COP28 Climate Change Conference in Dubai and Ukraine’s Role

ЗМІСТ

1. Basic Concepts and Abbreviations

2. Key Facts about COP28

3. Transition from СОР27 to СОР28

4. Reaching a financial balance between vulnerability and responsibility

• Loss and Damage
• Climate Finance
• Reducing emissions and phasing out fossil fuels
• Adaptation
• Global Stocktake
• Climate science
• Article 6

5. Ukraine’s interests in negotiations

6. What does the official Ukrainian delegation bring to COP?

• Non-inclusion of Russian emission reports in the occupied territories.
• Imposing obligations on Russia regarding emissions (direct and indirect) that have arisen as a result of military operations.
• Ukrainian pavilion at СОР28

7. The Ukrainian public’s positions about COP28

8. COP28 and the war: Impact of the war on the climate in Ukraine

1. Basic Concepts and Abbreviations

2. Key Facts about COP28

The annual United Nations (UN) climate change conference, known as the Conference of the Parties (COP) brings together world leaders, country delegates, the public, and the media to reach a consensus on how to address climate change. The parties include governments that have ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and/or the Paris Agreement. In addition, COPs attract thousands of delegates from civil society, the private sector, international organizations, and the media.

Since COP21 in 2015, the annual event has been primarily focused on implementing the Paris Agreement, which includes three main goals: limit the increase in the average global temperature to “well below” 2°C and aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels; adapt to climate change by increasing resilience; and align financial flows with “a trajectory of low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.”

The COP host changes every year, with the rotation based on global regions. COP28 will be held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), November 30-December 12, 2023. The host country appoints a president to oversee the discussions, who plays a critical role in engaging with governments and other stakeholders, offering direction and vision, and ultimately contributing to the agreements taking shape.

Dr. Sultan Al Jaber, UAE Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology and Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC Group), will lead the Dubai talks. Al-Jaber’s role in the fossil fuel industry, as well as the growing influence of fossil fuel lobbyists during the COP, are already causing controversy, with stakeholders questioning the integrity of the climate debate.

COP decisions are made by consensus, which makes the process of reaching agreement difficult and emotionally charged due to the parties’ different needs and interests.

3. Transition from СОР27 to СОР28

COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, was a highly emotional affair. The conference took place against the backdrop of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Climate activists pointed out that human rights had to be a necessary component of climate action, which was something impossible to ignore while in Egypt.

“The agreement to set up a loss and damage fund to support poorer countries being ravaged by climate impacts, which the public and the most vulnerable nations had been pressing for decades, was the only thing that saved the COP27 from totally failing to meet expectations.”

There was little to no progress, or sometimes even setbacks, on almost all issues during COP27. The final resolution downplayed the significance of the goal to keep global temperatures from rising more than 1.5°C [2.7°F] above pre-industrial levels, copy-pasted the part on “phase down of coal” from the COP26 resolution instead of phasing it out, and failed to mention other types of fossil fuels. It was evident that the host country’s climate policy affected the negotiations potential. This year is unlikely to be very different.

4. Reaching a financial balance between vulnerability and responsibility

COP28 is important for several reasons. First, this year’s conference marks the completion of the first Global Stocktake (GST), the primary mechanism for assessing progress on the Paris Agreement. Secondly, everyone is waiting for the full launch of the Loss and Damage Fund, which COP27 participants agreed to establish on the last day of the 2022 conference. The transitional committee of the newly created fund met five times this year, most recently on November 3-4, to work out the mechanism for the fund’s operation.

COP negotiations are organized in such a way that each country is included in a certain negotiating group, and is also included or not included in Annexes I and II of the UNFCCC. This status directly affects countries’ access to climate finance, as well as their obligations to help others.

• Annex I parties include industrialized countries that were members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992, as well as countries with economies in transition, including Ukraine.
• Annex II parties consist of Annex I OECD members, excluding countries with economies in transition. They are required to provide financial resources to help developing countries implement emission reduction measures under the Convention and help them adapt to the negative effects of climate change.
• Parties not included in Annex I are mainly developing countries, with some groups of countries recognized by the Convention as particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change, such as countries with low-lying coastlines, those prone to desertification and droughts, or others (e.g., countries that are heavily dependent on revenues from coal mining and trade).

This division, as well as the unofficial division of countries into the “Global North and Global South,” constantly brings the issue of financial capacity and financial assistance to the forefront of negotiations.

a. Loss and Damage

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) issued a report with proposals for creating an effective Loss and Damage Fund, which noted the following: “Even if optimal mitigation and adaptation strategies in line with the latest assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC ) are adopted on time, existing projections still anticipate significant unavoidable loss and damage from climate-related shocks locked into our warming world. Prior to the pandemic, loss and damage costs in developing countries were projected to be as much as $580 billion per year by 2030, by which time as many as 132 million more people could be pushed into poverty by the impacts of climate change.”

Some progress has already been made in forming a general understanding of the Loss and Damage Fund’s work; however, some unresolved issues require additional consideration. This includes aspects of scale (the fund must be large enough to address ongoing and growing losses and damages from the climate crisis), scope (transparent and inclusive funding eligibility criteria), and governance (there must be rapid distribution of aid to countries in times of crisis).

Another important component of the climate justice discourse is the issue of human rights, which is considered in two contexts. Human rights principles must be observed in the decisions of the UNFCCC bodies and in the proposed mechanisms for financing climate measures, in particular with regard to the fact that the groups of people and countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change should receive support.

As Climate Action Network (CAN) International comments, “The divergences between developed and developing countries have come to a boil particularly on issues around contributors to the fund, the location/host institute of the fund, and its governance structures. Rich nations such as the United States have called for all countries to contribute equally to the capitalization of the fund thereby erasing any semblance of equity and historical responsibility in who must give the most. They have also pushed for the Fund to be hosted by the World Bank, which will restrict its independence, prove more costly, and limit its capacity to disburse funds on time as the urgency of extreme weather events escalates.”

It currently appears that the U.S. that may potentially open up discussions about the Fund’s operation during COP28, and we will see heated debate around this vital tool. The Loss and Damage Fund can still be an example of countries really helping each other to overcome humanitarian, economic, and environmental crises, but it can only work as required if the most developed countries are ready to quickly provide for it, and the funding distribution mechanism works in a transparent and timely manner.

b. Climate Finance

Despite a pledge by developed countries in 2009, the target of $100 billion in climate finance has still not been met by 2023, even according to the OECD’s publicly criticized methodology. The commitment regarding double adaptation funding, which underpins the Glasgow Pact results, is far from complete. At the same time, the future Loss and Damage Fund lacks contributions, and even existing transition funding commitments are not fully funded.

At COP28, governments will continue negotiations on a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) to replace the $100 billion commitment. The deadline for this agreement is 2024, but progress in Dubai is critical to laying the groundwork for COP29. Finance will also play an important role in the negotiations regarding GST and the Loss and Damage Fund.

Ultimately, discussions and commitments related to scaling up and implementing climate finance may affect a number of other negotiating issues and have the potential to either unblock the parties’ ambitions or stifle any progress. This dynamic was evident at the climate talks in Bonn in June 2023, when a group of developing countries opposed including an item on the official negotiations agenda to increase the ambition for reducing emissions unless funding from developed countries was ramped up.

c. Reducing emissions and phasing out fossil fuels

Considering that emissions from the burning of coal, oil, and gas are the main cause of the climate crisis, it is quite striking that COP26 was the first time when the cover decision mentioned fossil fuels and the parties agreed to accelerate “efforts towards the phase-out of unabated coal power and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, recognizing the need for support towards a just transition.”

At COP27, a coalition of more than 80 countries pushed for COP26’s wording on coal to be expanded to include all fossil fuels. Although this reference did not make it into the official text of the decision, it suggests that pressure is mounting on the UNFCCC to address the issue.

The issue of phasing out fossil fuels is likely to draw a lot of attention at the talks in Dubai. Although this issue is not a separate item on the official negotiations agenda, it may still be included in a number of programs, such as the decision on GST, “mitigation work programme” and the cover decision. The need to phase out fossil fuels is highlighted in the GST Summary Report.

The phase-out of fossil fuels is being discussed as part of a wider energy package, which also includes targets to increase the use of renewable energy sources and improve energy efficiency. Agreeing on the renewable energy target was an important step forward at the G20 Leaders’ Summit in September 2023, where G20 members agreed to “continue and encourage efforts to triple renewable energy capacity worldwide.”

The UAE and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) recently released the report “Tripling Renewable Power and Doubling Energy Efficiency by 2030: Crucial Steps to 1.5°C.” This cooperation indicates that we can expect new commitments and coalitions aiming to develop renewable energy sources at COP28. The main point to watch is whether there will be any mention of divesting from fossil fuels in the new potential renewable energy development announcements.

d. Adaptation

The parties will discuss adaptation to climate change along with losses and financial assistance issues. For a region hosting COP28, vulnerability to the climate crisis is already a reality, and therefore we can expect that the topic of increasing sustainability will be given quite a lot of attention.

The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) is drafting a report on the commitments of developed countries to double funding for adapting from the 2019 level to 2025, as agreed at COP26. Funding for adaptation lags far behind the required amount and is scanty compared to future needs. In 2022, the United Nations Environment Programme estimated the annual adaptation needs of developing countries at $160-340 billion by 2030 and $315-565 billion by 2050. To give an idea of the scale, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates global fossil fuel subsidies at $7 trillion in 2022.

The fulfilment of current commitments and explicit indications of adaptation intentions are crucial to foster confidence and encourage the involvement of developing nations in collective climate efforts. This is particularly important given that many vulnerable developing countries already face an adaptation burden that exceeds their response capacity.

An interesting trend is the increase in diplomatic attention to food systems and agriculture before COP28. In July of this year, the UN Food Systems Coordination Hub and the President of COP28 presented a Declaration on Food Systems and Agriculture, which calls on countries to synchronize their national food systems and agricultural policies with nationally determined contributions (NDC) and national adaptation plans (NAP), and to include goals for decarbonizing food systems in these plans and national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAP). The Declaration Measures to transform food systems should complement, rather than compete with, efforts to accelerate the energy transition, as transformations in both sectors are necessary to achieve climate goals.

e. Global Stocktake

The GST is aimed at assessing collective global progress in achieving goals and objectives laid down in the Paris Agreement. As a result, governments will receive recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of their own measures and international cooperation in the fight against climate change. The GST is held every five years. The process began in December 2021 at COP26, and this year, recommendations will be represented at COP28.

The GST consists of three interrelated components. The first phase collects and synthesizes information on climate change and actions from governments, international organizations, scientific institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders. Based on the materials obtained, the second phase analyzes progress implementing the Paris Agreement and identifies opportunities for improving the effectiveness of measures, support, and international cooperation on climate change.

On September 8, 2023, a summary report containing the key conclusions and recommendations of the second phase was published. It indicates that the Paris Agreement has intensified global climate efforts, and that significant progress has been made since the UNFCCC came into force three decades ago. However, the report also clearly states that much more needs to be done, and outlines ways to implement the agreement at the proper level.

The third GST component will be completed during COP28. During this “political” phase, governments will discuss and consider the results of the GST technical phase. To this end, COP28 will host several high-level events aimed at generating key policy messages.

f. Climate science

At the end of March 2023, the IPCC presented a synthesis report summarizing the sixth reporting cycle of their research. That cycle began in 2015 and was the most ambitious of all; over the past eight years, experts have prepared numerous reports on climate change issues. Ukrainian scientists Mykola Shlapak, Svitlana Krakovska, and Yakiv Didukh joined the report drafting team.

Previous IPCC reports have examined various factors that can lead to climate change. Now it is noted that the changes are undoubtedly human-induced. In particular, human activity has led to more frequent and more intense extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, heavy downpours, and droughts.

The IPCC cites the following climate change impacts:

• The carbon concentration is the highest in at least the last 2 million years.
• Ocean level rise is the highest rate in the last 3,000 years.
• The area of sea ice in the Arctic is the smallest in at least the last 1,000 years.
• The melting of glaciers is unprecedented in at least the last 2,000 years.

Svitlana Krakovska used the IPCC platform to draw attention to Russia’s war against Ukraine. At an IPCC meeting at the end of February 2022, held after Russia began its full-scale invasion, Ms. Krakovska said that both Russia’s armed aggression in Ukraine and the climate crisis have common roots: the use of fossil fuels, on which humanity depends. The scientist’s statement became another argument against using fossil fuels as a source of funding for Russia’s war against Ukraine and contributed to strengthening the climate movement.

The IPCC report also contains positive news:

• Today, there are solutions in all industries that can reduce gas emissions by at least half before 2030.
• In some cases, renewable energy has proven to be cheaper than fossil fuels.
• Energy systems in some countries already run on renewable energy sources.

The report also underlined specific points that need to be met to limit the rise in the global average temperature to 1.5°C:

1. Global gas emissions should peak before 2025 and decrease by 43% before 2030.
2. Methane emissions should be reduced by 34% before 2030.

The IPCC does not generate fresh scientific data; instead, it scrutinizes the findings of tens of thousands of scientists worldwide. This UN entity holds significant weight as the information within its reports is challenging for political representatives to overlook or refute. As each report surfaces, the UNFCCC increasingly acknowledges established scientific facts about the climate. This compels individual countries to take heed of these facts and integrate them into their considerations. At this time, the IPCC finds that the current objectives set by countries are not aligning with the aims outlined in the Paris Agreement. This should encourage COP28 to renew and strengthen its ambitions.

g. Article 6

An issue that causes heated discussions every year is market and non-market mechanisms for cooperation between countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997 and enforced in 2005, was the first example of market mechanisms in international negotiations. However, it was later replaced by Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which, in particular, has:

• Article 6.2 provides for emissions trading between two countries under certain conditions.
• Article 6.4 about creating emission reduction credits through joint projects under UNFCCC supervision to avoid deficiencies that have led to an increase in emissions instead of reducing them.
• Article 6.8 considers other non-market ways of transferring emission reduction credits among different entities.

During COP28, the parties will continue detailed discussions on the opportunities of using market mechanisms for profit. Given that after past rounds of negotiations, the Paris Rulebook still has gaps in the double-entry of reduced emissions, as well as opportunities for offsets and the use of questionable geoengineering technologies, it is likely that COP28 parties will continue to stand their ground.

Article 6 market mechanisms should be accompanied by appropriate controls. These tools should provide sufficient detail in tracking the origin of reduction credits to prevent double counting: when multiple countries can use the same reduction credit to report on national climate goals.

5. Ukraine’s interests in negotiations

For several years, the Ukrainian delegation has been dedicated to exploring options for broadening access to climate finance. Presumably, we will not be able to receive funds from the Loss and Damage Fund, but the unprecedented destruction of the environment caused by Russia’s aggression and the long-term recovery process will make Ukraine eligible for “green” financial assistance. At the same time, Ukraine can apply for an increase in funding from institutions that already support us, such as the Climate Investment Fund, the World Bank, and the European Commission.

Simultaneously, Ukraine sees the mechanisms outlined in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as one of the potential avenues to secure funding for climate projects within its reconstruction efforts. To participate in mechanism 6.2, Ukraine’s goals in NDC must correspond to those of other partner countries. At the COP28, Ukraine will search for partners (countries and companies) that are interested in cooperation under Article 6. It is valuable to ready ourselves for the initiation of carbon markets and to foster expertise in this domain within the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources. Long-term projects should consider the options of creating emission reduction credits and raising investment through these mechanisms.

6. What does the official Ukrainian delegation bring to COP?

a.  Non-inclusion of Russian emission reports in the occupied territories.

Since 2014, Russia and Ukraine have included emissions from Crimea and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine in their cadastres. At every negotiation, Ukraine demands to ban Russia from doing that. This year, the delegation will encounter this challenging responsibility as the unfortunate reality is that the number of territories temporarily occupied by Russia has expanded since 2014. We must ensure that greenhouse gas emissions from the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine are not attributed to Russia’s balance sheet.

b. Imposing obligations on Russia regarding emissions (direct and indirect) that have arisen as a result of military operations.

The next important issue is the responsibility for emissions from military operations in the territories where they were conducted. The UNFCCC does not have a clear methodology for calculating and holding accountable for such actions. Certain greenhouse gas emissions, specifically those linked to military operations, still are not mandatory for reporting, despite being required under the Paris Agreement. For example, emissions from military operations, including military conflicts, may amount to a significant share of global greenhouse gas emissions, reaching about 5.5%.

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine also has an impact on the climate, but these emissions usually remain outside the scope of countries’ national reports. In the course of a year, the greenhouse gas emissions associated with warfare are estimated to reach 120 million tons of CO₂ equivalent, roughly matching the total annual emissions of a country such as Belgium.

At COP27, Ukraine presented a global initiative to assess environmental damage from military conflicts. Russia should be held responsible for these emissions, as well as for future emissions related to restoring facilities in Ukraine that were damaged by military operations — approximately 50 million tons of CO₂ equivalent. Given the complexity of accounting for such emissions, especially due to limited access to military data, Ukraine should cooperate with other countries to develop a methodology for accounting for “military emissions.”

c. Ukrainian pavilion at СОР28

Ukraine had its own pavilion at the climate conference and its own program at COP27 for the first time. This significantly heightened our country’s visibility in comparison to numerous others. Every day, thousands of people from all over the world visited the pavilion and its interactive exhibition. An additional advantage was that the Ukrainian delegation, the media, public organizations, and our partners knew where to look for each other. The pavilion became a meeting and mutual reinforcement spot.

The Ukrainian pavilion highlighted the following key topics:

• How Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has affected global energy security
• The impact of war on the environment (some examples were reflected in the pavilion design)
• The concept of “ecocide” and recognizing damage caused by Russia as an ecocide
• Methods for calculating environmental damage (as of November 2022, seven methods had been developed)
• Green recovery of Ukrainian communities
• Renewable energy and sustainable practices that already exist in Ukraine

We would like to highlight the participation of representatives of the Crimean Tatar Resource Centre, who spoke about the situation in the temporarily occupied Crimea, political persecution, and the need to recognize the ecocide activities of the Russian occupation authorities on the peninsula.

At COP28, Ukraine will have its own pavilion with an area of about 140 m² for the second time. The thematic content is likely to continue last year’s. Speakers will raise the issue of the impact of the war on climate change, acts of ecocide inflicted by Russia, and green recovery. The following thematic clusters may be distinguished based on the preliminary pavilion program:

• Local government efforts for achieving climate neutrality and planning for green recovery/restoration
• Decarbonization of the energy sector
• Ecocide and damage caused to the environment as a result of military operations
• Making businesses more “green”
• Youth participation in climate policy promotion and green recovery
• Environmental education

This year, NGO stakeholders have actively contributed to devising the pavilion’s program and communication strategy right from the outset. This collaboration stands as evidence of the effective engagement at COP27. 

7. The Ukrainian public’s positions about COP28

The Ukrainian Climate Network (UCN), which includes 37 public organizations, has traditionally prepared a position on the eve of COP28. UCN members shared their vision of the challenges to be highlighted by our delegation at negotiations this year:

• Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine directly affects the climate crisis and, accordingly, the whole world.
• There is a direct connection between the climate crisis and warfare, with one underlying cause being fossil fuels. Therefore, we must promote the rejection of fossil fuels in every possible way.
• A broad coalition of the parties should support creating a mechanism for liability for environmental damage caused by armed conflicts.
• Protecting and recovering ecosystems cannot be used to offset greenhouse gas emissions. This needs to occur concurrently with the swift cessation of all forms of fossil fuel use and a drastic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions across every sector.
• Ukraine’s position on market-based bilateral instruments under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement must meet the criteria for complementarity and avoiding double counting of emission reduction credits.

Ecoaction also released a position paper with the suggestion that Ukraine, in addition to the negotiation issues, not forget about the additional obligations assumed, namely participation in the Powering Past Coal Alliance, Methane Pledge, and the Declaration on Forests and Land Use.

In June 2023, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine confirmed its intention to close all state-owned coal-fired power plants by 2035. Ukraine first announced such intentions at the end of 2021 at COP26 in the UK. At COP28, Ukraine will reiterate its commitment to phasing out coal from the energy sector by 2035, ensuring a fair and gradual transition. This involves a distinct blueprint for shutting down coal enterprises, educational initiatives, employment prospects, social security for coal workers, and economic diversification within mining communities.

In 2021, more than 100 countries, including Ukraine, joined the Global Methane Pledge initiative, which provides for reducing methane emissions by 30% before 2030 compared to 2020 levels. Ukraine can diminish methane emissions by implementing climate strategies within the oil, gas, and coal sectors and agriculture and by instituting an effective waste management system.

At COP26in Glasgow in 2021, Ukraine signed the Declaration on Forests and Land Use. However, since then, there have been no significant changes in the implementing that declaration. It was not until July 2023 that the State Forest Resources Agency of Ukraine drafted the Law of Ukraine “On Attracting Investment and Economic Incentives for Implementing Afforestation and Forest Management”, which aims to regulate issuing and circulating carbon certificates, promote the conservation of unaccounted forests on abandoned agricultural land, and create new forests in a climate-friendly and harmless way for biodiversity.

Ecoaction also invited the Ukrainian delegation to join the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA) initiative. “Given the EU’s position on phasing out all fossil fuels and the need to strengthen energy security through the energy transition, Ukraine could join BOGA, an international coalition of governments and partners working together to promote phasing out oil and gas production. The coalition includes Denmark, France, Sweden, Ireland, Costa Rica, and other national and regional governments that have signed the BOGA Declaration. In doing so, they have pledged to strive towards curbing oil and gas production, devising a structured, just, and controlled approach for gradually reducing the extraction of these fossil fuels.”

Furthermore, this year, for the first time, the Regional Conference of Youth Eastern Europe was held in Warsaw. The participants also made a joint statement that highlighted, among other things, the following key points:

• Better involvement of young people in climate policy.
• Implement sustainable practices in agriculture and water management.
• Strengthen regional cooperation in renewable energy.
• Phase out all fossil fuels, including Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).
• Endorse the acknowledgment of ecocide as a criminal offense at the national level and advocate for its inclusion as the fifth crime in the Rome Statute.
• Promote local ownership and decentralize renewable energy sources, ensuring that local stakeholders are involved in management processes.

8. COP28 and the war: Impact of the war on the climate in Ukraine

We are entering a new round of negotiations amid the continuation of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Understanding that the host country is the UAE, this context will be present both “between the lines” and, quite possibly, publicly.

At COP27, officials mentioned the war in Ukraine in almost every speech, and the energy crisis and energy security even more. Russia did not have its own pavilion and behaved as unobtrusively as possible during the negotiations. There is no guarantee that this year will be the same. However, historically, Russia has not presented itself in the most favorable light, for example, by obstructing proposals to include human rights in a resolution, among other instances. Accordingly, this will be monitored by both the public and national delegations.

At the same time, the military escalation between Israel and Palestine will definitely have an impact on the nature of the negotiations. It is difficult to foresee specific solutions, but no one has any doubt that countries do not leave their context “at home” when they come to the climate conference. The topics of military conflict, human rights, fossil fuel mining, and climate policy are now more cohesive than ever. We cannot talk about one thing without mentioning the other.

This is why COP28 holds significance as a pivotal platform, among the limited few, where representatives from all sectors of society converge for two weeks, often requiring interaction to achieve some form of consensus. Time will tell what specific issues it will be able to resolve.