effects of adverse weather events.

Another document focused on improving environmental security is the **Strategy of State Environmental Policy of Ukraine until 2030**.¹⁵ An important component of the strategy is that it acknowledges the need for integrated and balanced development of economic, environmental, and social areas and emphasizes the importance of an environmental approach to sectoral policies. Climate change is a factor here that threatens international security, as it can disrupt food supply chains, degrade quality of drinking water, and endanger human life and health. The strategy's third objective is to ensure environmental policy is integrated in the decision-making process for Ukraine's socio-economic development. The objectives include: improving the quality of air, water, waste management, and management of water resources and preventing and adapting to climate change. Another objective of the strategy is to reduce emissions from mobile pollution sources to 70% of 2015 emissions by 2030.

Ukraine has also developed sectoral plans and strategies, for example, the **National Waste Management Plan until 2030 was approved in February 2020**.¹⁶ **The Drinking Water National Target Program**¹⁷, which was developed at the request of the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development and approved in 2021, is at the intersection of environmental and regional policy. The program deals with the problem of centralized water and sewerage services, which today

13 «Про схвалення Стратегії екологічної безпеки та адаптації до зміни клімату на період до 2030 року», Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України від 20 жовтня 2021 №1363-р, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-shvalennya-strategiyi-ekologichno-a1363r>.

14 Other areas affected by climate change and described in the Strategy are biodiversity, water resources, energy, fisheries, forestry, agriculture and soils, coastal areas, and tourism.

15 Про Основні засади (стратегію) державної екологічної політики України на період до 2030 року, Закон України №2697-VIII від 28.02.2019, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2697-19#Text>.

16 «Про затвердження Національного плану управління відходами до 2030 року», Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України від 20 лютого 2019 №117-р, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-zatverdzhennya-nacionalnogo-planu-upravlinnya-vidhodami-do-2030-roku>.

17 Концепція загальнодержавної цільової соціальної програми «Питна вода України на 2022–2026 роки», Документ 388-2021-р від 28.04.2021, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/388-2021-%D1%80#Text>.

are available to 69% and 47.8% of the population, respectively. The authors of the program also draw attention to the unsatisfactory quality of drinking water centralized water supply systems. They attribute this, in particular, to the obsolete infrastructure and the growing amount of new construction, which increases the load on the water supply network.

As to combating climate change, Ukraine developed the **Concept for Implementation of State Policy on Climate Change until 2030**¹⁸, which discusses the importance of including climate change issues in the agenda of various state policies, including environmental policy. The concept's objectives include reducing greenhouse gas emissions, reducing anthropogenic impact on the environment, increasing the ability of various sectors of the economy and human life to adapt to the negative effects of climate change, and developing adaptation policies at both the national and local level with special focus on communities and sectors that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

In addition, in 2021, Ukraine renewed its **national contribution to the Paris Agreement** ratified by it in 2016. Ukraine's new climate goal by 2030 is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 65% compared to 1990. However, this goal has already been criticized as being not very ambitious. If 2019 is taken as a point of comparison instead of 1990, Ukraine plans to reduce emissions by only 7% by 2030. And emission reductions are forecast not in all sectors of the economy; in fact, emissions are forecast to increase in the transportation sector.¹⁹ The principal measures mentioned to achieve this goal include thermal modernization of buildings, electrification and renovation of transportation, and introduction of a waste management hierarchy. During the last United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference, also known as COP26, Ukraine joined the international initiative Global Methane Pledge, which has the goal of reducing methane greenhouse gas emissions by 30% by 2030 compared to 2020.²⁰

At the local level, issues of environmental security and climate change are reflected in the *Strategies for Socio-Economic Development of Cities and Communities*. Regional councils must develop and approve Regional Waste Management Plans.

18 «Про схвалення Концепції реалізації державної політики у сфері зміни клімату на період до 2030 року», Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України від 7 грудня 2016 №932-р, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/249573705>.

19 Анна Акерманн, «Що змінить нова кліматична мета України до 2030 року?» Спільне, 2 листопада 2021, <https://commons.com.ua/uk/sho-zminit-nova-klimatichna-meta-ukrayini-do-2030-roku/>.

20 Олег Савицький, «Міста і кліматична криза: як змінювати інфраструктуру та політики?» Mistosite, 26 листопада 2020, <https://mistosite.org.ua/articles/mista-i-klimatychna-kryza-iak-zminiuvaty-infrastrukturu-ta-polityky>.

Both at the state and local levels²¹, all sectoral and local programs, in particular city master plans and urban planning documentation, must undergo a Strategic Environmental Assessment, which determines the impact of the proposed solutions on the environment.²² The new Strategy for Environmental Security and Adaptation to Climate Change until 2030 states that one of the objectives is to raise local authorities' awareness about measures to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change.²³

City environmental security agenda

Local decisions and policies are important for increasing environmental security, as some **environmental issues may be more pressing at the local than at the national level**.²⁴ According to the Human Security survey in four regions of Ukraine²⁵, only 7.1%²⁶ of respondents chose "environmental problems" among the problems that are most important for Ukraine. At the same time, 14.4% of respondents mentioned this option as one of the most important problems at the local level.²⁷ The survey also points out that people mostly negatively assess the environmental situation in their settlement.²⁸ In addition, residents of small settlements assess the environmental situation more positively compared to those who live in cities.²⁹ Among the important environmental problems at the level of their settlement,

21 Exceptions are state planning documents associated exclusively with national defense or emergency response, budgets, budget programs, and financial plans.

22 Про стратегічну екологічну оцінку, Закон України №2354-VIII, редакція від 01.01.2020, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2354-19#Text>.

23 «Про схвалення Стратегії екологічної безпеки та адаптації до зміни клімату на період до 2030 року».

24 Оксана Міхеєва, Безпека людини: оцінка та очікування мешканців та мешканок чотирьох областей України (Донецької, Луганської, Запорізької та Херсонської), Фонд ім. Гайнріха Бьоля — Бюро Київ, 2020, <https://ua.boell.org/uk/2020/11/16/bezpeka-lyudini-ocinka-ta-ochikuvannya-meshkanciv-ta-meshkanok-chotirokh-oblastey>.

25 Дослідження проводили у Донецькій, Луганській, Запорізькій, Херсонській областях.

26 According to another nationwide study that focused on perceptions of environmental issues, about 25.5% of people in Ukraine consider environmental issues to be one of the most pressing issues, see Світлана Балюк та ін., Екологічні тренди в Україні: погляд громадян. Звіт за результатами соціологічного дослідження (Київ: Фонд ім. Фрідріха Еберта, 2021), <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/17805.pdf>.

27 Балюк та ін., Екологічні тренди в Україні, 32–33.

28 Among those surveyed in the Human Security survey (Mikheieva 2020), about 55.1% said they were rather dissatisfied or completely dissatisfied with the environmental situation in their locality. According to the Environmental Trends in Ukraine: Point of View of Citizens survey (Baliuk et al. 2021), about 68.4% of respondents assessed the environmental situation in their localities as "definitely bad" and "rather bad."

29 Балюк та ін., Екологічні тренди в Україні, 9.

people often point to water pollution, an increase in the volume of household and industrial waste, air pollution, fires, arson, and unauthorized landfills.³⁰

As to climate change, 47.9% of Ukrainians surveyed consider it to be one of the biggest problems at the global level. At the same time, only 22.1% of respondents consider this problem urgent for Ukraine, and only 17.4% consider it urgent for their settlement.³¹ Despite relatively low concerns of the population about the effects of climate change at the local level, the number of emergencies caused by climate change in Ukraine is growing every year and will have significant negative consequences at the local level. For example, the most common of such emergencies is very heavy rainfall³²: 1,355 heavy rainfalls were recorded in the period 1986–2010, which is 44% of all natural meteorological phenomena. On average, they occur about 53 times a year³³ and cause floods and damage and destruction to transportation infrastructure and housing.³⁴ In the first half of 2020, the number of victims of weather emergencies increased (69,423 people) by 50 times compared to 2019 (1,347 people).³⁵

In addition, several temperature records were recorded in summer 2021 in Kyiv, and June 25 was the hottest day in the capital for the last 64 years.³⁶ The level of the world oceans is rising along with the rising overall average temperature on the planet. Small island states are already suffering from this rising. For example, the Fiji government has launched a resettlement program for people from villages closest to the coast and at risk of being submerged.³⁷ A similar problem may

30 See, for example, Балюк та ін., Екологічні тренди в Україні, 8–10; Міхєєва, Безпека людини, 38.

31 Балюк та ін., Екологічні тренди в Україні, 11.

32 Ольга Шевченко та ін., Оцінка вразливості до зміни клімату: Україна, Кліматичний форум східного партнерства і Робоча група громадських організацій зі зміни клімату, 2014, https://necu.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/ukraine_cc_vulnerability.pdf, 3.

33 Ibid.

34 For example, the largest flood in the last 60 years occurred in Western Ukraine in 2020. According to the State Emergency Service, 285 settlements in four regions were affected, about 10,000 houses were damaged, and 117 kilometers of roads and 64 bridges were destroyed. In the summer of 2021, 529 settlements were left without electricity because of bad weather, dozens of trees fell in Lviv from storms, and two people died, see Думанська, Марія, «Буревій у Львові забрав життя двох людей», Deutsche Welle, 2 серпня 2021, <https://www.dw.com/uk/burevij-u-lvovi-zabrav-zhyttia-dvokh-liudei/a-58727475>.

35 Анастасія Боброва та ін., Кліматична (не)справедливість: вплив зміни клімату на вразливі соціальні групи в містах України (Київ: Представництво Фонду ім. Г. Бюлля в Україні, 2020), [https://cedos.org.ua/pdf/Кліматична_\(не\)справедливість.pdf](https://cedos.org.ua/pdf/Кліматична_(не)справедливість.pdf), 16.

36 Вікторія Коломісць, «Спека у Києві б'є рекорди: температура повітря 25 червня була найвищою для цього дня за останні 64 роки», Hromadske, 29 червня 2021, <https://hromadske.ua/posts/speka-u-kyievi-bye-rekordi-temperatura-povitrya-25-cherhvnya-bula-najvishoyu-dlya-cogo-dnya-za-ostanni-64-roki>.

37 Justin Worland, "The Leaders of These Sinking Countries Are Fighting to Stop Climate Change. Here's What the Rest of the World Can Learn," Time, June 13, 2019, <https://time.com/longform/sinking-islands-climate-change/>.

affect Ukraine. About 590 settlements with 52,000 buildings may be partially or completely flooded³⁸ by 2100 because of the rising sea level. In addition, for the second year in a row, the world is battling the COVID-19 pandemic, which has endangered the safety and lives of millions of people. **All these phenomena** — extreme weather conditions, heat waves, rising ocean levels, the emergence of new infectious diseases, the decrease in green areas, deterioration of the drinking water quality — are the consequences of climate change.

The effects of climate change can be considered as a threat to environmental security at different levels, but this section focuses on the urban dimension of the problem. **First of all**, compared to other territories, cities are **more vulnerable** to negative effects of climate change due to high-rise buildings, large paved areas, developed transportation networks, and utility infrastructure, which if damaged would negatively affect the lives of city residents.³⁹

Secondly, cities not only suffer from the negative effects of climate change, but are the source of many of these problems. Cities already account for 80% of all greenhouse gas emissions and about 75% of total energy consumption throughout the world.⁴⁰ The UN predicts that the share of people living in cities will increase from 55% to 68% by 2050⁴¹, which will potentially increase emissions.

Furthermore, the role of cities in global and national decision-making systems is changing. Cities are becoming actors not only in the process of global competition for resources, capital, and people, but also at the level of countries, taking responsibility for climate change and creating networks to counter it, such as the Covenant of Mayors and C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. Reducing energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions and creating socially inclusive policies for **the housing, housing and utility infrastructure, and transportation sectors** can be an important contribution by cities to overcoming the climate crisis.⁴²

38 Олександр Голубцов та ін., Вода близько: підвищення рівня моря в Україні внаслідок зміни клімату, Екодія, 2018, https://ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/voda_blyzko_report_full-c.pdf, 35, 39.

39 Шевченко та ін., Оцінка вразливості до зміни клімату, 5.

40 Mike Hodson and Simon Marvin, “‘Urban Ecological Security’: A New Urban Paradigm?” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33, no. 1 (2009): 195, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2009.00832.x>.

41 The Right to the City and Cities for All (New York: United Nations, 2017), <https://uploads.habitat3.org/hb3/Habitat%20III%20Policy%20Paper%201.pdf>.

42 Савицький, «Міста і кліматична криза: як змінювати інфраструктуру та політики?»

Finally, cities, as “engines” of national and regional activities, consume resources unevenly.⁴³ Accordingly, they are spaces where not **only opportunities but also many social and economic inequalities are concentrated**. Thus, as the urban population increases, the issue of access of various groups of people to social benefits may become more acute, including housing, transportation, jobs, and clean air and water. At the same time, these processes will increase the impact of climate change on vulnerable groups. That is why a climate justice approach should be used in developing solutions to enhance environmental security and combat climate change.

A climate justice approach draws attention to the fact that **people who are least responsible for climate change are often the ones who suffer the most from its negative effects**.⁴⁴ First of all, socio-economic inequalities make certain groups of people more vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change. Secondly, it is difficult for vulnerable groups to **survive and recover** from extreme weather conditions.⁴⁵

Poverty is one of the pervasive factors that increases people’s vulnerability to climate change. Climate change can cause or exacerbate poverty both **directly** through destruction of housing and crop losses, and **indirectly** through rising food prices.⁴⁶ Factors that increase the poor people’s vulnerability to climate change include inaccessible and uncomfortable urban infrastructure, unaffordable and/or low quality housing, and precarious and informal employment.⁴⁷ In addition, low-income people cannot adapt their homes to climate change on their own, carry out thermal modernization, or purchase an air conditioner. Climate change is particularly difficult for people who are vulnerable by several indicators, such as the poor, those suffering from chronic diseases, the elderly, the low-income, or the homeless.

The connection between climate change and social justice is a **vicious circle**. Social and economic inequalities make some people suffer more from the effects

43 Hodson and Marvin, “Urban Ecological Security,” 195.

44 Timmons J. Roberts, “The International Dimension of Climate Justice and the Need for International Adaptation Funding,” *Environmental Justice* 2, no. 4 (2009):185.

45 Nazrul Islam and John Winkel, *Climate Change and Social Inequality*, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Working papers, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.18356/2c62335d-en>.

46 Боброва та ін., Кліматична (не)справедливість, 38.

47 Ibid, 38–9.

of climate change and, as a result, make them even more vulnerable.⁴⁸ In order to break this circle, it is necessary to develop socially sensitive environmental and other sectoral policies based on the idea of climate justice. Such policies should not only help to technically adapt and modernize various areas of the economy to the effects of climate change, but also increase the availability of **social benefits for various segments of the population**. And thus, these measures will help increase people's and communities' level of environmental safety.

Analysis of examples and cases: access to housing and mobility in the context of climate change

This section focuses on two interrelated aspects: access to housing and mobility. A house is a space where you can hide from extreme heat or cold, and a house's walls protect people from heavy rainfalls and storms. The readiness of various groups of people for climate change depends on the level of inclusiveness of countries' and cities' housing policies. The quality of housing and urban planning will determine the impact of buildings on the environment and the amount of energy they will consume. The organization of mobility will depend on where and how people will live. As most daily trips are made to and from work⁴⁹, housing and transportation policies are inextricably connected.⁵⁰

Access to housing

Housing is a basic human right granted by Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and enshrined in Article 47 of the Constitution of Ukraine. According to it, the state must create conditions in which every citizen will be able to build, buy, or rent housing. The possession or non-possession of housing determines a person's access to other social benefits: work, education, healthcare,

48 See, for example, Islam and Winkel, Climate Change and Social Inequality; Боброва та ін., Кліматична (не)справедливість.

49 According to data for 2015, 49% of trips in Kyiv were to/from work and 6% were to/from studying. These are one of the most important types of movement, as they have the longest duration and are regular (Poliukh 2017), <https://voxukraine.org/hto-kudi-j-koli-ua/>.

50 Daniel Aldana Cohen, Climate Justice and the Right to the City, Penn: Current Research on Sustainable Urban Development, 2018, <https://pennur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/Cohen.pdf>, 5.

and leisure.⁵¹ Home is a place where people **feel safe**, where they can relax and recover. The affordability and quality of housing affect people's ability **to survive and adapt to the negative effects of climate change**. Floods and other extreme weather conditions will more often **deconstruct housing**, and extremely low or high temperatures will **deteriorate the quality of available housing**. As a result of these changes, the value of the home as a safe space will only increase.

That is why the issues of adapting housing to climate change, renovating obsolete buildings, and creating a socially-just housing policy are already reflected in international climate documents and research. First of all, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) includes the need of adapting housing to climate change into its priorities. It points out that any building improvements must be based on an **inclusive policy to provide affordable and comfortable housing** for various groups of people, particularly the vulnerable.⁵²

In Ukraine, the housing affordability issue is extremely acute because of the wrong priorities in housing policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a process of mass free privatization of housing began, which continues to this day. As a result, most households live in privately owned housing.⁵³ Modern housing policy in Ukraine **encourages purchasing housing**. For example, there are various government programs that encourage purchasing housing⁵⁴, and tax legislation contributes to the further financialization of the housing sector, turning real estate into a reliable investment asset.⁵⁵

51 Павло Федорів та Наталія Ломоносова, Державна житлова політика в Україні: сучасний стан та перспективи реформування, Cedoss, 2019, https://cedos.org.ua/pdf/CEDOS_Державна-житлова-політика_Звіт.pdf.

52 Aromar Revi et al. "Urban Areas," in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. C.B. Field et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 568.

53 Федорів та Ломоносова, Державна житлова політика в Україні, 56.

54 For example, in 2002, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the strategic program On Approval of the State Youth Housing Program for 2002-2012, and in 2003 the Procedure for Partial Compensation of Interest Rates on Loans of Commercial Banks to Young Families and Single Young Citizens for Construction (Reconstruction) and Purchase of Housing was approved. A detailed analysis of state housing policy and a full list of state housing programs can be found in the State Housing Policy in Ukraine: Current Status and Prospects for Reform research by Cedoss (Fedoriv and Lomonosova 2019).

55 The real estate tax in Ukraine (Article 266 of the Tax Code) is 1.5% of the minimum wage and is charged not on the value but on the area of real estate. There is also a tax benefit for apartments with an area up to 60 m² and houses up to 120 m². The tax is not progressive, and therefore, the owner pays for each subsequent property the same amount as for the previous one. Because of such incentives, the right to housing faces a dichotomy between housing as a home and real estate as an investment asset (Fedoriv and Lomonosova 2019, 8).

However, **the need for housing is much broader than the effective demand**. Housing policy aimed at subsidizing purchases makes it impossible to develop the non-profit rental sector and hinders the creation of social and temporary housing. This exacerbates the negative effects of climate change, especially for vulnerable groups who are unable to purchase housing or who find themselves in difficult life circumstances. Finally, such a policy **encourages new construction**, especially in large cities, which contributes to the expansion of cities, increases commuting, and thus increases energy use and emissions. Furthermore, new construction is one of the reasons for overloading water supply networks and deteriorating drinking water quality.⁵⁶

Another problem at the intersection of housing and environmental policies is **obsolete housing**. The amount of obsolete housing in Ukraine **is growing every year**. According to the State Statistics Service, in 2019 the number of the obsolete housing had doubled in Vinnytsia (200 000 m²), Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv oblasts compared to 1991.⁵⁷ In 2021, the area of obsolete housing in Ukraine was 4.31 million square meters, which is about 0.43% of the total housing area.⁵⁸ These buildings are not energy efficient, as they have worn out building frames and utility networks (water and heat supply networks). **Obsolete utility infrastructure** is a factor that undermines environmental security by **limiting people's access to clean drinking water** and reducing the quality of their homes as a result of **excessive energy losses**. In Ukraine, energy consumption for heating is 250-400 kWh per square meter per year. In Germany, it is 180 per square meter per year, and in houses built using heat-saving technologies, it is 60-80 kWh per square meter per year.⁵⁹ According to research⁶⁰, energy losses in Ukraine can be significantly reduced with thermal insulation of buildings.⁶¹

56 Концепція загальнодержавної цільової соціальної програми «Питна вода України на 2022–2026 роки».

57 Федорів та Ломоносова, Державна житлова політика в Україні, 53.

58 Олександр Колесніченко, «Знести "хрущовки" з обличчя міст: як це буде і хто від цього виграє», Українська правда, 12 серпня 2021, <https://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2021/08/12/676820/>.

59 Олександр Дячук та ін., Перехід України на відновлювану енергетику до 2050 року. Звіт за результатами моделювання базового та альтернативних сценаріїв розвитку енергетичного сектору (Київ: Видавництво ТОВ «АРТ КНИГА», 2017), https://ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/perehid_ukraini_na_vidnovlyuvanu_energetiku_do_2050_roku.pdf, 35.

60 Ibid.

61 It is worth noting that the Energy Efficiency Fund is working on renewing obsolete utility infrastructure, providing grants for condominiums to cover part of the costs for major repairs and thermal modernization. There is a national Warm Home program, which reimburses part of the cost of loans to purchase energy efficient equipment for condominiums and individuals. Some cities also have individual programs for co-financing major repairs and upgrading utility infrastructure, in particular there are 70/30 programs for energy efficiency and major repairs in Kyiv. Under this program, partial reimbursement is provided for the cost of work, such as heat insulation of the facade, replacing windows, and technical re-equipment of utility networks. To learn more about the programs, please visit: <https://teplo.org.ua/programs>.

Access to mobility

High-quality and climate-neutral mobility is one of the key preconditions for environmental safety. The convenience of life in a city and the health and well-being of city residents depend on mobility. On the one hand, uninterrupted and comfortable mobility directly depends on weather conditions. Natural meteorological phenomena, which have become more frequent because of climate change, **can damage** transportation infrastructure, **delay** transportation, and **reduce its quality**.⁶² On the other hand, transportation is one of the **sectors producing the most harmful emissions**, especially in cities. That is why international documents and strategies emphasize the importance of transforming mobility to combat climate change. In particular, part of the European Green Course is the Strategy for Sustainable and Smart Mobility, the main goal of which is to reduce emissions from transportation by 90% by 2050.⁶³

As transportation produces a significant share of greenhouse gas emissions, changes are also needed in the approaches to transportation policy. For example, the transportation sector⁶⁴ in Ukraine accounts for about 19% of emissions in the energy sector⁶⁵ and 10-12% of total greenhouse gas emissions.⁶⁶ At the same time, vehicles accounted for about 71% of these emissions in 2019. To compare, rail and aviation account for only 1.5% and 0.5% of greenhouse gas emissions in the transportation sector, respectively.⁶⁷ According to the State Statistics Service, cars produced 78% of harmful substance emissions in the air in 2015 in Kyiv alone, while energy companies generated 11% of emissions, and other modes of transportation generated only 6%.⁶⁸ Accordingly, the increased number of private

62 Revi et al. "Urban Areas," 559.

63 Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy — Putting European Transport on Track for the Future, European Commission, 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0789>.

64 The transportation sector here includes motor transportation (private, passenger, freight, municipal; freight and passenger railway); gas and oil pipeline transportation; air; marine; off-road transportation; and agricultural, construction, and industrial production machinery. A detailed description of the sector can be found in the report of the Center for Economic Recovery, 2021, https://ubta.com.ua/files/20210713/Annex_1.pdf.

65 Звіт щодо визначення другого національного визначеного внеску України до Паризької кліматичної угоди.

66 Ірина Бондаренко, Разом до сталої і розумної мобільності, Екодія, 2021, <https://ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/razom-do-staloi-mobilnosti.pdf>, 5.

67 Звіт щодо визначення другого національного визначеного внеску України до Паризької кліматичної угоди, 17.

68 Богдан Тишкевич та Іван Вербицький, «Обережно, автомобілі! Які ризики для здоров'я несе забруднення повітря у Києві», Mistosite, 31 липня 2018, <https://mistosite.org.ua/articles/oberezhno-avtomobili-yaki-ryzyky-dlia-zdorovia-nese-zabrudnennia-povitria-u-kyievi>.

cars in cities will only worsen the air pollution. Furthermore, the increased paved areas contributes to the phenomenon of urban heat islands.⁶⁹

The policy of prioritizing road infrastructure over public transportation, micro-mobility, and pedestrian infrastructure is not only environmentally unsustainable but also economically unprofitable. Since cars need more space than, for example, public transportation, they carry far fewer people in the same period of time. Constructing, maintaining, and upgrading such infrastructure is much more expensive. Disproportionately higher support for private transportation compared to other types of mobility leads to deepening social inequalities. A minority of citizens can afford to buy and keep a car, while everyone needs public transportation and pedestrian infrastructure.

In Ukrainian cities, the **majority of the population uses public transportation for daily trips**. In Kyiv, public transportation carried about 57% of passengers in 2015.⁷⁰ In Lviv, cars were usually used by 23% of residents, and 52% traveled by public transportation in 2019.⁷¹ In Zhytomyr, according to 2019 data, 46% of residents used public transportation, 37% walked, and only 15% traveled by private cars. However, public transportation in many Ukrainian cities remains uncomfortable and is not adapted to climate change; the fleet is often insufficient and the routes of different modes of public transportation may be unrelated.

However, some cities have already begun transformations to improve their transportation infrastructure. In 2020, such plans were available in Lviv, Zhytomyr, Mykolayiv, and Poltava, and were under development in Kherson, Kyiv, and Sumy. Some cities have similar documents, for example, the Concept of Sustainable Transport and Mobility is part of the Strategy for Integrated Development in Chernivtsi. These documents' **priorities include** developing public transportation, creating bicycle infrastructure, increasing traffic safety, encouraging walking, establishing connectivity between city and suburban routes, arranging parking space, and developing multimodal transportation. **The solutions** proposed by

69 An urban heat island is a meteorological phenomenon when the temperature in certain parts of the city is higher than in the surrounding rural areas. This phenomenon can be best seen in summer and winter. The main factors contributing to this phenomenon are replacing the natural cover of the earth's surface with artificial surfaces that are heat up quickly by the sun and do not evaporate moisture (Cedos and Ekoltava 2020, 12).

70 Полюх, «Хто, Куди й Коли».

71 Тетяна Приходько, «Мобільність львів'ян: результати дослідження», Мобільність Львова, 30 серпня 2019, <https://mobilitylviv.com/lviv-modal-split-survey-results-2019/>.

the plans are to organize dedicated lanes for public transportation, priority crossing at intersections for public transportation, introducing a single ticket for different modes of transportation, and developing a system of green corridors.

Conclusions

The concept of security is socially constructed. Things that harm some people are not always perceived as a threat to others. However, climate change is a globally recognized anthropogenic phenomenon that affects human life and health, undermines the balance of ecosystems and the well-being of future generations. That is why environmental issues have become part of the security discourse since the 1980s.

There are several approaches to interpreting the environmental security concept. It can be considered at the international, national, or personal level. Understanding environmental security from the point of view of human security has several important advantages. First of all, it allows including issues of combating climate change in the agenda of various international organizations, not only those directly concerned with environmental issues. Secondly, it creates the possibility to pay attention to human rights and protecting vulnerable populations. Thirdly, such a vision allows avoiding the militarization of climate policy.

Environmental security is important, particularly at the city level, as high-rise buildings, large numbers of residents, and transportation only increase the vulnerability of cities to the negative effects of climate change. On the one hand, cities consume a huge amount of resources and produce a huge amount of pollution. On the other hand, they have the resources to counter climate change through solutions to transform social and climate policies.

Since cities are not only spaces of opportunity, but also areas of concentrated inequalities, we should not forget about the **social aspect of environmental security**. In fair cities, with a high level of environmental security, it is important to ask for which groups of people we will develop urban development policies and **whose security we will protect**.

The climate justice approach allows us to look at environmental security in terms of protecting vulnerable populations. After all, climate justice emphasizes that those people who are least responsible for climate change suffer from its negative effects the most. Environmental security issues should be integrated into various

sectoral policies, which will help to technically adapt and modernize different areas of the economy to the effects of climate change. At the same time, these policies should pay attention to the problems of accessing **social benefits for various categories of the population** and thus contribute to improving the personal environmental security of people.

Recommendations

In order to ensure that housing policy helps to improve environmental security, attention should be paid to housing affordability and quality. On the one hand, home is an important condition for adapting to climate change on a personal level. On the other hand, the arrangement to provide housing has a direct impact on the environment. In Ukraine, one problem is the wrong priorities in housing policy that support purchasing real estate, which encourages new construction and developers. Eventually, those who do not have enough money to buy an apartment risk to be excluded and are exposed to the risk of becoming homeless. In this area, it is important both to adapt and renovate existing buildings and utility infrastructure, and to reorganize government policies to increase housing affordability.

What can be done at the local level?

- Expand municipal funds for social housing.
- Create chains of free temporary shelters and day care centers for the homeless and people in difficult life circumstances.
- Expand networks and upgrade water supply systems, prioritizing quality drinking water that will be supplied centrally by the city.
- Bring thermal modernization of at least 30% of multi-apartment housing to energy efficiency class “B” by 2030 and reduce the specific consumption of buildings to 120 kWh/m² in 2030 and to at least 50 kWh/m² in 2050.⁷²

⁷² Бачення Екодії щодо дорожньої карти участі України у ЄЗК, Екодія, 20 квітня 2021, <https://ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/ezk-ua-fin.pdf>, 5.

In the area of mobility, in order to increase the level of environmental security, it is necessary to build transportation infrastructure taking into account the climate change factor: use materials that are resistant to extreme temperatures and arrange stops so that they are protected from heat and heavy rainfalls. It is also necessary to work on reducing emissions from transportation by encouraging pedestrian and bicycle mobility and improving the quality of public transportation. An important element is transitioning to electric mobility both for private cars and public transportation. Finally, the social aspect of mobility needs to be taken into account, and it is important to remember that vulnerable groups are the most dependent on urban infrastructure. Regular and reliable, clean-air public transportation from which you can conveniently transfer to other modes of transportation can mitigate the effects of climate change on vulnerable groups and increase both personal and general urban environmental security.⁷³

What can be done at the local level?

- Develop and adopt Sustainable Environmental Mobility Plans.
- Arrange dedicated lanes for public transportation.
- Develop and adopt Cycling Infrastructure Development Strategies.
- Prioritize public transportation when investing in the city transport infrastructure.
- When upgrading existing and building new infrastructure, use materials that are resistant to climate change.
- Introduce single electronic ticket systems for different modes of transportation.
- Develop pedestrian and bicycle infrastructure in cities, in particular to equip 100% of urban main roads for pedestrians and 50% for cyclists (including land crossings, barrier-free infrastructure).⁷⁴

⁷³ Боброва та ін., Кліматична (не)справедливість, 21.

⁷⁴ «Стала міська інфраструктура починається з пріоритету пішоходів», Екодія, 27 липня 2021, <https://ecoaction.org.ua/stala-miska-infra-pochynaetsia-z-priorytetu-pishokhodiv.html>.

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