



HUMAN SECURITY:

assessment and expectations
of the residents of the four
oblasts of Ukraine

(Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia,
and Kherson)

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**HUMAN SECURITY:
ASSESSMENT AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE RESIDENTS
OF THE FOUR OBLASTS OF UKRAINE (DONETSK,
LUHANSK, ZAPORIZHIA, AND KHERSON), 2020**

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OF THE FOUR OBLASTS OF UKRAINE**

**(DONETSK, LUHANSK,
ZAPORIZHIA, AND KHERSON)**

2020



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ABBREVIATIONS

FGS — focus group study

AH — amalgamated hromada
(amalgamated community)

UTS — urban-type settlement

HOA — home owners' association

INTRODUCTION

Security policy is often perceived through the lens of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, the actions or inaction of law enforcement agencies, the presence and absence of potential threats. Observing how events unfold in today's world, there is evidently a need to rethink this perception and adopt a broader understanding of this idea. Any country is primarily based on security and well-being of its citizens.

Every era, decade and even year brings new challenges and threats. The classic understanding of protecting yourself against the external enemy is now complemented by internal challenges and threats. The danger has taken on a new image: misinformation and populism, the pandemic, corruption and the economic crisis, social inequality and the unsatisfactory situation with the environment. The list of challenges may be endless, but they are present in our daily lives, these are the factors that people feel most acutely.

Under these conditions, it makes sense to look at the concept of **human security**, of-

ten mentioned in the Western narrative. This concept offers a broader interpretation of "security" where policy is based on how citizens are impacted. According to the 1994 Human Development Report by UNDP, "human security" includes the following elements:

- Political security
- Personal security
- Economic security
- Food security
- Health security
- Environmental security
- Community security

That is why in our research, it was important to us to focus on people's opinions and their understanding of "security." What does the population need to feel protected and safe? End of the war in Donbas (how and on what conditions)? Strong and smooth government policy (how should it be manifested)? Or stability on the ground? What are the needs, challenges and barriers to feeling safe? This report summarises the results of a sociological survey conducted in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. The findings represent

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not only an understanding of “security” as a concept, but also explore the main areas of human security, namely: personal, political, economic security, as well as cross-cutting topics such as health security, environment security, and community security in general.

The findings served as the basis for key conclusions and recommendations that are useful for decision-makers at the national and local levels, local governments of these oblasts, civil society, and international organisations.

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METHODOLOGY

GEOGRAPHY OF THE PROJECT

Zaporizhzhia, Kherson oblasts, and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts controlled by Ukraine.

RESEARCH METHODS

1) Quantitative part:

During July 18 — August 11, 2020, the Ukrainian Center for Sociological Research Socioinform conducted a survey using the CAPI method (questionnaire interview “face2face” using a computer (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing)). Sample size: 1,000 people aged 18 and older.

The sample was constructed as representative for four Ukrainian oblasts (Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk except for the occupied territories).

The sample is a quota-based, stratification, multi-level one. Quotas were based on:

- The type of the locality (oblast capital, other cities, villages);

- The size of the locality (cities with a population of more than 500,000, cities of 100-499 thousand, cities 50-99 thousand, cities 20-49 thousand, cities and urban-type settlements with a population of less than 20 thousand, villages);
- Gender;
- Age of respondents.

The sampling error with a confidence level of 0.954 {excluding the design effect} for the array as a whole does not exceed 3.1% for indicators close to 50%; does not exceed 2.7% for indicators close to 25% or 75%; does not exceed 1.4% for indicators close to 5% or 95%; does not exceed 0.6% for indicators close to 1% or 99%.

The sampling error with a confidence level of 0.954 {excluding the design effect} for each of the oblasts does not exceed 6.2% for indicators close to 50%; does not exceed 5.4% for indicators close to 25% or 75%; does not exceed 2.7% for indicators close to 5% or 95%; does not exceed 1.2% for indicators close to 1% or 99%.

2) Qualitative part:

- 8 FGS (in each oblast — 1 FGS with representatives of oblast and other types of cities and towns, 1 FGS — with representatives of urban-type settlements and villages; out of 4 rural FGS — 2 represent territories that are part of the amalgamated hromada (AH), 2 — territories that are not part of AH.
- 8 in-depth interviews, with respondents who hold certain positions or engage in public activities and proportionally represent oblasts and key areas important for “human security.”

Key semantic blocks of the questionnaire and interview guide:

- Sociodemographic parameters of respondents (basic — gender, age, marital status, education; additional — characteristics of employment at the time of the survey; questions about identity).
- Understanding the essence of security and its manifestations.
- The general assessment of problems in the country and locality.
- Personal security.
- Political preferences and political activity.
- Law enforcement and security.

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC PARAMETERS OF RESPONDENTS¹

Out of 1,000 respondents (250 people in each oblast), 44.8% are men and 55.2% are women. In terms of age, respondents represent the following groups: 15% — 18-29 years, 19% — 30-39 years, 17% — 40-49 years, 17% — 50-59 years, 32% — 60 and older (Appendix 1, Fig. 1).

Oblast centers represent 28.2% of respondents, other cities — 31.8%, urban-type settlements (UTS) — 13.2%, villages — 26.8%.¹ Fig.2).

More than half of the respondents are in a registered marriage. Unregistered cohabitation — 8%, divorced — 11.6%, and those who separated but did not file for divorce — 1.2%. 13.5% are widows and widowers (mostly women) and 14.9% are those who have never been married (Appendix 1, Fig. 3).

The educational parameters of the respondents are as follows — 19% have secondary education (incomplete and general secondary together), 49% — secondary special, 31% — higher (according to different classifications, those variations that cover modern bachelor's and master's), 1% — have a PhD degree (Appendix 2, Fig. 1)

At the time of the survey, 46.3% (463 people) were employed, and 53.7% of respondents (537 people) were not employed for various reasons. 30% of respondents are retired. Some of them fall into the group of those who were not employed at the time of the survey. Details of the nature of employment of respondents are contained in the appendices (Appendix 2, Fig. 2).

1

Data visualisation
—
in Appendix 1.
Socio-
demographic
parameters of
respondents.



BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

THE IMAGE OF SECURITY ACCORDING TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE STUDY

Almost all research participants (in this case we are talking about FGS and in-depth interviews) talk about security in its broadest sense — as human security, constructing the latter as a full functioning and adequate management of various spheres of society, which ultimately forms a sense of comfort and security.

The security model constructed by the participants includes the following components: financial security; physical security (with an emphasis on pro-

tection from violence in everyday life); access to quality, guaranteed and affordable medical services; freedom of expression and protection from persecution for the political or civil position; freedom of movement (which is understood rather as the ability to move freely in their locality without fear of attack or aggression); full-fledged work of the law enforcement system; the possibility to protect one's honour and dignity; availability of comprehensive government services on various aspects of life; protection against external aggression, control over the circulation of weapons; psychological security and the "right to the future" (this means the possibility of a wider planning horizon).

HUMAN SECURITY, ... , A FULL FUNCTIONING AND ADEQUATE MANAGEMENT OF VARIOUS SPHERES OF SOCIETY, WHICH ULTIMATELY FORMS A SENSE OF COMFORT AND SECURITY.

CAUSES AND FACTORS FORMING A SENSE OF DANGER

Participants of the research relate factors that cause a sense of danger to the following aspects:

The physical aspect of security (experience of both real and perceived threat of violence or manifestations of aggression, which forces a person to devote a lot of time to thinking about and implementing protection strategies. Eventually, this significantly changes the lifestyle of the average person — affects the choice of time to move on the streets, the attitude to their appearance, forces them to make efforts, including financial, to strengthen the protection of themselves and their property/housing).

The economic aspect of security is described by the participants as a number of situations and conditions that force a person to constantly live in a situation of uncertainty, unpredictability, significantly limited planning horizon, worry about the lack of family budgets and constantly live in fear of lack of money, the lack of “financial cushion” which could help a person/family survive a crisis or a job loss.

One of the key points in talking about threats is **the medical aspect**. It is relevant due to the incomplete nature of medical reform and is exacerbated by increased attention to the medical sphere during the pandemic. In the results of both quantitative and qualitative research, we see the general attitude of the respondents — lack of confidence that it would be possible to receive high-quality and effective medical care in the place of residence free of charge and fears about the possible official or “grey” price of healthcare.

Another factor forming the sense of danger is the lack of a well-functioning **social protection system**. The latter works with fixed categories of the population (people with disabilities, temporarily unemployed, large families, etc.) and is part of local government services. Accordingly, the average person who finds himself or herself in a difficult life situation, in fact, has nowhere and no one to turn to for help and mostly does not turn to anyone but relatives. This situation becomes even more problematic for migrant workers, whose “registration” does not coincide with the actual place of residence and limits the ability to apply for assistance due to its attachment to local budgets.

The unprocessed memory of the war and the changes in daily life that have occurred because of the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons among the population enhance the sense of danger. This motive reflects the fact that the population of two of the areas of interest — Donetsk and Luhansk — continues to live very close to the contact line and depends on the balance of power. Even though the population of these regions characterises the current situation as relatively peaceful, their experience of the active phase of hostilities in 2014-2015 is largely present in their mind right now, actively voiced, and remains a deep trauma that continues to affect their attitude to the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian army and requires careful work with the population of frontline areas given the specific reality they are forced to live in.

The last important component of the danger construct is the image of the **“dangerous other.”** The latter is reflected in the survey — most respondents said that only their immediate environment has a positive impact on them and their lives — family, relatives, and to a lesser extent — friends, neighbours, colleagues. Instead, the number of categories of negative impact is much bigger and their impact is more pronounced. We see the same in descriptions of various situations in which people feel unsafe — any stranger is perceived primarily as a potential threat (both at night on an unlit street and in business relationships for fear of being deceived). Reflecting on this problem, the participants of the study partially connect this phenomenon with the lack of unity in Ukrainian society, with the lack of experience of solidarity and interaction. The lack of direct and successful contact with other people increases the wary attitude towards nominal “others.”

RANKING AND DETAILING OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS

In the situation of choosing from the proposed list of problems (filling out the questionnaire) that may be related to the feeling of security **at the level of the country as a whole**, survey participants primarily emphasise the problem of ending the war (46.4% of all respondents), lack of money for food and basic needs (39.4%), and corruption of government officials (39.4%). **At the level of the municipality** the problem of lack of money for food and basic problems (32.2%), the problem of availability of quality medical care (29.9%), and unemployment (29.3%) come to the fore. FGS participants and interlocutors were invited during in-depth interviews **to make lists** of the most important problems from their point of view, indicating the level at which they are most pronounced — at the level of the whole nation or the area where the research participant lives. Thus, we have another list of problems that the research participants talk about “unprompted”. Accordingly, these are the problems they hear about and that become the subject of reflection, anxieties, evaluation, and affect the perception of the surrounding reality. In this way, we have the opportunity not only to identify key issues but also to understand their essence and perception from the standpoint of respondents.

At the national level as a whole, the problem of **war and its termination** comes first. However, most participants of the study avoid talking about possible scenarios for the end of the war; if they talk about the need for negotiations, they prefer not to name the parties that should conduct this negotiation process. Lack of a clear position on the armed conflict (or unwillingness to show it)

can be a serious problem in the implementation of certain steps to resolve the conflict, as such actions may encounter an unpredictable reaction from the population. The record of these positions in the quantitative study shows the dominance of the “compromise” strategy in resolving the conflict, but we do not have a detailed explanation of the essence of this compromise during the discussions.

Almost all respondents actively emphasise the destructive impact of **corruption** on their lives and well-being. According to the research participants, corruption is absolute, pervasive, and ultimately degrading for human dignity, as an individual is perceived solely through the prism of solvency. However, detailing the understanding of this phenomenon through examples from the everyday life of the participants of the study allows us to say that we are talking about grassroots bribery, rather than examples of corruption perpetrated by government officials. The average person usually has no direct experience of government corruption but is willing to believe in it, based on their daily experience of under-the-counter payment for various services. This point is important to understand, because such guidelines and attitudes shape the attitude of the population to the government system as a whole, as these “unofficial” payments for budget services are perceived as a general failure in the functioning of the state. Understanding these attitudes and practices is important because their high prevalence reduces the chances of normal cooperation between the government and the public.

The problem that is difficult to study and understand is **poverty**, unemployment, complaints about high tariffs and limited family budgets, which are only enough to cover basic expenses. Even

though such rhetoric is highly relevant, it is quite difficult to translate it into objective indicators. However, in this case, we can talk about the prevalence of subjective “trauma” by poverty, which in any case affects the negative attitude towards the state and government officials. Closely connected with the discourse of “poverty” is the claim that the country has lost its industrial character and the closure of industrial enterprises, which, according to respondents, have led to further degradation of the labour force and the social sphere. The image of the “factory” as a whole retains its symbolic and nostalgic outlines of stability, security, guaranteed work, and social package.

Largely pronounced is the motive of **inequality and injustice**, the sense of which is based on the non-universal nature of laws, their differentiated application to people from different segments of the population, unequal access to socially significant benefits and opportunities. This feeling is also related to people’s assessment of their life chances and prospects.

At the local level, the set of problems is generally the same — most participants in the study emphasise that all these problems are cross-cutting and cover all levels of public life. However, as an additional aspect at this level, we can highlight **infrastructure problems**. The latter gain significant weight because they not only reduce the comfort of the space in which people live but also cause segregation, cutting off the primarily rural population from quality services (including medical) as well as opportunities for educational, cultural, and sports development. Besides, the assessment of problems at the local level provides a significant update on the **environmental problem**. This means the lack and quality of water, air pollution,

fires and arson, spontaneous landfills (which occur due to the lack of recycling plants, and due to the practices of the residents themselves, who do not want to pay for garbage removal and dump it in the open or near localities).

PERSONAL SECURITY

Respondents focus primarily on financial and health issues while speaking during FGS and in-depth interviews about the **personal level of security** and issues. They also convey their feelings of uselessness, worthlessness; they talk about the lack of opportunities for personal fulfilment and lack of sense of the future (as an opportunity to plan their lives at least a year or two ahead).

Ukrainian society remains characterised by a minimum radius of trust, which includes only close circles of communication — especially family and relatives, as well as friends, acquaintances, neighbours, and colleagues. All other groups are practically excluded from the positive environment of the respondents. Instead, the choice of groups of people who, in the opinion of the respondents, are present in their lives and have a negative impact is much wider. Among the leaders of the negative influence were the “Ukrainian government,” journalists, and representatives of political parties. These three groups are united by a general rejection of what the average person associates with politics and the political in general. Detailing of **the general sense of security** depending on the type of locality suggests that **people in rural areas feel safer than in the city**. At the same time, we see that the oblast capitals seem somewhat better, though not significantly, in terms of security than other cities in the region. The nature of the study with its focus

on security issues and causes gives the impression of respondents’ total dissatisfaction with their lives. The associations method quickly activates local patriotism in the participants of the study and allows them to move away from a purely problematic vision of one’s space. In quantitative terms, we see that on average **just over 60% of respondents believe that the space of their locality is generally safe**. Assessment of life and position in society at the level of general philosophical phrasing of the question shows that most respondents are satisfied with their lives (satisfied with life — 65.7%, with their position in society — 68.6%). One in five respondents is dissatisfied with their life and one in eight does not have an exact answer to this question.

POLITICS AND SECURITY

At the time of the survey, 66% of respondents said they planned to vote in the local elections. Their motivation for participation has its peculiarities. Most of the interlocutors who participated in FGS and in-depth interviews demonstrated a **“fatalistic” position, noting that they consider their participation in the election important but at the same time that it would not affect anything**.

The conversation about grounds for electing a local-level candidate confirms the dominance of the “personal” type of voting — voters are most inclined to support the candidate for his or her personal qualities (that is, in fact, for the image that is formed by advertising messages). The importance of party affiliation of candidates was noted by 16.7% of respondents (choosing from a list of other characteristics of candidates). During the FGS, choosing

between “party affiliation” and “non-partisanship”, the audience was split almost in half. However, the arguments “for” and “against” the party affiliation of the candidate are quite contradictory and unstable (people in the discussion easily reject their own arguments).

Clarification of expectations from the candidate during FGS and in-depth interviews demonstrate the importance of “**political biography**” (list of specific implemented projects), “**relatable candidate**” (the criterion is primarily the local origin of the candidate and his / her children who study in Ukraine and not abroad), **personal qualities** (it is first and foremost a communication component, which includes the skill to speak to the public and accessibility, the opportunity to contact the candidate and get a response).

In general and during the FGS, participants of the study demonstrated a willingness to support a person who meets certain subjective and often stereotypical ideas about a politician. Voters are practically not interested in either the political program or the candidate’s strategy. Moreover, **the paradoxical nature of the average**

person’s way of thinking is that at the level of requirements, people voice the desire for long-term change, hard and unobtrusive work to improve almost all areas of life; however, they tend to support candidates who can demonstrate simple and visible results such as a paved road, a new playground, etc.

According to respondents, **the leaders among the representatives of political parties in the local elections are the Opposition Platform for Life and the Servant of the People.** The choice in favour of a certain political force does not depend on the type of locality (except that in villages and urban-type settlements there is a higher percentage of those who have not yet decided on the choice). **The support of the Opposition Platform for Life increases with the age of the respondents, while the audience of the Servant of the People is shifted towards younger age. There are also differences between oblasts — Donetsk and Luhansk are more supportive of the Opposition Platform for Life, Zaporizhia and Kherson are more willing to support the Servant of the People representatives.** However, a high percentage of those who have not yet decided either

**GROUNDS FOR ELECTING
A LOCAL-LEVEL CANDIDATE CONFIRMS
THE DOMINANCE OF THE “PERSONAL”
TYPE OF VOTING —
VOTERS ARE MOST INCLINED
TO SUPPORT THE CANDIDATE FOR HIS
OR HER PERSONAL QUALITIES.**

on the issue of participation in the elections or on the political force for which they will vote to remain silent about the local elections.

The proposal for participants of FGS and in-depth interviews to formulate a potential “request” to a local councillor also provides important information. In these requests, we see the expectation that almost all the problems that were discussed at the beginning should be resolved. **The local councillor must ensure the comfort and safety of life on the ground in all aspects — to provide people with jobs, education, quality medical services, infrastructure, etc.** Obviously, such expectations are essentially impossible in real life. Conventionally inflated expectations combined with demonstrated low political activity systematically lead to the disappointment of the electorate in the elected candidates, lack of trust, and overall faith in the effectiveness and efficiency of the electoral system and the government.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVITY

As for political participation and activity of most potential voters, **61.5% of respondents said they did not engage in any activity.** The most prominent items on the list (for 9-10% of respondents) are appeals to public utilities and institutions of their locality, signing petitions, appeals to local authorities (mayor’s office, executive committee, oblast council, village council, oblast administration). The next 6-7% stated that they participated in volunteer activities, appealed to local councillors, and participated in election campaigns. This means mostly **conventional political activity.**

Out of the nearly 40% of respondents who have tried to solve their own or social problems in one way or another, the majority evaluate their actions as effective. Such assessments actively **deny social mythology that nothing can be achieved or changed.**

During FGS and in-depth interviews, we tried to find out how the amalgamation of the territories affects the general atmosphere in the locality and the activity of the residents. However, in most cases, it was a short-term experience that is not yet fully understood by the research participants. The AH heads who took part in the interview emphasised the problem of incomplete reform, which resulted in a situation where authority was transferred to the community while resources remained part of the local executive structures. Under such conditions, there is a situation when the requirements for the management of AH from the population are growing, and meeting them is quite problematic. Nevertheless, AH practice has intensified local business initiatives and the work on preparing various projects for funding.

In cities and towns, **HOAs are increasingly becoming an example of the possibility and success of collective action to improve living spaces.** The latter is transformed into mini-laboratories to gain experience of collective action and responsibility. These experiences are not equally successful, but they attract people’s attention.

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF FEARS AND ANXIETIES

The quantitative part of the study showed a significant **population polarisation in the estimates of key foreign policy vectors**. The least worrying for the population is the prospect of rapprochement with Russia, which, with a significant percentage of those expressing concern about closing its borders with Russia, indicates a high level of loyalty to Russia and a willingness to make concessions. We see the same in the rhetoric about possible ways to resolve the situation in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which is more characterised by the rhetoric of compromise than victory. Detailing these preferences during the FGS and interviews shows that despite the awareness of the problem of war as a key to the country, people mostly avoid talking about possible scenarios of its ending and the parties to the negotiations. However, the cessation/termination of the war is declared as one of the key demands to the government. In those isolated cases when these scenarios are voiced, the rhetoric is far from victorious. These are mainly negotiations and agreements with Russia and the so-called “unrecognised republics.” Several issues related to a number of aspects of national identity were a possible deepening of the understanding of the participants’ attitudes to key domestic and foreign policy challenges. Despite the lack of a clearly established direct link between national identity and political or foreign policy preferences, this issue merits special attention and is often taken into account in organising political campaigns or formulating political messages from both the parties and the government.

We observe **generational differences in the distribution of groups by nationality**.

There is a clear tendency to the increasing percentage of those who identify as Ukrainians from senior to junior age (69% in the group “60 and older” and 87.7% — in the group “18-29 years”). Comparisons of respondents’ answers regarding their native language and the language of use allow us to speak **on the importance for respondents to declare Ukrainian as “native”** even in cases when it is not actively used by them in everyday life. Almost half of the respondents speak Russian at home and work. In the oblasts under research, 10-12% of respondents speak Ukrainian in their everyday life. However, we should note a significant group of respondents who emphasise their bilingualism, claiming that they communicate in both languages equally. Thus, we can say that in the regions that are traditionally nominated as “Russian-speaking,” almost half the respondents know, tolerate, and are ready to use the Ukrainian language in various situations of their daily lives.

Detailing of language use depending on what language the respondents marked as native (Ukrainian, Russian, or both equally) allows us to talk about **no significant differences in the practices of using a language in the official workspace and private space at home**. Among those respondents who identified Ukrainian as their mother tongue, 27-28% speak Ukrainian at work, 23-25% speak Russian, and 47-50% speak both languages equally. Among respondents who identify Russian as their mother tongue, 2-3% speak Ukrainian at work and at home, 13-17% speak both languages and 80-55% speak Russian. Among those who identified themselves as bilinguals, 4-7% speak purely Ukrainian, 33-40% — Russian (in this case, the use of Russian increases in the workplace — 40.4%

speak Russian at work and 32.8% — at home) and 56-60% speak both languages equally at home and at work.

In the next question, we asked respondents to move from the question of nationality and language to self-esteem and determine whether they feel/do not feel like members of the following nominal communities, which are often appealed to by political leaders: “part of the East Slavic world”, “part of Europe”, “part of the unity of the former Soviet republics”, “citizen of the world”. If there are no significant generational differences in defining oneself as a “part of the Slavic world” or as a “citizen of the world,” they immediately become apparent in matters of belonging to the unity of the former Soviet republics” or “Europe.” **We have a clear tendency for the percentage of those who identify with the former Soviet Union to decrease with age.** We do not see such a clear tendency in respondents identifying themselves with the European space as in the attitude to the former unity of the Soviet republics, however, **the share of those who “do not at all feel” part of the European space among the youngest group of ages 18 to 29 is almost twice as small as among the age groups of 40 years and older.**

Depending on the type of locality, **we see that residents of villages feel the least “European,” while the residents of cities that are not oblast capitals feel the most “European.”** However, in terms of localities, we see **a split in the population in terms of its self-identification by this parameter** — significant and almost equal are the groups of those who “largely” feel themselves belonging to a particular nominal group and those who actively deny this affiliation (“do not at all feel”).

THE LEAST WORRYING FOR THE POPULATION IS THE PROSPECT OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH RUSSIA, WHICH, WITH A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THOSE EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT CLOSING ITS BORDERS WITH RUSSIA, INDICATES A HIGH LEVEL OF LOYALTY TO RUSSIA AND A WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS.

In terms of oblasts, residents of Luhansk and Zaporizhia oblasts feel an affiliation to the European space a little more. **The paradox of the Luhansk region** is that the population with a more pronounced pro-European choice compared to other oblasts actively positions itself as part of the former Soviet space. Therefore, the “European” prospects of this area without taking into account several other identity parameters should be considered with some caution.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

61.4% of all respondents stated they had not encountered any criminal acts against them in the past year. Among the most common offences were deception/fraud (16.2% of respondents confirmed the fact of a personal encounter with such actions), psychological pressure (10%) and theft (6.3%). Among the offences that occur directly at the level of localities, respondents particularly highlight excessive alcohol consumption and alcoholism (41.5%), drug addiction (32.2%), property crimes (theft, robbery, banditry) — 27%, violations of public order (hooliganism, vandalism, fights) — 26.9%. Many respondents are concerned about the problem of drug trafficking (19.2% indicated this as a problem) and corruption, bribery (18.1%).

An important aspect of security is the presence of the police in people's daily lives — visibility of their work, patrolling, accessibility. Half the respondents said that they see police officers every day, 25% see them once or several times a week, 14% — several times a month, 12% — infrequently or not at all.

Those who trust the police (38%) remain fewer than those who do not trust them (54%). The prospect of cooperation is influenced by the experience of direct contact of citizens with the police and its success or failure. Those respondents who confirmed the fact of communication with the police show a much greater willingness to further cooperation (which is indirect evidence of the generally positive nature of the interaction). Refusal to cooperate may be due to the negative experience of personal contact (often there is a lack of response or reaction to the request or the expression of dissatisfaction by the police officers due to a "minor" cause of calling them,

which is essentially a communication problem). However, a more serious reason for refusing to cooperate is the fear of retaliation. The choice of cooperation varies depending on the gravity of the crime witnessed by the person. In threatening situations, people choose among different behavioural strategies, from completely refusing to cooperate with the police to agreeing to anonymous cooperation (for example, an anonymous call).

RECOMMENDATIONS

NATIONAL LEVEL

1. An important factor in reducing anxiety and focus on thinking in the zero-sum logic is to reduce the level of uncertainty about the transformation processes in the eyes of citizens. The lack of a generalised vision creates uncertainty about the final destination of reforms, which exacerbates the sense of objectivity and affects the overall assessment of the situation. The political culture of the regions under research indicates that the desired source of vision should be the political leadership of the state; nevertheless, proposals for such visions may come from political players across the board, as well as from public or expert circles. Supporting strategic discussions can also be a tool of education on the work of public institutions, comparison with the practices of different regions of Ukraine. Thus, **introducing strategic discourse in the form of expert, public, or political creations** as well as special events and educational programs, will contribute to reducing uncertainty in society.

2. Active awareness-raising work with residents, overcoming the traumas of war, explaining the essence of reforms

and their end result, etc., which should **be based on a long-term generalised vision or development strategy.**

3. The disintegration of most systems of public administration, duplication of functions creates in the average person a sense of imperfection of the government, its incapacity. One of the tasks should be **the revision of system structures and streamlining the functional load of structural units.**

4. Fragmented actions and imperfect distribution of functions between elements of the law enforcement system, lack of standard and clear protocols and procedures affect the feeling of insecurity of the average person. **The formation of a sense of safe space directly depends on the good organisation of the law enforcement system and its level of communication with the population.**

5. The creation of the **auxiliary education system** at the level of schools and adult education programs on the basics of social sciences and the system of public institutions will help citizens create a coordinate system to understand

the distribution of responsibilities between institutions, ways to address problems, decision-making models in modern Ukraine. This is an important step towards the formation of the civic agency of those who in any case should and can enjoy the constitutional right to making their voices heard.

6. Most people's reactions and positions show a lack of communication with, and feedback from, representatives of various spheres of life, including public administration. Reforms and ongoing measures are insufficiently communicated and remain incomprehensible to people. A new effective system of targeted information about the available opportunities, services, etc. is much needed. The system of local state administrations (oblast, region, and military and civil administrations), territorial subdivisions of central executive bodies, representatives of local self-government bodies should take over **the development of "road maps" (clear algorithms) of appeals and procedures for solving key problems** related to the work of medical sphere, education, social security, and assistance, etc. **and their communication to the population.**

SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

1. Identify **the minimum available mobility threshold for each locality**, followed by a national/regional/donor program to support access to services and opportunities where population/demand/infrastructure conditions prevent both public and private services

from establishing. In the process, it will probably be necessary to introduce and communicate more widely the change of approaches to distance measurement: in addition to physical distance, time and resource aspects should also be taken into account. This may lead to the emergence of zoning and transport support services that enable the full development of children, adolescents, and adults.

2. Introduce a system of educational and extracurricular exchange programs with different regions of Ukraine, preferably those that actually differ significantly among themselves, which will allow every citizen to have accumulated domestic and work experience from various Ukrainian discourses at the beginning / in the middle of their careers.

LOCAL LEVEL

1. Development of education and critical thinking, which form critical trust instead of unconditional trust, based on knowledge, understanding of processes, and ability to work with information. In this way, the atomisation of the population, which has resulted from distrust and lack of experience in solidarity, can be partially overcome.

2. Support and dissemination of AHs and HOAs practices, since both have become mini-laboratories for the development of initiative, activity, entrepreneurship, the formation of self-government practices, departure from the paternalistic position and paternalistic way of thinking.

3. It is necessary to train the AHs representatives, which lack knowledge of strategy, budgeting, and local governance. Lack of knowledge and experience, lack of long-term strategies narrows the planning horizon to one day, leads to irrational spending of money and resources, and does not add value in the medium and long-term perspective.

4. Creating programs to increase the feeling of security: street lighting, visibility of law enforcement presence, rapid response to vandalism and destruction of infrastructure.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

1. International donors are focused on their ideas and interests, often not coordinated with national and local development programs. **Coordination of potential donors' actions is required**, as activities are often duplicated and the population receives support and training not in those areas in which they really need but depending on what is funded. This prevents the public sector from solving real local problems and reorients them to the implementation of the requested projects, the activities of which are immediately terminated after the funding runs out.

2. Training of party staff (both central and grassroots) on how to write effective strategies, business plans, how to build grassroots structures is necessary. In this case, we are talking about people who are ready to take an active position, but they often lack systemic knowledge.

3. Representatives of the public sector need the same training, which in the long run would not mimic the activities requested by the foundations but could initiate their own projects, really needed by the local population. HOA core leaders can be a separate group for training, as such practices at this stage have the greatest impact on the shift in thinking and the formation of self-government practices.

4. Formation of thematic donor priorities for the communities of the South and the East, which can be deployed faster than government programs, but which can later be replaced/supplemented by government programs focused on:

a. Activation of the cultural life of communities, including by developing a space organisation culture both through curricula and through festivals and other events, open-air, and invitations of cultural figures.

b. Dissemination of knowledge and practices of modern urbanism, which allows us to achieve an improvement in the quality of life within the existing infrastructure capabilities and provide an understanding of ways to improve/change the infrastructure. It is important to be able to access more opportunities for modern urban life in any type of locality.

c. Assistance to local initiatives through the system of micro-grants with a simple procedure for obtaining and reporting (ideally through

HUMAN SECURITY

local distribution tools). This should enable local leaders to express themselves and diversify the field of initiatives while contributing to local development.

d. Assistance with education on modern post-industrial opportunities of the economy, based on harmonious coexistence with nature, a higher level of ecological consciousness, and readiness for a more careful use of resources. In addition to the factor of sectoral influence, such projects should become a marketing tool for the success of another, non-industrial way of building society, illustrating an alternative to returning to the "old order."

RESEARCH RESULTS IN DETAILS

2

The question for the participants of the study was phrased as broadly and gradually as possible, so as not to influence the wording of the answer: "What is the meaning of the word 'security' to you?" with a further question "What is the feeling of security for you?" and only then — "When / under what conditions do you feel safe? What needs to be / happen / change to make you feel safe? After voicing the position by the respondent — "Who do these changes depend on?).

THE IMAGE OF SECURITY ACCORDING TO THE STUDY PARTICIPANTS

To find out how people construct the concept/image of a safe society, we used qualitative methods (in our case it is focus group discussions (FGS) and in-depth interviews)².

Most respondents reflect on security in its broad sense — that is, as human security, describing it as full functioning and adequate management of various spheres of society, which ultimately forms a sense of comfort and security.

““ For me, security is something intangible, but something that allows me to do something I love, to spend time with my family and not be distracted. It is something invisible that is not valued until it is no longer there. When you do

not need to make any additional efforts to preserve life and health (a young man, a city in Zaporizhia oblast).

““ For me, safety is just being and living without pain. Without physical pain, without emotional, psychological pain. A life without pain in any sphere of human existence (an elderly woman, a town in Donetsk oblast).

““ For me, security is when my rights are not violated, when there is peace, tranquillity, when no one is invading my personal life with some superfluous rules, so to speak. Security is when I'm happy with everything when I am content with everything (a middle-aged man, a town in Kherson oblast).

“ I agree with some words. It is when society and the state respect my rights. Constitutional, legislative rights. When my rights are respected, and I fulfil my responsibilities as a citizen. And the state and all state structures ensure the exercise of these rights by the people around me (a middle-aged woman, a town in Kherson oblast). ”

A detailed description of the concept of security, provided by the participants of the study, allows us to reconstruct the basic meanings that people put into it:

– **Financial security** (stability of the financial system of the state, a financial backup (savings), stable rules in the economic sphere of society and business in particular; the availability of assistance mechanisms in critical situations that require serious financial investment, etc.).

– **Physical security, protection from violence** (First, the attention of the study participants was focused on the manifestations of street violence, the danger of the space of localities, on the potential possibility of becoming the object of aggression or physical attack. It was also about psychological pressure — from parents, family members, and the immediate environment).

– **Availability of quality, guaranteed, and affordable medical services** (one of the key topics in the conversation about security. In their comments, study participants cover the quality of services — both the service itself and the quality of diagnosis and treatment, as well as their territorial and material accessibility for an average person).

– **Freedom of expression, protection from persecution for the political or civil position** (In this case, we see two key types of opinions. On the one hand, respondents note that they can speak freely and without hindrance, although no one needs their point of view and no one listens to anyone. On the other hand, respondents report a high level of self-censorship due to the pressure of the immediate environment and potential conflicts or manifestations of aggression by other people).

– **Freedom of movement** (Speaking about freedom of movement, respondents detail this point not so much as the right to move freely to another town or country, but as the right to return home safely at any time of day and not to be afraid for their lives. Research participants with experience in labour migration also talk about restricted movement across state borders, which severely undermines earning opportunities. Additionally, for the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the issue of crossing the contact line is important).

– **Full-fledged performance of the law enforcement function by the government, protection against criminal acts** (The experience of study participants in this issue is not unambiguous, but the general sense of insecurity dominates).

– **Opportunity to protect one's honour and dignity** (Respondents emphasise the lack of known and available mechanisms for such protection, as well as raise issues regarding changes in legislation on self-defence).

– **Protection against external aggression** (This motive is especially strong among the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk

The opinions expressed in this section are based on the participants' answers to the first general and broad question, "What is the meaning of the word 'security' for you?"

oblasts, primarily through the prism of the experience of the active phase of the armed conflict in 2014-2015).

– **Comprehensive public services on various aspects of life** (This aspect often comes up in the context of corruption and bureaucracy).

– **The right to the future** (to not be afraid of the future, have a financial backup and know that there are effective protection mechanisms. This aspect partly intersects with physical and economic security, but respondents need to emphasise feeling like there is/is no point in the future).

– **Psychological security** (protection from coercion, psychological pressure, excessive control, deprivation of the right to make independent decisions, humiliation, etc.).

– **Control over the circulation of weapons** (Respondents reflect on the problem of availability of weapons, easy acquisition and lack of proper recording, especially in areas adjacent to the contact line).

The environmental security motive is not raised by respondents without a “prompt.” However, the proposal to voice the most significant problems at the national level, at the level of the locality and the personal level immediately leads to environmental issues.

CAUSES AND FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SENSE OF DANGER

In the next block of questions, participants of FGS and in-depth interviews were asked to move from a description

of the term “security” to a description of their feelings. What exactly creates the feeling of danger? Why cannot people feel safe and what affects it?

Remember that it is a question of subjective feelings of research participants which are based both on personal experiences and the influence of the information flow in which an average person lives. Despite the different sources of origin of these attitudes and guidelines, the existing perception of reality shapes the behaviour and choices of people, dramatically changing their daily lives.

We can structure the responses of study participants as follows.

1. The physical aspect of security. For the participants of the study, this aspect is associated with constant stress and expectation of danger. As a result, people begin to limit their lives and actions, they cannot avoid thoughts of protection, they are forced to change their style and way of life and live in constant anticipation of an attack or violence.

““ *The right to life. I am deprived of it because every day we have fighting (an elderly woman, a city in Donetsk oblast).*

““ *I live on the first [ground] floor and yes, there is lighting in the building, and most of the time there is no dubious folk hanging around. But still, I cannot open the windows everywhere... I live alone now. It's uncomfortable. In the evening I do not feel calm and safe at all, because there are often rowdy men on the street. And I can't walk quite late. My limit is up to nine PM. Until nine,*

I can walk the streets and not feel anxious, but later — I worry (a young woman, the town in Donetsk oblast).

“ Let’s say I can’t let a child walk alone, even though she’s already a pretty big girl. I know that at our age we could walk the streets freely and our parents would let us go and not be afraid. Now, I try to be somewhere nearby my kid, because, yes, I’m uncomfortable, I can’t sit at home all the time and know that my child is somewhere alone (a middle-aged woman, a city in Luhansk oblast).

2. The economic aspect of security. The problems that are manifested in this area are also traumatic for a person, creating a psychologically difficult situation of uncertainty, insecurity. This refers to both limited earning opportunities and the need to somehow manage insufficient family budgets and constantly live with the fear of lacking money for basic needs.

“ From the financial point of view, I do not feel safe, because nothing can be planned, and these financial changes... today, tomorrow, the day after tomorrow. It’s always moving, changing, so it is impossible to plan something to make it look like it’s a safe existence. In this regard, of course, it is difficult (a middle-aged man, a city in Donetsk oblast).

“ Today I woke up in horror because I had a dream that my roof was leaking. As if there are no means to repair it now, I do not feel safe, because my house is not my for-

ress. When the roof leaks, you understand (a middle-aged woman, a city in Donetsk oblast).

3. Healthcare as an element of quality and safe life.

This is one of the key motives in talking about a sense of security. The participants of the study consider the main aspects of the problem to be the quality of medical services and their territorial and financial accessibility. As a result of the incomplete medical reform, certain “circles of access” to medical services, both territorial and financial, are being formed. The average person is faced with the choice to receiving a lower quality service at the local level or a trip to the regional / oblast city/town with a wider choice of specialists and opportunities for quality service. The paid nature of most medical services becomes financially burdensome for the average person without a health insurance system. Accordingly, it adds to the fears of the future due to the understanding of the “unaffordable” sums (both official and unofficial) needed to pay for serious medical services. Health insurance practices are fragmented, affecting only large corporations, so they do not solve this problem for the general public.

“ As for medical care, I have already said, I faced such a problem when my mother got sick and I needed money for surgery, it was very difficult, because the sums were unaffordable, although we did the operation in a public clinic, it was supposed to be free, but we were told a particular sum of money by phone, it was very large, and we scraped and borrowed and, thank God, everything is fine, but still there is a problem, of course

(a middle-aged woman, a city in Luhansk oblast).

“ Yes, if we are talking about emergency medicine, let's say a person has an appendectomy, if it needs to be done urgently, they may not do it very well, even, say, leaving you with a large scar that will be difficult to remove and difficult to heal. However, in case your family and relatives figure something out and pay, they will make everything nice and clean *(a middle-aged woman, a city in Zaporizhia oblast).*

“ Nowadays, you need to have some kind of insurance, although we do not have such insurance, or you need to have enough money, which we also do not have at the moment. It's just so scary that if you happen to get sick, you come to the hospital, and if you or your relatives have no money, you just will not be treated *(a young woman, a village in Donetsk oblast).*

“ The fact is that working on the “Motor”, we pay a fee there. And, well, for medical services. We have our own clinic, even a hospital I should say. And I am sure that if something suddenly happens... I will be taken to that hospital. I can't say it's 100% free for me. Right? Since I pay for this insurance anyway. At least I will be sure that there they will help me and put me in the hospital if necessary. Conditions are often better there than at some people's place... I know for sure, too, a pal of mine works for Zaporozhstal steel plant. They also have insurance there. If something happens to you, God

*forbid. But again, it all depends on the company itself. Therefore, well, working at this enterprise, I am confident *(a young man, a village in Zaporizhia oblast).**

4. The problem of social protection. The participants of the study state that under modern conditions they found themselves alone with their problems. The only real noticeable help for them is the work of employment centers, which can support those who have temporarily lost their jobs. Most of the respondents declare that they do not expect any help from the government, so they rely only on themselves. Accordingly, the average person who is not associated with others, who does not know effective mechanisms for protecting their rights, including social protection, lives in chronic stress from total responsibility for themselves and their loved ones, experiences abandonment and insecurity.

“ Look, it is true that if a person gets sick, no one will help them except themselves. Only you can help yourself, the state does not care about you here *(a young man, a city in Luhansk oblast).*

“ I do not like the law passed that the company can dismiss an employee without good reason, that is, at their discretion. That is, you are warned, told that from today you do not work here. I know that's how foreign companies work, but I somehow lived with a slightly different attitude to people. We have a workers' union but it does not protect the workers, that is, they work and are more focused on the management of enterprises, and this is not one enterprise, and

I feel it a little myself (an elderly woman, a village in Zaporizhia oblast).

“ You lost your job, you do not have a financial backup, because you were a little unprepared for it, that is, it is a surprise — the state does not care much for your well-being. It did not even bother to promise anything. It is your problem that you lost your job, your problem that you ended up in this situation — solve it yourself. In this regard, I also feel very insecure (a young woman, a village in Zaporizhia oblast).

“ Our society is not apt to support people. If you know your rights and want to protect them, then you are labelled as a brawler, a troublemaker and so on. We have not formed universal values that would satisfy the need of each person for a normal sense of security (a young woman, a village in Zaporizhia oblast).

5. The impact of war and the uncontrolled circulation of weapons on the sense of security. The respondents also consider the motive to be rather important, regardless of the area of residence. Although the experiences of the war differ, the latter is a stressor for all research participants. While for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, it is a memory of the active phase of the armed confrontation in 2014-2015, of the feeling of complete insecurity, violence by armed people, the residents of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts speak more about the traumatic nature of the unresolved war, about its constant presence in the life of an average person. Poorly pro-

cessed experience of the initial phase of the war remains an important problem — life in an armed conflict zone, the peculiarities of interaction with the military, and so on. Research participants acknowledge that the situation has now changed dramatically, but the existing memory of events (both real when respondents talk about their immediate experience and mythologised when retelling stories heard from others) remains an influential factor in perception. It is noteworthy that most of the stories are related to the actions of the Ukrainian army, so it requires further work with the population, that happened to be at the epicentre of the armed conflict and information war.

“ I work with those people who personally participated in all these horrors of war, who saw it all. They were evicted. The combatants would come to the family in the middle of the night for three months in a row and said to get out of here and take the children. “We are going to live in this house, it will be our post” (an elderly woman, a city in Donetsk oblast).

“ And more about security. You know, I have a database of more than 100 people who were wounded in the war. And they do not have the status of persons with disabilities, because our government did not draw up case reports correctly. And these people today can't prove the fact of this injury (an elderly woman, a town in Donetsk oblast).

“ We had a military unit nearby, there were explosions, explosions with light. I had to treat the child for a year and a half from fright, she had a tic. There was

our Ukrainian army encamped. If only they were at least at a safe distance, now they are in our village, but they are quite far from our house, so I see them very rarely, they are very calm, we have no complaints about them, they go to the same shops, they go to the same cafes as we do. Now we have no claims at all, but when they rode the streets on tanks, whistling and ripping these light explosions, there were problems (a young woman, a village in Donetsk oblast).

“ In our country, the combatants also raised a racket, got drunk, drove drunk, and walked the streets with weapons, went to the shops with weapons all the time. I worked in the kindergarten, the children were afraid when first, planes exploded above our heads and fell to the ground. The children were very scared. We hid them. This had a great impact on the children in kindergarten. I have a grandson, he was small then, but he somehow ended up ok. I personally was so scared when we had shelling. And when shells were falling on the roof, when they were shooting and checking, these armed, these impudent people. They came in impudently into the house and went around the whole yard. Now, the situation is pretty ok they do not go around the village drunk; we do not see them much. There were ones so scary that we were even afraid to go out for a walk with a child... It was impossible to go outside to the yard, they were swearing terribly and would enter our garden without permission, behaving as if at home. And we sat

quietly like mice in our own home (a middle-aged woman, a village in Donetsk oblast).

“ Regarding wolves, foxes. Some people complained their sheep were bitten by wolves. They said that now there is silence, calm, you can't shoot, because of this we have now a lot of all kinds of animals and birds, which also harm the garden, but no one reacts to it. Many people see wolves, and my sister saw them really close to her home. Maybe it's not wolves, maybe it's wild dogs because the military left a lot of dogs. I don't know, nobody tries to solve it; nobody wants to deal with it. It is scary to go out in the evening (a middle-aged woman, a village in Donetsk oblast).

“ At four o'clock in the morning, we were woken up by a soldier. He pointed a gun at the yard, and we were left wondering whether he will shoot or what he was going to do there? The boys got lost, or the tank flashed in the gardens. We are so scared, so anxious for the future of our children and grandchildren (an elderly woman, a village in Donetsk oblast).

6. Atomisation of society and the image of the “dangerous other.”

Interlocutors describe their surroundings mostly as hostile, and other people (strangers) as a potential danger. The habit of relying only on oneself in difficult life situations makes people constantly alert and have a heightened sense of danger. Accordingly, the safe space is narrowed to one's own home or even a nominal “safe island” (although their safety in the process of discussion is

questionable). The prevalence of such attitudes in society, regardless of what is the source of their formation — direct experience or public discourse — requires active intervention. These sentiments preserve the atomisation of society, greatly limiting any attempts at associations and solidarity.

“ When I’m on an island where there are no people and I have a fishing rod in my hands that’s when I enjoy my life. Yes, because I can influence everything myself. There are no internal influences, but it is only if the weather is fine and no thunderstorm comes your way (a middle-aged man, a city in Zaporizhia oblast).

“ Well, this is because lately, there were too many inadequate people hanging around (an elderly woman, a city in Zaporizhia oblast).

“ Even late in the evening, sometimes when I walk down the street, I cross to the other side of the road when I see people coming my way. Because you never know what a person has in mind, you never know how soon the police will come if called (a young man, a city in Donetsk oblast).

“ Well, I am not afraid to say something, because I have a Rottweiler. But without the dog, it is difficult and rather scary. Because, for instance, five people are coming my way and swearing loudly. I feel uncomfortable, I should say. And if there are women with children in their way, what can they do at all? And nowadays, guys can even hit a woman... (an elderly man, a city in Kherson oblast).


“ I don’t feel safe alone on the road, because even though we have modern signs, modern pedestrian crossings and when you click on this pedestrian crossing, there is no car, nothing, we have right-hand traffic and when some bastard rushes on the left lane, not even on his lane, even though the pedestrian crossing is flashing, the music is booming in his car, and the bastard still does not mind and rides on (an elderly man, a city in Kherson oblast).

RANKING AND DETAILING OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS

The above-described factors and aspects of the formation of the average person’s sense of danger are found also in the results of the survey. In one of the questions, the respondents were asked to choose from the proposed list up to three problems that they think are the most important at the moment a) for the whole country and b) for the locality in which they live. The result was two problem rankings.

FIGURE 1

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE CURRENTLY THE MOST IMPORTANT TO UKRAINE OVERALL? (SPECIFY UP TO 3 PROBLEMS), N = 1000? (%)




If we consider lists of problems concerning additional parameters (employment status of the respondent, oblast, type of locality), it makes for insignificant variation which mainly stays within the margin of error. The only significant difference in the ratings depending on the criterion of employment is that for respondents who do not have a job, the position "lack of money for food

and basic needs" comes to the fore in the ranking of nationwide problems (this item was marked as problematic by 34.8% of employed respondents and 43.4% of unemployed ones). In the ranking of local problems, this item leads to all the categories of the respondents.

When answering the questionnaire, respondents **chose problems from the list** proposed by the researchers.

FIGURE 2

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE CURRENTLY THE MOST IMPORTANT TO YOUR COMMUNITY? (SPECIFY UP TO 3 PROBLEMS), N = 1000? (%)



During the in-depth interviews, FGS participants and interviewees were asked **to make their own lists** of the most important issues from their point of view, indicating at what level they are most pronounced — at the level of the whole country or area where the research participant lives. So, again, we have the opportunity to make a list of problems that respondents talk about

“on their own.” Accordingly, these are those problems that they frequently encounter and think about, worry about, assess, and which affect their perception of reality.

Describing the problems that are important for **the country as a whole**, most of the participants in the study put the problem of **war and its termination** in the first place. War is indicated

as a waste of resources, as a source of deadly danger for those who can be mobilised. It is also about the protracted impact of the war on society, the long-term unresolved issue.

The second most frequently mentioned problem is **corruption**. The moderator's task was to separate the interlocutor's personal experience from secondary information about corruption obtained from various sources. Almost all participants in the study noted that they had personal experience of grassroots ("customary") corruption — informal payment for government employees and health workers, cash collection in schools and kindergartens, bribes to obtain a driver's license (even with a computer testing there is a person who "helps" to deal with the computer for an additional fee). According to the comments of the study participants, this everyday corruption is absolute, pervasive and ultimately degrades human dignity, because a person is perceived solely through the prism of solvency. However, it should be noted that the examples given by the respondents relate to everyday grassroots bribery rather than examples of corruption by government officials. So in this case we have social mythology, underpinned by real cases of bribery, which give the average person the impression of total, pervasive corruption. The average person generally has no direct experience of government corruption but is willing to believe in it. This is an important point that reduces the chances of effective cooperation between government officials and the public.

The next problem by the frequency of mentions is a whole range of situations related to the provision of medical services. Overall, people have a feeling that accessing medical services is difficult. Problems include low

qualifications of doctors, medical errors and incorrect diagnoses; lack of specialists on-site (in cities that are rayon centres, too); the need to travel considerable distances to obtain quality services (thus the cost of diagnosis and treatment is added to the transport costs); complicating procedures for access to specialists due to the need for additional time-consuming procedures to obtain referral; as well as high prices for medical services (both official and "grey"), often unaffordable for the average person. The inability to provide normal treatment traumatises people, becomes a source of constant anxiety and expectation of the worst.

The next set of problems that concern the participants is **unemployment, poverty and high prices/fees**. Poverty manifests itself in people's lives systematically — the need to constantly look for additional work, to give up the weekend; in traumatic situations of unofficial payment for services to which people are already entitled; through fear of losing their job and insecurity before the employer. Note that the "lack of money for food and bare necessities" and "reduction of employment opportunities, unemployment" are the two leading items in the ranking of local problems. Both of these problems concern both employed and unemployed respondents almost equally.

The next section is essentially **dissatisfaction with the authorities**. The latter are accused of incompetence, inconsistency, activities without a well-thought-out strategy, trial and error. In contradiction to the demonstrative populism of the authorities, which the respondents emphasise, they are not ready to engage in a true conversation with the people. People complain about

the lack of real information, about the fact that the government manipulates people's minds by providing information with the way it needs. Also, it is widely believed that the authorities do not keep their promises (first, they think of the story when the government promised that the warfare would be over soon). Notably, the "authorities" are viewed in an abstract, impersonal, timeless (not tied either to a certain stage of the political process or specific persons) way, far removed from an average person.

The next moment of tension is the feeling of **inequality and injustice**. People believe the law is not universal and does not apply the same way to people from different social groups. Inequality is manifested in the comparison of lifestyles and is exacerbated by information from media shows. An additional important point of the feeling of injustice is the perception of the authorities as a system where only loyal people and "pocket" organisations can thrive. All this makes an average person feel that there are no social opportunities and no future, and eventually forces them to consider migration.

An additional aspect of the feeling of injustice is the manifestations of **"spontaneous people's democracy"** — when people gather in groups and put pressure on representatives of other groups in society or the judiciary. When acute social issues are resolved this way, this exacerbates the perception of laws as something that is not universal, whose application depends on a certain person, their characteristics, belonging to a certain social group, availability of support or lack thereof, etc. This phenomenon frightens people so much that they speak about it in "Aesopian language", that is, they speak innuendos, hints, avoid directly naming these

groups that threaten them. This basically indicates degradation of the idea and practice of activism in people's minds.

A recurring motive is also the emphasis on the **country's loss of industrial character**, its apparent deindustrialisation, the closure of industrial enterprises with the subsequent degradation of labour and the social sphere.

Many problems are identified at the level of society itself. Research participants say there are **value and generational divisions**. Value splits are associated with different assessments of the historical past. It is mostly about different interpretations and assessments of the past events and historical figures by the inhabitants of western and south-eastern Ukraine. On the one hand, respondents say no point of view should be imposed over another; on the other hand, they insist on the formation of a "monolithic" ideology that would bind the country together. The generational splits are more articulated by young participants in the study and are associated with radically different visions of life and prospects for the development of older and younger generations and their imbalance in the overall population structure of the studied areas.

Speaking about the problems, the respondents noted their pervasive nature, manifestation at all levels of the government — from the central to the local level.

Speaking about security problems **at the local and personal levels**, the study participants emphasised financial insecurity. Respondents pointed out that the statistics of average wages do not reflect the real level of wages. Most complain that they have virtually no "backup" (they admit that they have small savings, but those savings are

not enough to resolve a serious health problem or to temporarily cover the cost of losing a job). Compared to the experience of the '90s, the current situation is assessed as better. A smaller number of participants in the study say that they generally have enough to live on, but there is a lack of funds for vacation, travel, consumption of cultural products.

Some respondents are aware that the assessment of their own financial situation depends not only on income but also on the level of expectations.

“ FGS participant: You see, everyone feels like they don't have enough. Some people don't have enough bread, some people don't have enough to buy a plane ticket. It is difficult, impossible for me to live on my pension. But we all live like that. We do not know how we live, but we spend two thousand every month.

Moderator: Then why don't you feel financially secure?

FGS participant: Because I really want to go to a jewellery store instead of a pharmacy (a woman, middle-aged, a city in Kherson oblast).

Obviously, the assessment of the material condition is largely subjective. However, the available assessments generally convey the prevailing general sense of people's dissatisfaction with their financial situation, whatever it may be.

Unemployment has become a significant problem for former industrial cities that **have gone through the closure of enterprises**. In this situation, a large number of people lost their jobs and found themselves with no means of subsistence. People emphasise that

they have had to solve most of these problems on their own. For most, this was a factor that has pushed people into external labour migration.

Study participants noted the severity of **infrastructure problems**. First of all, it was about the quality of roads, which is especially important for rural areas, but it is also a problem for the entire road infrastructure in the south and east of the country. There are also negative comments on the city's infrastructure, the fact that any improvements are fragmented and short-lived. The lack of normal roads and fully functioning public transport “cuts off” children from villages and small towns from opportunities for educational and cultural development — in the villages, there are often no people who would organise clubs for children, and with the lack of transport, such clubs in bigger cities become unavailable. Space itself becomes a significant limitation for a person in their pursuit of basic comfort in life:

“ My nephew got rollerblades as a gift — where can he ride? Who knows? It's raining, you have new shoes, where will you wear those shoes? (young woman, a village in Zaporizhia oblast).

The **space of localities** itself is presented as uninteresting, “Soviet-style», which lacks comfortable areas, recreation areas and entertainment for different categories of the population. People complain about excessive real estate development in cities and felling of green areas without a further restoration.

Survey participants had quite an interesting description of an entire range of problems connected with the performance of the whole government system

as **“non-rapid response.”** The point is that various government agencies, in principle, perform their functions, but react so chaotically, belatedly, unsystematically, that it does not contribute to the image of a well-oiled machine that can function properly.

At the local level, the emphasis is more on **environmental issues.** We are talking about the lack and quality of water, air pollution, fires and arson, spontaneous landfills (which occur due to lack of recycling plants, and due to the practices of the residents themselves, who do not want to pay for waste management and dump it wherever they want).

At the local level, there is a stronger manifestation of the **“dangerous other.”** It is about a significant change in the perception of “one’s own” space (street, district, locality). While space was perceived as familiar and safe before, now, there is an increasing view of this space as a source of danger, with rudeness, aggression, driving under influence, alcohol and drug addiction prevail, and the regular person feels uncomfortable and insecure. There are often mentions of young people who have alcohol as their only means of entertainment:

“Kids. They drink alcohol and start smashing everything. And everything that is done for the village — say, new benches, a playground. So, these sports areas that were made. They start drinking alcohol and smashing everything. Here, people sit... my child and I went out to get some rest in the evening, to get some fresh air, they can... well, behave aggressively.” (a young woman, a village in Kherson oblast).

In the temporal aspect, the emergence of this “dangerous other” fits with the “post-Soviet” period that is described as degradation. Obviously, there are a number of factors behind this, but it is worth considering the decline in solidarity in society, the processes of atomisation and, consequently, the lack of experience of direct communication with other people. This increases social distances and leads to a wary attitude towards other people.

“Here people, at least in the city, people are not very united. Everyone stays to themselves, just don’t touch them. I will stay calm. Until some point, I also belonged to this category of people, but lately, I really have not been liking it. And I became more socially active. I used to be able to pass a person who is sick on the bench, I could pass by. Okay, someone else will do it for me. That idea that “someone else will do for me” — it’s a little wrong nowadays, I think. Start with yourself and transform society this way (young man, a city in Donetsk oblast).

PERSONAL SECURITY

While talking about personal safety and problems during FGS and in-depth interviews, respondents focus primarily on financial and health issues. They also convey their own feelings of uselessness, worthlessness; talk about the lack of opportunities for personal fulfilment and lack of sense of the future (as opportunities to plan their lives at least a year or two ahead).

A series of questions with four gradations of responses (“yes,” “yes, somewhat,” “rather not,” and “not at all”) proposed to respondents during

3

In this issue certain indicators from the SCORE analytical tool have been applied [Electronic resource]. — Access: <https://use.scoreforpeace.org/uk/use/publications>. We will remind that in this case, participants of research provide their answers based on the offered questions, rather than generate the list of problems on their own.

4

As noted in the subsection Rating and Detailing of the Most Important Problems, “corruption” and “corruption abuse” have their own specifics in the respondents’ perception. If you ask about personal experience, study participants testify to the facts of bribery in schools, medical institutions, kindergartens, etc. Respondents get their knowledge about government corruption mainly from the media (they named TV shows as a source of information). Therefore, respondents’ answers about “corruption abuse” are rather a characteristic of general dissatisfaction with the imperfection of almost all public services (education, medicine,


the survey allows for quantitative detailing of certain problematic aspects of life at the local level³.

Only 14.5% of respondents believe that they can receive medical care free of charge, while 80.8% have doubts (56.4% of them chose a categorical and clear answer “no”). The answers regarding the protection of the average person from corruption abuse are similar⁴ (76.7% consider themselves unprotected from corruption abuse, 13.7% — protected).

68.8% of respondents doubt that the police can protect them and their family members. People rather feel vulnerable to arbitrary abuse in their daily lives than protected from it. More than half of respondents are dissatisfied with the environmental situation. A significant proportion of respondents (65.1%) agree that they have reason to worry about the fact that they or their family members may lose their jobs within a year. In fact, the average

FIGURE 3

PLEASE TELL US ..., N = 1000 (%)



person lives with a sense of insecurity: physical, psychological, and economic. The fact that the average person perceives their environment mainly as hostile is confirmed by the answers to the following two questions. Respondents were asked to select three groups from the list or add their own options to different groups of people who may have a positive or negative impact on them.

In choosing groups that have a positive impact on the lives of respondents, we see the usual minimum radius of trust for Ukrainian society, which includes only close circles of communication — primarily family, as well as friends, acquaintances, neighbours and colleagues. All other groups are practically excluded from the positive environment of the respondent. Instead, the choice of groups of people who, in the opinion of the respondents, are present in their lives and have a negative impact is much wider. The leaders of the negative influence were the “Ukrainian government”, journalists, and representatives of political parties. These three groups share a common rejection of what the average person associates with politics and the political in general (Fig. 4 and 5).

Talking to respondents about security in one way or another leads to a detailed description of the problems that prevent ordinary residents from feeling comfortable and protected. The nature of the conversation leads respondents to excessive concentration on problems. Conversely, using the associations method⁵ helps to specify people’s feelings and their assessment of their everyday lives in a rapid mode.

While answering questions about the positive aspects of their localities, city residents speak about nature, new elements of infrastructure (mostly shopping malls), the sea, the river, green areas. Among the bad ones are

the environment, garbage, roads, closures of enterprises, and local authorities. People describe their homes in an entirely positive manner. In addition to the classic association with your fortress, the house is described as a place of comfort, joy, love, rest, recovery of energy and tranquillity. Emotional and rational characteristics are mixed in the job descriptions. Work is described as a means of subsistence, life support, earnings, and as a dream, personal fulfilment, an opportunity to benefit humanity, satisfaction and development. The value of cities is justified by the presence of important objects — a port or an enterprise. In addition, people speak of the value of the historical past, human potential; they substantiate the city’s uniqueness in various ways.

Villagers construct their living space according to almost the same scheme with minor variations. Speaking of good in the village they speak about cultural spaces, clubs, schools, kindergartens, children, air, fishing and nature. Roads, lighting, water supply, landfills, population degradation and alcoholism are among the bad characteristics. The home is similarly a centre of peace, relaxation, protection, and family relationships. There are more negative aspects in job characteristics — a job is described as “a pain,” disappointment; but it is also described as the meaning of life, opportunity and professional growth. Substantiating the value for the oblast and the country appears difficult. Here people construct the image of a granary, breadwinners of the whole country, a place of life of cheerful and hard-working people. The value is also substantiated by the very fact of existence, presence on the map of the country.

Quantitatively, we see that on average, a little more than 60% of respondents consider the space of their own locality overall safe (Fig. 6).

public institutions in general), which require exhausting spending of time and financial resources. Corruption at the government level is conveyed through the image of “oligarchs who can do whatever they want.” Thus, the image of corruption is also a generalising image that conveys the full range of feelings of social inequality.

5

Participants of FGS and in-depth interviews were offered to continue incomplete sentences proposed by the moderator (The best thing in our city/village is...; The worst thing in our city/village is...; For me, my home is...; My job for me is...; Our city / village is important for the oblast (indicate oblast) because...; Our city / village is important for the entire country because...).

6

Respondents could choose up to three options. The figures show what percentage of the total number of respondents chose one or another option from the list.

FIGURE 4⁶

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS OF PEOPLE DO YOU THINK ARE MORE PRESENT IN YOUR LIFE AND HAVE THE GREATEST **POSITIVE** IMPACT ON YOUR LIFE, N = 1000? (%)




FIGURE 5

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS OF PEOPLE DO YOU THINK ARE MORE PRESENT IN YOUR LIFE AND HAVE THE GREATEST **NEGATIVE** IMPACT ON YOUR LIFE, N = 1000? (%)





FIGURE 6

DO YOU CONSIDER YOUR LOCALITY OVERALL SAFE? /
TYPE OF LOCALITY / OBLAST, N = 250 IN EACH OBLAST (%)



The feeling of security is higher in rural areas and tends to decrease as the size of locality increases.


Assessing the quality of utilities and infrastructure, respondents are more satisfied with the quality of energy and gas supply; estimates of water supply, heating and the quality of public transport are ambiguous. The latter demonstrates the uneven quali-

ty of utilities depending on the type of territory/locality. For example, people in cities are much more satisfied with the quality of heating than they are in rural areas. The same applies to water and gas supply.

The respondents are most dissatisfied with the quality of roads both in the locality where the respondents live and between localities — almost regardless

FIGURE 7

ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE QUALITY OF UTILITY SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE? N=1000 (%)



of the region or place of residence. In their responses to the previous questions, more than half the respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the environmental situation in their own locality. Detailing this problem gives the following result (Fig. 8). If the question about life and situation in society is phrased at the general

philosophic level, most respondents are satisfied with their life. One in five respondents is dissatisfied with their life and one in eight does not have an exact answer to this question. The associations method quickly activates local patriotism in its participants and helps to step away from the problematic view of one's space.

FIGURE 8
WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES THAT MAY OCCUR
IN YOUR AREA ARE OF MOST CONCERN TO YOU?
N = 1000 (%)





FIGURE 9

ARE YOU SATISFIED...



POLITICS AND SECURITY

At the time of the survey, 66% of respondents said they would vote in local elections, 22% did not intend to vote, and 12% had not yet decided.

In focus group research, the issue of voting in the local elections was characterised by significant fatalism. Both those who are going to vote in the election and those who do not believe that in the end, their vote will not affect anything:

“ I will definitely participate, but I think the result is predictable. That is, the election has already taken place (young man, a city in Zaporizhia oblast).

“ Of all my acquaintances, many do not want to vote in any elections because no one needs it, and everyone understands that nothing will change. What's the point of me going if everything is already decided for me (young man, a city in Donetsk oblast).


“ The man was right saying that before when you went to the polling station, you knew your voice mattered, and now, everyone has decided in advance who is going to win, all the numbers. But it's important to me. I definitely go to the polls, I think it is necessary to go, to cast my vote... The man is right, it is not the voter who wins, it is the one who counts. What do we have — votes get lost, votes merge, and so on. The people I supported with my vote did not win, it was somebody else instead. Because they united. Those votes were lost somewhere. Well, overall, you know how it goes, there's no confidence now (an elderly woman, a city in Kherson oblast).

People comment on their previous votes in the context of their disappointment in the candidates they supported:

“ Respondent 1: This is a constitutional right, which I believe I must exercise, and then we will see, that is, a person will justify this confidence or not. Then, if they do,

FIGURE 10

ARE YOU GOING TO VOTE IN THE 2020 LOCAL ELECTIONS?



I'll say, I voted for this person. If they don't justify my confidence, I'll say, that's it.

Respondent 2: This scheme has already happened before, and none of them has ever justified it.

Respondent 3: To be honest, it brings me nothing but disappointment.

(R1, middle-aged man; R2, elderly man; R3, middle-aged woman; cities in Luhansk oblast).

The rhetoric about election fraud demonstrates the lack of trust in the electoral system in Ukraine. Even the respondents who participated in the work of counting boards and could personally see that everything worked in line with the procedures and requirements still spoke about fraud on other levels of the electoral system:

“ I was on the counting board, and I saw that whatever was bought and fixed, it was not there. I was sitting right there where people vote. And I can say that nobody bribed

me personally, not just me but also those who worked with me. We did not have fraud organised, we were not falsifying any votes. We counted honestly. And I worked in the elections 4 or 5 times. This was not just one case or two cases. That's what statistics show. There is probably fraud, yes, but not on this level. It goes to a higher level. Perhaps they eventually steal those votes somehow or do some other forgery. (middle-aged woman, a city in Kherson oblast)


Claims about elections as a means to influence the political situation and statements about the importance of civic duty are rather marginal. Even though 60% of respondents indicated that they would participate in the elections, the motivation for this participation is quite peculiar.

Based on the answers to the questions about the qualities of local elected officials that are crucial for voters, we have compiled the following ranking of characteristics.

FIGURE 11

WHAT IS CRUCIAL FOR YOU, WHEN YOU ELECT A LOCAL COUNCILOR?

N = 1000 (%)



The oblast and the type of locality do not really affect voters' priorities in selecting the candidate. In all cases, voting is mostly "personal" — voters show a willingness to vote not for a political party, but a "brand," a "star," a media person present in public discourse.

During focus groups, the research participants also reflected on the criteria they use to select potential local councillors. Potential voters claim that they usually pay attention to the candidate's team, as well as to their "politi-

cal biography" (what the candidate did as opposed to what they talked about during the election campaign).

It is important for voters that the candidate should feel relatable and close to them, i.e. their local origin, life in the same locality, the fact that their children go to school in the same electoral district, etc. This is viewed as a certain guarantee that the person will care about improving things in the locality. The issue comes up, especially in rural areas.

As pointed out above, the choice of

a particular candidate is often influenced by their personal qualities, by the image they manage to create as part of their electoral campaign. In this case, the communication component is important to voters: they want the candidate to be approachable, to demonstrate interest and attention.

The most in-demand characteristics of a potential candidate are humanity and moral fibre (by the latter, they mean work for the sake of society at large as opposed to personal enrichment).

Overall and during focus groups, research participants were willing to support a person who corresponded to a certain subjective, often stereotypical, idea of a politician. Voters hardly care about the candidates' strategy or platform. What is more, there is a certain paradox in people's mindset: at the level of demands, people say they want long-term change and hard yet inconspicuous work for the betterment of almost all areas of life in society, yet, they tend to support candidates who can demonstrate simple, visible results — new roads, installed playgrounds, etc.

Only 16.7% of respondents said that the political affiliation of the candidate was important to them. Since voters tend to select "flashy" leaders, this causes the dominance of populist practices, while politics itself is not perceived as painstaking teamwork to manage the government.

People choose party candidates over independent candidates for the following reason: a party candidate is viewed as having more resources, while an independent politician in opposition ("the lone warrior") will not be able to make a real difference; respondents believe a party representative is easier to hold accountable since he or she can be pressured through the party; party

**ONLY 16.7%
OF RESPONDENTS
SAID THAT
THE POLITICAL
AFFILIATION
OF THE CANDIDATE
WAS IMPORTANT
TO THEM.**

candidates are viewed as having more initiative; they may be supported by the party's reputation and financial backing.

Support of independent candidates, on the other hand, is explained by them being "outside the system" (which means, among other things, that they are not part of corrupt schemes). Respondents believe candidates without a party affiliation will be more "humble" in their behaviour and will not engage in "PR" for the sake of their party and party leaders; thus, they will be more action-oriented; people without a party affiliation will also be unlikely to jump ship and buy spots on various party lists (yet, the status of an independent candidate is still viewed as something that can be "sold" to a party or another political entity before the elections); overall independent candidates are viewed as less dependent on external forces.


Overall, people's ideas of both types of candidates are contradictory and situational. The average voter, who has no confidence in the integrity and transparency of the election procedure, tries to rationalise their choice at least somehow. However, their choice is not steady and definite; in a conversation,

people will change their mind and agree with other people's reasoning. The motives for the selection of a candidate in correlation with the type of locality can be found in Appendix 4 (Fig. 1-2).

Based on the question about which party candidates are viewed as most worthy of trust at the local level, we have compiled a ranking of potential elected representatives by party affiliation:

FIGURE 12

REPRESENTATIVES OF WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES WILL YOU CONSIDER FIRST AS WORTHY OF ENTRUSTING WITH THE POWER AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, N = 1000 (%)



7

The question emphasised that the question was about voluntary unpaid political activity.

While the preferences for this or that political force have almost no correlation with the type of locality (apart from the fact that in villages and small towns, the percentage of those who have not yet made their choice is greater), there are certain differences if we break the results down by age. The support of Opposition Platform for Life increases together with the age of the respondents, while Servant of the People tends to be more popular with younger people (Appendix 4, Fig. 3). There are also some differences between oblasts — Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts support Opposition Platform for Life more, while Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts are more likely to support Servant of the People (Appendix 4, Fig. 5). However, the election is far from decided in these areas, since there is a high percentage of those who are not sure whether they are going to vote and if yes, representatives of which party they are going to support.

When asked about possible expectations from the local authorities, we see that people want to see almost all the problems that we discussed initially resolved. A local councillor must ensure comfortable and safe life in the locality in all aspects — provide people with jobs, education, high-quality healthcare, infrastructure, etc. Since such expectations are inherently unrealistic, this leads to permanent disappointment in the elected candidates, the lack of trust and faith in the effectiveness of the electoral system.

A LOCAL COUNCILLOR MUST ENSURE COMFORTABLE AND SAFE LIFE IN THE LOCALITY IN ALL ASPECTS


— PROVIDE PEOPLE WITH JOBS, EDUCATION, HIGH-QUALITY HEALTHCARE, INFRASTRUCTURE, ETC.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVITY

Regarding political activity and participation of the potential voters themselves, 61.5% of respondents said they were not politically active in any way. On the list of possible activities, the most common actions (taken by 9-10% of respondents) included appeals to municipal enterprises and institutions of the locality, signing petitions, appeals to local government representatives (the mayor's office, the executive committee, the local council or administration). 6-7% of respondents indicated they engaged in volunteer work, appealed to local councillors or participated in election campaigns⁷.

FIGURE 13

HAVE YOU DONE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING FOR FREE
IN THE LAST THREE YEARS, N = 1000 (%)



An additional question as to whether these actions were effective shows that the vast majority of those who were politically active did see the results of their activities.


This is an important point, because about 40% of respondents have tried to solve their own problems or those in society overall, one way or another, and they assess their actions as effective. This result debunks the common belief that nothing can be achieved or changed.

In focus groups and in-depth interviews, we tried to figure out how **amalgamation** affected the general atmosphere in the locality and the residents' activity levels. However, in most cases,

it was a short-term experience, which research participants had not yet had a chance to process and reflect on. Heads of amalgamated hromadas who were interviewed emphasised the fact that the reform is incomplete, which creates a situation where the powers have been granted to the community yet the resources remain with the local executive structures. In this situation, people have growing demands to the amalgamated hromada leadership, and it proves rather challenging to meet them. However, the amalgamated hromada practice gave a boost to local entrepreneurial initiatives and various projects which can apply for funding.

FIGURE 14

HAVE YOU DONE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING FOR FREE
IN THE LAST THREE YEARS, N = 1000 (%)




In cities, **the possibility and success of joint action to improve one's space is increasingly illustrated by associations of apartment housing owners.** These are transformed into mini-laboratories

to gain experience of joint action and responsibility. Not all of these experiences end up working, but they do draw people's attention.

FIGURE 15⁸

DO THE FOLLOWING ITEMS MAKE YOU FEEL ANXIOUS, N=1000 (%)



8

See detailed data
in Appendix 5,
Fig. 1

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF FEARS AND WORRIES

One condition of security is minimising fears and worries. We asked respondents to answer important questions on foreign and domestic policy, which are constantly discussed in Ukrainian society, from this very perspective — fears and worries.

The things that worry our respondents most include the permission for land sale, military action resuming, and the current conflict on the occupied territories (part of Donetsk and Luhansk

oblasts and the annexed Crimea) remaining in status quo.

When it comes to closing borders with both Russia and Europe, as well as the perspective of potential NATO accession or the possibility of losing the visa liberalisation regime, we see quite different responses, which illustrates the key aspects of social polarisation. This line of social divisions continues when it comes to making peace with Russia on Russia's conditions and the movement towards the EU / Europe. The prospect of rapprochement with Russia worries about 24.3% of respondents, while almost 66% do not feel worried about it. Overall, we can speak about significant


social polarisation when it comes to key foreign policy vectors. The prospect of rapprochement with Russia is the least worrying, which, amid a significant percentage of those who are concerned about closing borders with Russia, indicates a high level of loyalty to Russia and a willingness to make concessions.

We see these attitudes manifest themselves in two key foreign policy vectors: those respondents who are worried about the vector towards the EU / Europe are likely to speak about the resolution of the situation in Donbas as of a compromise (59.6%) rather

than victory (13.2%). Among those who are worried about the prospect of rapprochement with Russia, the rhetoric of compromise remains significant (41.6%), but the percentage of those who speak in the categories of victory is greater — “victory in the military way,” — 15.2%, “victory in the political way” — 13.2% (the total score of the “victory” rhetoric is 28.4%). Similarly, this group of respondents shows significantly greater support for international peacekeepers or international administration (11.1% vs. 1.6%). We see an almost opposite situation in the issue of federalisation — among those

FIGURE 16

DO THE FOLLOWING ITEMS MAKE YOU FEEL ANXIOUS? / WHICH RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN DONETSK AND LUHANSK OBLASTS BEST DESCRIBES YOUR POSITION?, N=1000 (%)



who are concerned about rapprochement with Russia, it is supported by 2.5%, while among those concerned about the EU / European vector as a whole, it is supported by 10.2%.

Overall, the rhetoric of compromise as opposed to victory is characteristic of over half the respondents (54%). All other positions do not have such a clear support group. 17.9% of respondents expect military and political measures that will lead to victory and 5% are ready for international peacekeepers and international administration. We must also note a high number of respondents refusing to express their position — 7.1% chose the answer “difficult to say” and 5% directly said they did not want to talk about it.

The research participants’ attitude to key domestic and foreign policy challenges can perhaps be better understood through the lens of certain issues

about their national identity.

Despite the lack of a clear proven link between national identity on the one hand and political or foreign policy preferences on the other hand, this issue merits special attention and is often taken into account in the organisation of political campaigns or the formulation of political messages from political parties and the government alike.

The quantitative part of the study allows us, to some extent, to outline the key identity markers of residents of Ukrainian oblasts covered by the study. When asked about their nationality, the majority of respondents identifies as Ukrainians (79%), 16% identify as Russians, 3% identify as other nationalities, 0.7% of respondents find it difficult to determine their own nationality and 1% of respondents chose the answer “I do not think of myself in terms of nationality.”

FIGURE 17

WHICH RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN DONETSK AND LUHANSK OBLASTS BEST DESCRIBES YOUR POSITION?, N=1000 (%)





FIGURE 18

RESPONDENTS WHO INDICATED THEIR NATIONALITY AS "UKRAINIAN" / AGE GROUPS, N = 1000 (%)



We observe the presence of generational differences in the distribution of groups by nationality.


As we go from older to younger generations, there is a clear increase in the share

of people who identify as Ukrainians.

In the following figure we see national self-determination in terms of age excluding the group "Ukrainians" (see Fig. 19)

FIGURE 19

WHAT IS YOUR NATIONALITY? / AGE GROUP, N=1000 (%)



Here, we see that the percentage of those who identify as Russians grows with age; however, we see an approximately equal distribution of the position “I do not think of myself in terms of nationality.” We can assume the reason to be that when the older generation thinks of nationality, they still link it to the logic of their former Soviet passport where it was mandatory to record nationality, and they do not perceive nationality as part of identity but rather as an inherent characteristic that you inherit from parents. The younger generations, on the other hand, identify with the modern country of Ukraine, thus they identify as Ukrainians both ethnically and politically. The position “I do not think of myself in terms of nationality” in this case can be viewed as a certain protest against the politicisation of this characteristic and on the formation of certain stereotypes about the political behaviour and choices of representatives of certain nationalities. However, this position is rather marginal. The moment of “uncertainty” that we see is interesting as well — we can see that the age group 30 to 39 hardly ever selected the option “difficult to say” answering the nationality question. For the age group 40 to 59, however, this issue gives rise to reflection and doubt. Similarly, we see the emergence of this uncertainty among the younger age group.

If we compare the responses concerning native language and real language use, we can conclude that for respondents, it was important to emphasise that Ukrainian was their “mother tongue” even if they did not use it in their daily life. Almost half of the respondents use Russian while communicating at home and at work. 10 to 12% of respondents in all the studied oblasts use Ukrainian in their daily life. We should also take note of the significant group of

respondents who emphasise being bilingual, claiming they communicate in both languages equally. Thus, we can conclude that in the regions that are traditionally called “Russian speaking” almost half the participants speak, tolerate and are ready to use Ukrainian in various situations in their daily life.

Looking at language use in detail depending on which language respondents marked as native (see Appendix 5, Fig. 2-3) leads us to speak about the absence of significant differences between the practical use of this or that language in the official work space and private home space. Among those respondents who identified Ukrainian as their mother tongue, 27-28% speak Ukrainian at work and at home, 23-25% speak Russian, and 47-50% speak both languages equally. Among respondents who identify Russian as their mother tongue, 2-3% speak Ukrainian at work and at home, 13-17% speak both languages and 50-55% speak Russian. Among those who identified as bilingual, 4-7% speak exclusively Ukrainian, 33-40% — exclusively Russian (in this case, the use of Russian increases in the workplace — 40.4% speak Russian at work and 32.8% — at home) and 56-60% use both languages equally at home and at work.

In the next question, we asked the respondents to step away from the issue of nationality and language to their self-perception and to see whether they do or do not feel part of the following nominal⁹ groups to which political leaders tend to appeal. At the level of this self-perception, we see polarisation. Almost equal groups are comprised of those who actively recognise and just as actively deny belonging to the unity of the former republics (27.5% largely

9


A group of people that does not occur naturally through the unity of social characteristics but is rather constructed as a certain category for science or with a practical goal.

10

In this issue, we use separate indicators from the analytical tool developed as part of the project: University of St. (2013). Region, nation and beyond: An interdisciplinary and transcultural reconceptualisation of Ukraine [Data set] <https://www.uaregio.org/en/about/stage-1/>

FIGURE 20

WHAT LANGUAGE DO YOU USUALLY SPEAK ...? N = 1000 (%)



feel such affiliation, 32.5% actively deny it), the same applies to self-perception "citizen of the world." When it comes to affiliation with the "Eastern Slavic world," the polarisation is mitigated by uncertainty. Most respondents deny belonging to the European space (the responses "rather do not feel" and

"do not at all feel" total 60.9%)¹⁰. If we compare the same data across groups of those who define their nationality as "Ukrainian" and "Russian," we can see a significant difference only in the responses concerning self-perception as "part of the unity of former Soviet republics."

FIGURE 21

HOW MUCH DO YOU FEEL ...?, N = 1000 (%)





FIGURE 22

WHAT IS YOUR NATIONALITY? / HOW MUCH DO YOU FEEL ...?
(RUSSIANS N = 166, UKRAINIANS N = 788 (%))



Since there are more people of the older generation among those who identify as Russian, we can suggest this difference in positions is not connected entirely to the national self-identification but is rather generational.


While there are no significant generational differences when it comes to self-perception as “part of the Slavic world” or “citizen of the world,” they immediately emerge if we look at belonging to the “unity of former Soviet

republics” or to “part of Europe.” There is a clear tendency whereas the age of respondents decreases, the number of those who identify with the former Soviet space decreases as well.

We do not see a similarly clear tendency in the identification with the European space; however, the group those who “do not at all feel” part of Europe among the youngest category of ages 18 to 29 is almost twice as small as among age groups of ages 40 and above. Depending

FIGURE 23

HOW MUCH DO YOU FEEL PART OF THE UNITY OF THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS? / RESPONDENT'S AGE, N = 1000 (%)




on the type of locality, we see that the residents of villages feel the least “European”, while residents of smaller cities (not oblast capitals) feel the most “European”. If we look at localities, however, we see the polarisation of society in this indicator — the groups of those who “significantly” feel like part of this or that nominal group and those

who deny such affiliation (“do not at all feel”) are almost equal and both significant (see Appendix 5, Fig. 4).

As for oblasts, residents of Luhansk and Zaporizhia oblasts have a slightly greater sense of belonging to the European space. The paradox of Luhansk oblast is that here the people who have the pro-European choice actively identify as

FIGURE 24

HOW MUCH DO YOU FEEL PART OF EUROPE? / RESPONDENT'S AGE, N = 1000 (%)



part of the former Soviet space (see Appendix 5, Fig. 5-6).

LAW ENFORCEMENT


The sense of insecurity in the face of illegal behaviour, the growing crime rates that are viewed as a source of danger which can lead to violence are an overarching theme of all security issues, which means that law enforcement issues are important for the average person. Of all respondents, 61.4% said they had not encountered any criminal activity in the past year. The most common offences are fraud (16.2% of respondents

indicated they had personally encountered such actions), psychological pressure (10%) and theft (6.3%). Of all the variations of discrimination, language-based discrimination was the most common one (4.7%). We can find some additional information on the subject in the responses during focus groups. Here, we can reflect on another aspect of societal tension — in the sector of the national language policy. Notably, the participants spoke about discrimination of both languages, Russian and Ukrainian.

“ I also want to say something in response to the previous speakers about the language question. I also

11
For convenience of perception, the diagram does not include the 61.4% bar (those respondents who have not personally encountered any of the offenses listed in the question).

FIGURE 25¹¹
HAVE YOU PERSONALLY ENCOUNTERED THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS PERPETRATED AGAINST YOU IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, N = 1000 (%)



12

Respondents could choose up to three options. The figures show what percentage of the total number of respondents chose one or another option from the list.

speak two languages, I grew up in Donetsk oblast, I have lived here all my life. And my whole family speaks Russian. But I don't see a problem in someone else wanting to speak Ukrainian. You say — you are forced to speak Ukrainian, but you want to force those people to speak Russian as you do. This attitude is biased. You are just as biased towards those people. (young woman, Donetsk oblast).

“ And there's also the question of language because let's say I'm from Donetsk oblast, and it was unusual to me that it's been made compulsory now that even when you answer questions in class, you have to do it in Ukrainian. It is inconvenient for me; I read all the literature in Rus-


sian and it is difficult for me to adjust. These are the main problems that I see (young man, Donetsk oblast).

Among offences that occur at the level of localities, respondents point out excessive alcohol consumption and alcoholism (41.5%), drug addiction (32.2%), property crimes (theft, robbery, banditry) — 27%, public disorder (hooliganism, vandalism, fights) — 26.9%. Many respondents are concerned about drug trafficking (19.2% indicated this as a problem), as well as corruption and bribery (18.1%).

Detailing of this issue by oblast shows that in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the key problems are excessive alcohol consumption, alcoholism, public disorder and drug addiction. In Zaporizhia

FIGURE 26¹²

WHAT TYPES OF OFFENSES DO YOU CONSIDER THE MOST PROBLEMATIC IN YOUR LOCALITY?, N = 1000 (%)



oblast, property crimes (theft, robbery, banditry), drug addiction and alcoholism come to the fore. In Kherson, the same three problems remain, but in a different order — alcoholism, drug addiction, and then property crimes (see Appendix 6, Fig. 1-2). When these problems are broken down by type of locality, the oblast capitals show about the same results, with slight differences, with drug addiction being the most frequently named problem. In other types of localities, alcoholism comes first, with drug addiction, public disorder and property crimes following it in various orders.

An important aspect of security is the presence of the police in people's daily lives — the visibility of their work, patrolling, the option to address the police when the situation calls for it. Half of the respondents said that they see police officers every day, 25% see them once or several times a week, 14% — several times a month, 12% — infrequently or never.

The answers to this question have their own specific nature when broken down by oblast and type of locality. Overall, the police in Luhansk oblast are the most "visible" ones (69.6% indicated they saw


police officers every day, and 17.6% — every week), while the police of Kherson oblast are the least visible (with 33.6% indicating they saw the police every day, 28% — every week). The highest number of respondents who do not see the police at all are in Kherson (11.2%) and Donetsk (8.8%) oblasts (see Appendix 6, Fig. 5). As for localities, we see a clear tendency of police visibility decreasing from oblast capitals to villages. 59.5% of oblast capital residents see the police every day, 20.9% see them every week; in other cities, the numbers are 53.8% and 21.1% respectively; in UTS — 48.5% and 27.3%, and in the village — 34.3% and 32.5%. Villages also have the highest number of people who see the police infrequently — 16.1% indicated they had seen police officers several times in the past year or had not seen in the past year at all (Appendix 6, Fig. 6).

Some fewer people trust the police (38%) than those who do not (54%).

We see the same patterns within oblasts. There is a certain difference in different types of localities — in smaller cities and UTS, the police are trusted more overall than in oblast capitals and in villages (see Appendix 6, Fig. 7-8).

FIGURE 27

HOW OFTEN HAVE YOU SEEN POLICE REPRESENTATIVES
IN YOUR LOCALITY IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? N = 1000 (%)



In the next question, we wanted to find out whether respondents themselves were ready to work with the police. This readiness was demonstrated by 60% of respondents, 33% expressed unwillingness to cooperate. Whether they were ready or not correlated with the level of trust. Respondents who said they fully trusted the police demonstrated an active willingness to cooperate (87%). Of those who indicated they completely distrusted the police, 37.8% expressed readiness to work with them, while 54.7% were reluctant to do that (see Appendix 6, Fig. 9). In terms of age, people

between the ages between 30 and 59 are more likely to help the police. There is no significant difference between women and men in their willingness to help the police (see Appendix 6, Fig. 15-16). Confidence in law enforcement officers is affected by the experience of direct contact with the police and its success or failure. 35.1% of respondents indicated they had communicated with the police during the past year, while 64.9% said they had had no such contact. Even though police “visibility” is different depending on the type of locality, the share of respondents who had personal communication with

FIGURE 28
TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU TRUST LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES?, N = 1000 (%)





FIGURE 29
ARE YOU READY TO HELP LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (TESTIFY, ACT AS WITNESSES, INFORM ABOUT OFFENSES, ASSIST THE INVESTIGATION, ETC.)?, N = 1000 (%)



the police was about the same in different localities. In terms of age, people between the ages between 18 and 49 had more contact with the police, people of ages 50 and above — less contact. Men have more contact with the police than women do (see Appendix 6, Fig. 10-12).

Those respondents who had communicated with the police demonstrated a much greater readiness to cooperate with the police in the future (64.4% of those ready to cooperate vs. 29% of those who are not ready). Those who'd had no personal experience with the police are much less likely to cooperate (see Appendix 6, Fig. 13). On the other hand, trust in law enforcement agencies has almost no correlation with experience of direct contact with them or lack thereof (see Appendix 6, Fig. 14).

Qualitative analysis gives a basis for detailing of some peculiarities of how the activity of law enforcement agencies is perceived at the level of localities. Respondents note the lack of police personnel in rural areas. One precinct officer often works in several villages at the same time, the police do not come to the call quickly enough — accordingly, they often fail to prevent the offence and only arrive upon its commission.

Under such conditions, the issue of cooperation with the police becomes especially important. However, as the qualitative study has shown, such cooperation is not easy to develop and depends on trust in law enforcement and prior positive experience of interaction.

What impedes such cooperation? What can be the reasons for distrust in the police? These are often a number of fairly typical situations that stand in the way of this cooperation.

The level of trust in law enforcement agencies is declining due to the lack of response to citizens' appeals. That is, in this case, we are talking about is a lack of feedback, at least a formal response to citizen appeals with a report on the

actions taken by the police. Distrust is especially heightened in situations where citizens report drug dens or drug production when it all unfolds in front of all the neighbours, everyone knows it; people report it to the police and see no response. This creates distrust in the police, leading to accusations that the police are covering up this type of illegal activity.

Another aspect that can create a negative experience of cooperation is the police expressing dissatisfaction over being called:

“ It is often difficult to work with them, to call the police, they shame you so to speak, for example, because when you see some offence being committed and you call the police, they look at you like an idiot and say, why did you call the police? (young man, a city in Zaporizhia oblast).

In this case, we speak about the police having communication problems in their work with the public and inability to provide people extra support in their readiness to work with the police.

Some more important reasons for reluctance to cooperate with the police is fear of retaliation, lack of security of the witnesses from those they testify against. People are afraid of revenge against themselves or their relatives. When the environment is perceived as causing anxiety, the person views such danger as entirely real. In this case, people choose between different behavioural strategies — from complete refusal to cooperate with the police to consent to anonymous cooperation (for example, an anonymous call). This may partly explain why the issue of cooperation or non-cooperation with the police does not depend on trusting it. A person may generally trust the police but be afraid to cooperate because of possible retaliation.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. RESPONDENTS SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

FIGURE 1

AGE PARAMETERS OF RESPONDENTS, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)





FIGURE 3

MARITAL STATUS, N = 1000 (%)



APPENDIX 2

FIGURE 1

EDUCATIONAL PARAMETERS OF RESPONDENTS, N = 1000 (%)





FIGURE 2

WHICH OF THESE CHARACTERISTICS BEST DESCRIBES
YOUR CURRENT EMPLOYMENT, N = 1000 (%)



APPENDIX 3.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

FIGURE 1

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
THAT MAY OCCUR IN YOUR AREA ARE OF MOST CONCERN TO YOU? /
OBLAST N = 1000 (%)





FIGURE 2

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
THAT MAY OCCUR IN YOUR AREA ARE OF MOST CONCERN TO YOU?
TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)



APPENDIX 4. POLITICAL CHOICE

FIGURE 1

WHEN YOU ELECT A LOCAL COUNCILOR,
WHAT IS CRUCIAL FOR YOU? (SELECT UP TO THREE OPTIONS) /
TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 2

WHEN YOU ELECT A LOCAL COUNCILOR,
WHAT IS CRUCIAL FOR YOU? (SELECT UP TO THREE OPTIONS) /
TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 3

REPRESENTATIVES OF WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES WILL YOU
CONSIDER FIRST AS WORTHY OF ENTRUSTING WITH THE POWERS
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL / AGE, N = 1000 (%)



FIGURE 4

REPRESENTATIVES OF WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES WILL YOU
CONSIDER FIRST AS WORTHY OF ENTRUSTING WITH THE POWERS
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL / TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)



13

Fig. 3-5:
we reviewed 6 key
parties presented by
the level and intensity
of support.

FIGURE 5¹³

REPRESENTATIVES OF WHICH POLITICAL PARTIES WILL YOU
CONSIDER FIRST AS WORTHY OF ENTRUSTING WITH THE POWERS
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL / OBLAST, N = 1000 (%)



APPENDIX 5.

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES
IN THE CONTEXT OF FEARS AND WORRIES

FIGURE 1

DO THE FOLLOWING ITEMS MAKE YOU FEEL ANXIOUS, N=1000 (%)




FIGURE 2

WHAT LANGUAGE DO YOU CONSIDER YOUR NATIVE LANGUAGE / WHAT LANGUAGE DO YOU USUALLY SPEAK AT WORK (NATIVE LANGUAGE: UKRAINIAN N = 340, RUSSIAN N = 376, UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN EQUALLY N = 271 (%))




FIGURE 3

WHAT LANGUAGE DO YOU CONSIDER YOUR NATIVE LANGUAGE / WHAT LANGUAGE DO YOU USUALLY SPEAK AT HOME (NATIVE LANGUAGE: UKRAINIAN N = 340, RUSSIAN N = 376, UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN EQUALLY N = 271 (%))




FIGURE 4

HOW MUCH DO YOU FEEL ...? / TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)






FIGURE 5

HOW MUCH DO YOU FEEL PART OF EUROPE? /
TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)

**FIGURE 6**

HOW MUCH DO YOU FEEL PART OF THE UNITY OF FORMER
SOVIET REPUBLICS? / TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)



APPENDIX 6. LAW ENFORCEMENT

FIGURE 1

WHAT TYPES OF OFFENSES DO YOU CONSIDER THE MOST PROBLEMATIC
IN YOUR LOCALITY? / OBLAST, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 2

WHAT TYPES OF OFFENSES DO YOU CONSIDER THE MOST PROBLEMATIC
IN YOUR LOCALITY? / OBLAST, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 3

WHAT TYPES OF OFFENSES DO YOU CONSIDER THE MOST PROBLEMATIC IN YOUR LOCALITY? / TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 4

WHAT TYPES OF OFFENSES DO YOU CONSIDER THE MOST PROBLEMATIC
IN YOUR LOCALITY? / TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 5

HOW OFTEN HAVE YOU SEEN POLICE REPRESENTATIVES IN YOUR LOCALITY IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? / OBLAST N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 6

HOW OFTEN HAVE YOU SEEN POLICE REPRESENTATIVES IN YOUR LOCALITY IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? / TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 7

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU TRUST LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES? / OBLAST, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 8

HOW MUCH TRUST LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES /
TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 9

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU TRUST LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES? / ARE YOU READY TO ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, N = 1000 (%)






FIGURE 10

HAVE YOU COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS? / TYPE OF LOCALITY, N = 1000 (%)

**FIGURE 11**

HAVE YOU COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS? / RESPONDENT'S AGE, N = 1000 (%)

**FIGURE 12**

HAVE YOU COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS? / WOMEN, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 13

HAVE YOU COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS? / ARE YOU READY TO ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES?, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 14

HAVE YOU COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS? / TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU TRUST LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVES?, N = 1000 (%)




FIGURE 15

ARE YOU READY TO ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES /
AGE GROUP, N=1000 (%)




FIGURE 16

ARE YOU READY TO ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES /
RESPONDENT'S GENDER, N=1000 (%)

