In November 2025, the city of Belém in the heart of the Amazon became a focal point of the global climate debate. COP30, branded by Brazil’s president as the “COP of Truth,” was meant to mark a shift from promises to action — raising high expectations for real progress on climate commitments.
- Summary
- Did Expectations and Concerns Come True?
- Negotiation Outcomes
- Just transition
- Global adaptation goal
- Climate finance
- Carbon markets and Article 6
- Other areas of negotiations
- The Role and Impact of the Public
- Ukraine at COP30
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Outcomes
1. Summary
The thirtieth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30) took place in November 2025 in the city of Belém, Brazil, in the very heart of the Amazon. This “COP of Truth,” as it was nicknamed by President of Brazil Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was supposed to become a platform for an open conversation about meeting climate commitments and collaboration in the spirit of “mutirão” (a Portuguese term meaning joint effort to achieve a common goal). The organizers sought to attract a record number of participants, especially representatives of indigenous peoples. They succeeded in part: despite logistical challenges, over 56,000 people were given accreditations, and even more participated in the climate march.
We will discuss below how the negotiations went in Belém, Brazil, what (or who) prevented ambitious decisions from being made, and whether this COP really became a summit of “implementation.”
2. Did Expectations and Concerns Come True?
In our overview article about this year’s conference (available here) we wrote about potential issues that could possibly emerge in terms of organization and negotiation themselves. Some of them came true, some did not, but there were also some rather unexpected challenges that the Brazilian hosts handled in different ways.
In short, this year’s UNFCCC Conference of the Parties wrapped up in an atmosphere that reflects the state of the global climate policy: technical progress alongside dead ends in political agreements and a feeling that the world cannot keep up with its own promises, once again. Belém, with its tropical storms, fire at the negotiation location, and constant delays in plenary sessions, turned into a living metaphor: the system is now operating at the limits of its capacity and therefore cannot always provide the desired result.
The city was actively preparing for the conference. In the days leading up to COP30, new venues opened up almost daily, roads were widened, parks, restaurants, and bars were emerging, and new exhibitions were prepared, awaiting about 50,000 visitors. Belém, with a population of over 1.3 million, has received approximately $1 billion in investment in recent years aimed at revitalizing one of Brazil's oldest — and poorest — state capitals. To make matters worse, the outflow of residents seeking jobs and a better quality of life also made it one of the cities with the most dramatic population decline in Brazil. Therefore, COP30 became an opportunity to make the region more attractive for tourists by reconstructing the city infrastructure.
For Brazil, hosting COP30 was a matter of honour and an opportunity to portray itself as a global leader in climate policy. President Lula da Silva positioned the Belém Summit as one that would highlight gaps in the implementation of the Paris Agreement and demand greater ambition from all the countries participating in the event. The key idea of Brazil’s presidency at the COP was the concept of a “global mutirão,” that is, mobilizing the entire world for joint efforts to save the climate. This term was also used in the title of the final package of decisions following the Conference, Global Mutirão, uniting a number of complex issues into a single document. However, this ambitious plan encountered significant obstacles during the negotiations. The draft texts remained a contentious point until the very last moment, and the deadlines for decision-making were repeatedly postponed.
Speaking at plenary sessions, Lula da Silva and Brazilian Environment Minister Marina Silva emphasized the need for a global roadmap to phase out fossil fuels, uniting a number of countries around this idea, from Germany and the UK to Kenya. However, Brazil’s own course in this direction has proven rather controversial. A few days before COP30, Lula’s government approved the exploration of an oil well on the Equatorial Margin of the Amazon. This decision was vehemently criticized by the public, while the government explained its decision as an attempt to accumulate funds to finance the energy transition. Brazil’s dual role, as a leader of climate ambition and as a major oil producer, serves as a prominent illustration of the challenges faced by countries that try to combine their economic interests and environmental ambition.
At the end of the talks, a fire started in one pavilion, briefly pausing the negotiation process and forcing the attendees to evacuate. The fire was contained within a few minutes. It was caused by a power grid malfunction. Earlier, during the first week, indigenous activists entered the “blue zone” without accreditation to protest against denial of access and to demand protection of their territories. This led to clashes with security. Following these incidents, UNFCCC Secretary-General Simon Steele officially expressed concerns about the safety of delegates and the venue.
The overall geopolitical backdrop left much to be desired as well: the absence of some leaders from high-emitting countries, protracted conflicts (such as the wars in Ukraine and in Gaza), and economic tensions caused “geopolitical headwinds” that complicated the negotiations. Thus, COP30 outcomes largely reflect the current geopolitical situation and the crisis of multilateralism. The most striking absence was that of an official US delegation. For the first time in a decade, one of the world’s largest economies failed to fully participate in the negotiations. Other key players, including Chinese President Xi and Russian President Putin, also skipped the summit. The absence of the US provided some relief, given they would therefore not disrupt the talks immediately, but a group of the fossil fuel sector lobbyists effectively operated at the summit anyway.
This withdrawal on the part of Washington led to a tangible leadership vacuum: there was no strong voice capable of tipping the scales in discussions about reducing emissions or financial aid. The EU and China tried to fill this gap. Beijing, in particular, supported the idea of a just transition and announced the early achievement of peak emissions by 2029. The EU tried to ramp up its ambitions: EU countries updated their NDCs and led a coalition to abandon fossil fuels. However, at critical moments, both the EU and China demonstrated caution. On the one hand, Europeans insisted on the mentions of 1.5 °C and human rights, on the other hand, they blocked climate finance decisions. China was traditionally not prepared to take steps that it would consider a threat to its sovereignty. Thus, there was no coherent force driving progress at COP30, with different leaders pulling the negotiations in different directions.
Another characteristic feature of COP30 was the unprecedented participation of corporate lobbyists. Belém featured over 300 lobbyists of industrial agriculture, a 14% increase from last year. They represented the interests of companies driving deforestation and responsible for a third of global emissions. The number of fossil fuel industry reps was even greater, about 1,600, that is, one of 25 summit participants. Civil society organizations have voiced major criticism of this representation. “How can the climate crisis be solved while those creating it are influencing the talks and delaying decisions?” said executive director of Greenpeace Brazil, pointing to the 12% increase in the number of oil lobbyists compared to COP29.
Ensuring the presence of indigenous people at the summit proved to be a challenge. 2,500 representatives applied. They even organized a flotilla on the Amazon towards Belém. For the first time, the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples ended up in the spotlight, and the government of Brazil even issued resolutions on recognizing 10 new territories of the indigenous peoples during the conference. However, inequality persisted. “Only 14% of indigenous Brazilians who wanted to join COP30 were accredited for the ‘blue zone’... To be here, you need accreditation, and only two people in my region obtained it,” said Lucas Tupinambá, a young indigenous leader who travelled by boat for two days to attend the summit. Later, on the second day of COP30, global media were shocked to hear about activists allegedly entering the territory of the conference by force, even though they were only guided by their sincere desire to be heard. This event had impact on the further course of negotiations, particularly, intensifying the participation of global civil society. Every day, about 10 campaigns with various slogans took place in the “blue zone,” while the hosts ramped up the militarization of the space to maintain order at the request of the UN.
3. Negotiation Outcomes
As COP30 was drawing to a close, thoughts on its level of success or failure were divided. The summit resulted in the Global Mutirão decision (unofficially — Belém Package). The Presidency noted from the outset that this was not a traditional decision in the typical COP format, but it functioned similarly to the usual final document of such summits.
On the one hand, agreements were reached on a number of key issues — adaptation, just transition, and the functioning of carbon markets. On the other hand, the inability to reach a consensus regarding the gradual phasing out of fossil fuels became a bitter disappointment for many. The main tension of the process is that several countries can veto long-developed decisions, and therefore, it is high time the decision-making process at the COP were reviewed.
Let us consider the main vectors of the negotiations in more detail.
3.1. Just transition
Discussions about the subject of just transition were among the key topics at the conference. One important accomplishment in this sector was the adoption of the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), which puts human rights and equality at the heart of the fight against climate change. Countries will now be required to coordinate their work on supporting a just transition, share promising experiences, and support the implementation of such policies, especially in low-income countries with limited state capacity. Finally, global efforts by countries towards a just transition, which have been fragmented and inconsistent to date, can contribute to a long-awaited outcome: mandatory support for communities and workers whose livelihoods depend on fossil fuels and/or other carbon-intensive sectors. Thus, the development of BAM means that justice in the global transition to a sustainable economy now is not only a slogan but has an official spot in the UN climate system.
Notably, BAM was initially a civil society initiative. The draft mechanism was developed by a number of CSOs, including the Climate Action Network (the largest international coalition of environmental non-profits that unites over 2,000 organizations, including ones from Ukraine), the Women and Gender Constituency network (a coalition of dozens of organizations on gender justice recognized by the UNFCCC Secretariat as the official observer), allies from the worker and youth movements, as well as the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice. The international community calls this outcome one of the biggest accomplishments in the history of UN climate negotiations—a true breakthrough in the fight for rights and justice in the context of climate change.
The summit was not without its disappointments. Over 80 countries, including vulnerable countries from Africa, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific Region, as well as the EU and the UK, insisted on adopting a roadmap for the gradual phasing out of fossil fuels. However, countries largely dependent on oil and gas production promoted the idea that countries should be allowed to use available fossil fuel resources to develop their economy. The Arab states and Russia were among the most active blockers of the roadmap (though there is information about an unofficial list with as many as 84 countries opposing this idea). Therefore, the final text on just transition does not directly mention the abandonment of fossil fuels, again. This, in turn, led to major criticism from a number of countries and even accusations towards Brazil, which allegedly filed the final document in the form of an ultimatum.
In response to this weak decision, 24 countries joined as a coalition outside the UNFCCC, led by Colombia, and signed the Belém Declaration—a commitment to phase out fossil fuels and strive for a just, equitable energy transition. The signatories declare that they will not allow “a handful of countries to hold the world hostage” and will continue to move forward even if the oil powers block the consensus.
3.2. Global adaptation goal
A specific list of indicators to measure countries’ progress in adapting to climate change was another significant expectation for this year’s climate negotiations. As a result, we do have 59 voluntary indicators that encompass various sectors, including food, access to water, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, and livelihoods, and integrate such cross-sectoral issues as finance, technology, and capacity-building. However, individual countries and the international community still have many questions and objections to the text of this decision. However, it is important that COP30 laid the groundwork for tools tracking the progress in adaptation and set a political benchmark for financing. Adaptation is no longer a side issue; it was included in the main outcome of COP30.
Changes to the final list of indicators, on which a group of experts had been working diligently for 2 years, were added in the last hours and were not agreed upon at the previous consultations. This undermines the credibility of the announced indicators and will undoubtedly complicate their implementation. Several countries, particularly ones from South America and the EU, expressed significant concerns about this decision-making procedure and did not support the proposed list of indicators at the final plenary session. At the same time, the COP30 President stated that, given the existing objections and concerns expressed at the plenary meeting, the decision could be further refined during the next session in Bonn. Further steps of technical work on the indicators remain unclear, but it has been hinted that the list of indicators will be reconsidered by 2027.
3.3. Climate finance
Adaptation measures. While indicators are being coordinated, adaptation financing remains yet another crucial aspect. The need to help vulnerable countries handle increasing floods, heat waves, and storms was cited as a key topic of the talks in Belém. Traditionally, projects protecting lives in the situation of climate change, such as the construction of flood protection systems or drought-resistant water supply systems, have more difficulty with engaging funds compared to projects reducing emissions, for instance, related to energy efficiency or RES.
The group of developing countries, including G-77+China, insisted on tripling the funding of adaptation to USD 120 billion a year, claiming that any new Global Adaptation Goal would be senseless without financial backing. Throughout the negotiations, African and Asian countries insisted on specific financial commitments, noting that developed countries are not fulfilling their COP26 promise to double adaptation funding by 2025. As a result, however, there is only a weakening of commitments by developed countries regarding adaptation funding and postponement of the deadline for tripled funding until 2035. The international community emphasizes that this is nothing but “a betrayal of vulnerable and impacted people in the Global South and driven mainly by the EU and Japan.” The reference to 2025 as the baseline was also removed from the final text. This added uncertainty about what exactly the 2035 target means.
Loss and damage fund. Against the backdrop of unambitious adaptation financing, the development of the Loss and Damage Fund appears a relative success. Negotiations on its operational launch have advanced significantly, with the first call for applications with a total grant package of $250 million having already been announced. This signals that the long-awaited Fund, agreed upon back at COP27 and established at COP28, is finally moving beyond political promises and starting to allocate actual resources to communities at the forefront of the struggles due to the climate crisis.
Looking at the announced figures relative to the real needs, the optimism quickly fades, however: in 2025 alone, the expected climate-driven damage of developing countries is roughly estimated at USD 395 billion. The Fund’s pilot financing would thus cover less than 0.1% of this amount. Therefore, we believe that the launch of the Fund this year is more about the symbolic meaning of its operation and a show of political will rather than a real tool to compensate for losses at this stage.
Funding sources. Expanding the sources of climate funding is a permanent subject of negotiations. This is advocated, in particular, by developed countries that do not want to take on new commitments. Instead, they promote the idea of mobilizing private funding and charitable contributions from wealthy developing countries.
A notable point here is the Baku—Belém Roadmap launched as part of the NCQG (New Collective Quantified Goal approved at COP29), an initiative that was meant to identify how to achieve climate funding in the amount of USD 1.3 trillion. Independent analysis has shown that approximately half of this amount could come from private sources, with the remainder coming from multilateral, bilateral, and concessional financial flows. The recommendation to take into account this roadmap was also set out in the COP30 general decision.
A big success, according to the host party, was the creation of the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, a long-term mechanism of tropical forests protection funding, and engaging USD 6.7 billion into this instrument. The funds will be raised not only from donors but also through the production of “green bonds.” At the same time, activists emphasize: for the Facility to be truly just, it should provide direct access to indigenous peoples, the primary guardians of tropical forests. It has been agreed that indigenous communities will receive at least 20% of the available funding, but now, it is crucial to establish transparent governing bodies involving those indigenous people, too, which would ensure they could receive the funds without bureaucratic obstacles.
The financial outcomes of COP30 can be characterized as meant for the formation of a framework structure rather than provision of cash flows. In particular, the lack of fresh contributions into current mechanisms, such as the Loss and Damage Fund and the Adaptation Fund, alongside the loss of an important donor, the US, causes particular concerns among vulnerable countries.
3.4. Carbon markets and Article 6
Traditional discussions regarding market mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement continued as well, in preparation for the real implementation of this part. Interestingly, further formal negotiations on Article 6 were not planned until 2028, the year of their scheduled review. However, as the negotiations took place in the Amazon, it was impossible to ignore the potential of carbon markets to as a means to address one of the key drivers of the climate crisis. Large parts of the tropical forest are no longer carbon sinks due to massive deforestation; carbon dioxide is mostly released into the atmosphere during forest fires.
Eventually, it has been agreed to launch a new global carbon credit market under Article 6.4 using basic methodologies for projects that will receive such credits. The rules for bilateral trading of emission reductions under Article 6.2 have also been improved, which should prevent countries from submitting double reporting. A separate framework has been developed for non-market cooperation mechanisms under Article 6.8, such as knowledge exchange as well as technological and financial support.
Combining these solutions brings Article 6 to a more concrete path towards implementation: for the private sector, such solutions boost the technical progress necessary to regulate the demand and supply of credits under Article 6.4 and the importance of due diligence by regulators in countries participating in cooperative approaches under Article 6.2. This progress strengthens the architecture of international cooperation under the Paris Agreement umbrella. We hope that clear rules will unlock climate investment while ensuring proper accountability.
3.5. Other areas of negotiations
Mitigation and Transition Away from Fossil Fuels. Accomplishments of COP30 in climate change mitigation have been quite modest. The political dynamic has somewhat shifted, however: the mention of gradual transition away from fossil fuels, once a taboo subject, is now overtly on the climate agenda.
The compromise reached in the final hours is that the COP30 agreement indirectly supports the previous commitment to transition away from fossil fuels, citing the UAE consensus of COP28. In practice, this means that countries agreed to reduce the use of fossil fuels (back in Dubai) without including actual solutions in the text. The next steps in this direction went beyond the official UN text and focused on voluntary cooperation. In particular, Brazil announced that it would lead an informal coalition (with stakeholders) within the next year (by COP31) to develop a roadmap with guidance to phase out fossil fuels.
The outcomes also contained several other elements, such as the launch of the Belém Mission for 1.5°C, which urges all countries to implement internal plans for combating climate change, and an agreement to continue the Mitigation Work Programme, or MWP, at least until 2026.
Forests, nature and indigenous peoples. Holding COP30 in the Amazon did lead to concrete achievements on the protection of forests, biodiversity, and the rights of indigenous peoples. Although efforts to formally integrate the Rio conventions (climate, biodiversity, desertification) have reached the dead end due to objections from some countries, COP30 still put forward a number of important initiatives:
- the aforementioned Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF);
- an informal Deforestation Roadmap;
- new commitments on indigenous peoples’ rights to land: 15 governments have committed to recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples and communities to over 160 million hectares of land by 2030. This initiative also received financial support in the amount of USD 1.8 billion from various sources;
- in the area of biodiversity and oceans, mostly bilateral agreements have been reached; six countries have also joined the Blue NDC Challenge, integrating ocean and climate action into their NDCs.
The final document mentions the word "deforestation" only once, and even that in the context of "the need to step up" without any specifics. Therefore, criticism is still valid, since key decisions are now solely up to voluntary initiatives, while mandatory global goals to stop deforestation have not been given due space.
Combating disinformation and protecting scientific credibility. This year, anti-science statements have been particularly common in negotiations by certain countries. Governments have spoken that it was not necessary to trust the data presented in IPCC reports, particularly about fossil fuels as the key reason for the climate crisis. There were also the calls to step away from the UN ICJ’s decision on states’ climate commitments and to reduce reliance on science as the basis for climate policies.
To counter these trends, UNESCO, together with the Government of Brazil and the UN, launched the Global Initiative for Information Integrity on Climate Change, which aims to help investigate, expose and refute climate change-related disinformation. “Trust in scientific knowledge is the foundation of urgent climate action by governments and citizens. Nevertheless, the discredit of evidence is distorting public perception and weakening science-based policies,” says UNESCO.
Significant progress in countering climate fakes has been made by signing the first Declaration on Information Integrity on Climate Change in history. It was initially signed by 10 countries and later, as of early December, by a total of 21 countries, which committed to combating fakes in this sector. We hope that more countries, including Ukraine, will join this important initiative in the future.
Gender equality was another area in the spotlight. A new expanded Gender Action Plan (GAP) was adopted, which continues efforts to integrate gender aspects into climate policy, emphasizes gender-sensitive financing, and promotes women's leadership, especially that of indigenous and rural women and women of African descent.
A number of other important initiatives were launched or reviewed, particularly the Global Youth Declaration (presented), the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) — a UN framework damage and loss program initiated back in 2013 (reviewed for the third time), the Belém Health Action Plan (BHAP) (adopted), the Global Initiative on Jobs & Skills for the New Economy (initiated) and the Belém Declaration on Global Green Industrialization (initiated).
The fate of COP31 was also decided in Belém: Turkey will physically host the summit in Antalya, while Australia will hold the official presidency. This is a compromise to take into account the interests of the Pacific region after a long dispute. This unusual co-presidency has surprised the international community, particularly given that Turkey’s updated climate plan allows it to increase emissions by 16% by 2035. There are concerns that this could lead to an increased vagueness of the final agreements and lower ambition of possible solutions. Leaders of small island states have expressed dissatisfaction that the Oceania region has never hosted COP, even though the islands in the Pacific are precisely the areas most affected by the climate crisis. However, Antalya promises to focus on the problems of the islands: a special "pre-COP" meeting is planned in the Pacific islands to draw attention to this region.
At the same time, a group of African countries officially supported Ethiopia (Addis Ababa) as the host of COP32 in 2027. The African COP32 is expected to have a strong focus on adaptation, agricultural issues, and financial support for poor countries, as Ethiopia and neighbouring countries are highly vulnerable to climate shocks.
In his impassioned closing speech, Brazilian President Lula reminded delegates of the Amazon's sweltering everyday life and the world's expectations for action. While the conference did not achieve the breakthrough on fossil fuels that the global community had hoped for, it did sharpen fault lines and unite a broad coalition determined to move forward. Some negotiators have hinted that the fight to phase out fossil fuels will resume and intensify at COP31.
4. The Role and Impact of the Public
A powerful wave of public activism raged around the official negotiations, which made COP30 different from the three previous conferences, all of which took place in less democratic regimes. More than 70,000 people participated in the Global Climate March on November 15. This is the first such campaign since COP26 in 2021 and the largest in COP history. The rally was led by indigenous peoples of the Amazon, joined by youth movements, international NGOs, feminist and anti-colonial initiatives. Marches and rallies were taking place in over 100 cities and 27 countries across the world at the same time. Activists and indigenous peoples demanded stronger action from governments to address the climate crisis, chanting slogans in defence of the Amazon and calling for an end to the fossil fuel era. Ukrainian marchers also stressed the need to hold Russia accountable for ecocide and climate war crimes. In parallel, the People's Summit(Cúpula dos Povos) was held in Belém, with tens of thousands of civil society representatives. In its declaration, the summit linked climate change to the problems of colonialism, wars, and the rise of far-right movements, although there was no direct mention of the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
One of the key aspects of civic mobilization at COP30 was the fight for just transition. Global activist networks promoted the creation of the aforementioned Belém Action Mechanism (BAM).
The daily Fossil of the Day anti-award, organized by the Climate Action Network, continues to be a tool of public shaming. The dubious prizes were awarded to countries that most hindered negotiations or promoted the interests of the fossil fuel sector, including New Zealand, Canada, the EU, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. A special solidarity award, on the other hand, was awarded to the indigenous peoples of the Amazon for their brave resistance both in the streets of Belém and at the summit venue. For international NGOs, these instruments are more than just “theatre”: they form the public reputation of countries, generate news, and help to mobilize national campaigns following the COP.
The Ukrainian public at COP30 consistently emphasized that Russia's war against Ukraine was not only a security and humanitarian crisis, but also a large-scale climate and environmental threat that should be taken into account in global politics. The key message was that Ukraine's reconstruction must be green and just: with reduced dependence on fossil fuels, development of renewable energy, nature-based solutions, and support for vulnerable communities. Ukrainian NGOs spoke about the need to account for war emissions, ecocide, and ecosystem destruction so that these losses would be reflected in future compensation, climate finance, and recovery mechanisms. An important emphasis was placed on the role of civil society as a bridge between communities, government, and international partners, shaping the agenda rather than merely reacting.
A key event for the third sector was the panel “Ukrainian Civil Society: Climate Resilience in Times of War and Recovery,” organized by the Ukrainian Climate Network. It featured projects showing that civil society remained the driver of climate action even during the full-scale invasion, from local adaptation and decarbonization to development of political solutions.
Despite the general institutional crisis in the formation and implementation of environmental policies in the Ukrainian government due to the dissolution of the Ministry of Environment in the summer of 2025, Ukraine was properly represented at COP30. The delegation consisted of representatives of the newly established Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture and the Reform Support Team, headed by Deputy Minister Pavlo Kartashov. However, once again, the government failed to use the platform of the Leaders Summit within the COP to share Ukrainian narratives. In our opinion, the voice of a country that is experiencing war and at the same time facing the environmental consequences of the aggression should be even more prominent at the world's main climate event. Therefore, the focus remains on using the COP as a platform for finding bilateral and multilateral cooperation, financing, and technology exchange.
The government delegation focused on the setup of the Ukrainian pavilion. This year, its concept was dedicated to the Ukrainian environment in the form of a time capsule preserving the voice of nature, wounded by the war, but at the same time striving for a green future for Ukraine. This vividly demonstrated the contrast between Ukraine’s destruction and resilience to the visitors. Among the main thematic blocks on which representatives of our government worked together with scientists, the public, and business were the impact of war on the climate, in particular the methodology for calculating damages, updating climate policy, food security, sustainable recovery, innovation, and tech solutions.
5. Ukraine at COP30
One of the key areas of work where Ukraine opposes Russia yet again in terms of climate negotiations is objecting to Russian reports on greenhouse gas emissions which systematically include data from the occupied Ukrainian territories. This year’s outrageous moment was the absence of a footnote referring to UN GA Resolution 68/262, which confirms Ukraine’s territorial integrity, in reports on Russian emissions. During the opening of the plenary session of the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies (on the first day of the conference), a representative of the negotiating team spoke on this key issue for our state: the international community's non-recognition of the legitimacy of Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territories.
Another key issue in the work of Ukrainian representatives during COP30 was compensation for climate damage caused by the Russian aggression. Ukraine announced plans to apply for the Register of Damages, a mechanism introduced by the Council of Europe in May 2023 (since February 2025, the Register also features an environmental claim form). The expert community emphasizes that this is currently the only possible tool to receive compensation from Russia. While it is too early to speak about a clear amount, the recent report of the Initiative for Greenhouse Gas Accounting for War (IGGAW) mentions the quantitative equivalent of war emissions in the amount of USD 43.8 billion.
The aforementioned statement was made by the Deputy Minister of Economy, Environment and Agriculture during a side event on responsibility for climate damage caused by the Russian war against Ukraine. International guests who participated in the discussion supported Ukraine's initiative and noted that it would become an important international precedent.
6. Outcomes
The results of COP30 demonstrated the hybrid nature of progress: technical solutions were adopted, but political breakthroughs once again remained out of reach. In Belém, countries agreed to launch financing from the Loss and Damage Fund, adopted the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), endorsed the first global set of adaptation indicators, and advanced the operationalization of Article 6. However, key decisions to phase out fossil fuels were not made, again: in the final text, this subject is only indirectly mentioned via the “UAE consensus.” This vividly highlighted the main problem of multilateralism: the ability of several states to block long-awaited global solutions.
The political context was a decisive factor in the limited ambition of COP30. The absence of the US, the caution of the EU and China, the difficult geopolitical circumstances, as well as the unprecedented presence of fossil fuel and agribusiness lobbyists have significantly shrunk the space for bold decisions. Despite strong pressure from over 80 countries, led by Colombia, the demand for a clear roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels has not found consensus support. The financial outcomes ended up half-hearted at best: although a set of indicators was established for adaptation, and new funds received initial contributions, the key issues of the scale of adaptation financing and compensation were postponed once more. All of this points to a crisis of confidence and the limited effectiveness of the current negotiation format.
At the same time, COP30 became a mobilization point for global civil society and a platform for new forms of leadership. Belém will still go down in history as the “People’s COP,” with tens of thousands of marchers, unprecedented participation by indigenous peoples, and the emergence of alternative political coalitions outside the UNFCCC. The main impulse for ambition came from below — from communities, the youth, feminist movements, and indigenous peoples. The lesson of COP30 is that real progress increasingly depends not on consensus between governments, but on pressure from societies and coalitions of countries ready to act.
Ten years after the Paris Agreement, the bottom line remains alarming: national interests still often prevail over common survival. In this context, the co-presidency of COP31 looks less like an innovation and more like another compromise, which emphasizes that we must continue to search for real practices for a multilateral climate regime that will ensure the effectiveness of future COPs and the survival of humanity.